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If there is no abstract or notes, it means I took up the reference from some other documents. I usually quote the primary source however. You will find here the transcription of my endnotes files.

Last update: Dec 14, 2013

Anonymous (1978), ‘Regents of the State of California v. Bakke’, (U.S. Supreme Court).

http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/constitutional-law/constitutional-law-keyed-to-chemerinsky/equal-protection/regents-of-univ-of-california-v-bakke/2/

A white medical student was denied admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis due to the implementation of a special admissions program designed to assure the admission of a specified number of minority students, thereby limiting the number of white students. Strict scrutiny was used to invalidate the medical school’s admission policy.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, as here, it must be regarded as suspect. When a state’s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on the person’s color of skin or ancestry, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. Merely filling a racial quota is not a substantial state interest and thus, is per se unconstitutional.

Facts. Respondent, Mr. Bakke, challenged a special admissions policy implemented by the Petitioner, Medical School of the University of California at Davis, claiming that he was unconstitutionally denied admission based on this policy. The policy was designed to assure the admission of a specified number of minority groups. The State Supreme Court of California held the special admissions program unlawful, enjoined Petitioner from considering the race of any applicant and ordered Respondent’s admission.

Issue. Whether strict scrutiny should be the level of judicial scrutiny applied to the special admissions program.

Whether the purpose of “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical profession is constitutionally permissible as to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Whether the purpose of countering the effects of societal discrimination is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Whether the purpose of increasing the number of doctors in underserved communities is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Whether the purpose of creating a diverse student population is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Held. Yes. Judgment of the State of California Supreme Court affirmed. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background (as here), it must be regarded as suspect. Since a suspect class is being discriminated against, strict scrutiny must be applied to the special admissions program.

No. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake and is forbidden by the United States Constitution. If Petitioner’s purpose is to ensure a certain percentage of a particular group based on its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose is invalid.

No. The state has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating or eliminating the disabling effects of social discrimination. The government has no greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from another. Therefore, the purpose in helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Petitioner perceived as victims of “societal discrimination” does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons such as Respondent.

No. There is virtually no evidence indicating that Petitioner’s special admissions policy is either needed or geared to promote that goal.

Yes. Diversity is clearly a constitutionally permissible interest for an institution of higher education, as the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admission program. The question remains, however, whether the program’s racial classification is necessary to promote this interest. Here, Petitioner’s special admissions program focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of overall diversity. Therefore, the special admissions program is unconstitutional.

Dissent. Since whites are not a minority, only intermediate review should be used. Therefore, the affirmative admissions program is entirely constitutional.

Concurrence. The question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case and discussion of that issue is inappropriate.

Discussion. This highly divided case applies strict scrutiny to a higher education admissions policy rendering the policy invalid because the policy was based, in part, on a quota system.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/495961/Bakke-decision

Bakke decision, formally Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,  ruling in which, on June 28, 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court declared affirmative action constitutional but invalidated the use of racial quotas. The medical school at the University of California, Davis, as part of the university’s affirmative action program, had reserved 16 percent of its admission places for minority applicants. Allan Bakke, a white California man who had twice unsuccessfully applied for admission to the medical school, filed suit against the university. Citing evidence that his grades and test scores surpassed those of many minority students who had been accepted for admission, Bakke charged that he had suffered unfair “reverse discrimination” on the basis of race, which he argued was contrary to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, in a highly fractured ruling (six separate opinions were issued), agreed that the university’s use of strict racial quotas was unconstitutional and ordered that the medical school admit Bakke, but it also contended that race could be used as one criterion in the admissions decisions of institutions of higher education. Although the ruling legalized the use of affirmative action, in subsequent decisions during the next several decades the court limited the scope of such programs, and several U.S. states prohibited affirmative action programs based on race.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, case decided in 1978 by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held in a closely divided decision that race could be one of the factors considered in choosing a diverse student body in university admissions decisions. The Court also held, however, that the use of quotas in such affirmative action programs was not permissible; thus the Univ. of California, Davis, medical school had, by maintaining a 16% minority quota, discriminated against Allan Bakke, 1940–, a white applicant. The legal implications of the decision were clouded by the Court’s division. Bakke had twice been rejected by the medical school, even though he had a higher grade point average than a number of minority candidates who were admitted. As a result of the decision, Bakke was admitted to the medical school and graduated in 1982.

The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. All rights reserved.

Reference links:

http://www.factmonster.com/us/supreme-court/cases/ar32.html

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) – Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) Case Summary Allan Bakke filed suit (…).

http://www.factmonster.com/encyclopedia/people/bakke-allan.html

Anonymous (1982), ‘Judge Rejects suits for Translation’, New York Times, 24 oct.,  p. 49.

A l’origine du No. 60 de l’IJSL sur la question de la langue officielle et des droits linguistiques en 1986.

1986. The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English Language Amendment. International Journal of the Sociology of Language (60).

A l’origine du No. 60 de l’IJSL sur la question de la langue officielle et des droits linguistiques en 1986. In Oct. 1982, Edward R. Neaher, Federal Judge in Brooklyn, NY, rejected a law suit pleading that social security forms are discriminatory because they are not printed in Spanish:”The National Language of the USA is English”

(AACLME), Australian Advisory Council on Languages and Multicultural Education. 1991. Language is good business, at Melbourne. (AALC), reference from François Grin.

(1999). MULTICULTURALISM, a symposium on democracy in culturally diverse societies, Delhi. Click on link .

Australian Language and Literacy Council. 1994. Speaking of business. The needs of business and industry for language skills. Canberra: National Board of Employment, Education and Training. Reference from François Grin

Abanto, Alicia (2011), ‘ Informe defensorial No. 152 Aportes para una policia nacional EIB a favor de los pueblos indigenas del Peru. World’, paper given at Conference on the Education of the Indigenous People (WIPCE 2011), Cusco, Peru.

First met in Lima thanks to Miryam Yataco.

She’s delighted to meet so many authors and finds it a great opportunity to find ideas for Peru and beyond. As in many ombudsman cases, the Defensoria considers the indigenous questions as a priority. Their goal is that the State improves its attention to the education of the Indigenous Peoples. She explains her investigation.on competencies. Defending the Rights and checking that the public institutions respect the regulations. In Peru, young Indigenous people do not receive a quality education. Alicia and her colleagues wondered how the institutions were managing the issue and justified such a situation. ‘We are not only lawyers but also supervisors’. They thus decided to supervise the implementation of the public policy regarding Bilingual Education in Peru.  She then went on explaining how this implies working with various entities and making sure that the number of teachers is adequate.This meant working with 5 directions depending from the Ministry of Eduction and all the regional governments, i.e. 16 Directions on regional education, 50 local education management units and 54 education institutions (Andean and Amazonian schools of all kinds ). The result of the survey clearly indicate a lack of bilingual educators and even those who exist are not adequately trained considering the diversity of the Amazonian languages especially. She gives an intermediary number of 57 indigenous languages in Peru. The Teachers Training schools for indigenous language are extremely few (about 5 on a total of 30 such schools) and moreover, there is no correspondence between the presence of indigenous languages and the nearby schools and universities or teachers’ training schools. She also notes a dramatic lack of enrollment in teaching carreers for indigenous languages. Since 2007, a terrible decision from the government forbids school entry for those who didn’t get a mark of 14. This was very detrimental for indigenous languages, particularly in the Amazone region. She deplores a lack of political commitment and a lack of vision regarding this regulation that shouldn’t apply to indigenous peoples. She even goes further in considering the fact that teachers of indigenous languages who in fact do not qualify can be assimilated to blatant corruption in getting a position they do not deserve. She clearly points at the regional governement Whereas they are obvious efforts in the Andean languages education, it is clear that Amazonian languages are clearly discrimated since only 15 of the existing 55 amazonian languages are studied and taught. Another problem is that self-appointed indigenous language specialists are clearly unqualified. Throughout the whole country there is a decrease in bilingual intercultural education (BIE). Information is insufficient regarding the demand in BIE and the technical definitions of BIE services are not clearly determined. There is as well a lack of coordinatin between the various services. Recommendations for a new BIE plan:

  • Creation of a national committee on BIE

  • Adequate training of teachers in all the indigenous languages

  • Ensuring the availability of educative material

  • Cleaning up the mess

  • Creating a linguistic and ethnic map based on an offical census of indigenous populations.

This presentation went well over the time limit and all participants received a copy of her book as well as a CD from UNESCO entitled “I have the right to be taught in my language”
Ravie de rencontrer autant d’auteurs. Une chance pour trouver des idées au Pérou et dans le Monde . Comme beaucoup d’ombudsman, la Defensoria considère les questions autochtones comme prioritaires.  Travaille pour que l’Etat améliore son attention à l’éducation des Peuples Autochtones. Explique son travail de recherche sur la compétence. Défendre les Droits et vérifier que les institutions publiques se conforment aux législations en vigueur. Au Pérou, les jeunes autochtones ne reçoivent pas une éducation de qualité. Nous nous sommes posé la question de la gestion des institutions qui expliquent ce problème. Non seulement nous sommes les avocats mais également les superviseurs.

Se sont proposés de superviser l’implémentation de la politique publique de l’Education Interculturelle bilingue au Pérou.

Spécifiquement: évaluer la gestion des entités du secteur de l’Education en matière d’Education Interculturelle bilingue (EIB), Vérifier si l’offre des enseignants est suffisante.

Travaillent avenc 5 directions dépendant du minisètre de l’Education (DIGEIBIR, DIGEBR, DIGESUTP, PLANMED, UPER) et les gouvernements régionaux à savoir 16 directions régionales de l’education (DRE)  50 unités de gestion éducative locales (UGEL) et 54 institutions éducatives (écoles de tous ordres andins ou amazoniens)

Résultat de l’Enquête:  nombre insuffisant d’éducateurs bilingues et ceux qui le sont sont insuffisamment formés à la diversité des langues amazoniennes. Au Pérou, première conclusion, pas assez d’enseignants par rapport aux élèves autochtones et ceux-ci ont une formation insuffisante ou inappropriée. 57 langues autochtones environ au Pérou au moins. Les écoles de formation des Maîtres qui enseignent les langues autochtones sont nettement insuffisantes (5 instituts dans tout le pays sur un total d’une trentaine). Là où il y a des peuples autochtones, il n’existe pas, dans les universités locales, une offre de formation en langue autochtones. Par ailleurs, de moins en moins de candidats se présentent pour une carrière dans l’enseignement des langues autochtones. Depuis 2007, une décision nocive du Gouvernement interdit l’entrée à l’école des élèves qui n’avait pas obtenu une note suffisante. Dans les zones amazoniennes, le total d’instituts de formation et d’universités et de candidats est très faible. Manque de volonté politique et manque de vision que la règle générale ne devrait pas s’appliquer aux peuples autochtones. On peut même parler de corruption dans ce domaine car l’argent est détourné. Les gouvernements régionaux ont une grande responsabilité dans cette situation. Il existe des programmes pour les langues andines mais pas pour les langues amazoniennes. Il est nécessaire de diversifier les orientations dans le domaine des langues afin d’équilibrer cet état de fait. Seules 15 des 55  langues amazoniennes sont étudiées. Un autre problème est que les spécialistes n’en sont pas vraiment!!!!

On observe une baisse dans tout le pays du service d’éducation interculturelle bilingue. Il n’existe pas une information suffisante sur la demande éducative en EIB et de normes techniques pour définir les services d’ÊIB. Pas assez de coordination entre les différents services.

Recommandations: un nouveau plan d’EIB:

  • Un comité national sur l’EIB
  • Formation appropriée des enseignants dans toutes les langues
  • Garantir la disponibilité de matiériel éducatif
  • renforcer la direction d’EIB qui devrait développer des programmes.
  • Mettre de l’ordre!
  • Créer une carte linguistique et ethnique et faire un recensement officiel sur les populations autochtones. 

Nous offre son bouquin. 

 other links: post with Alicia Abanto’s 2010 article

Abbi, Anvita (ed.), (1996), Languages of tribal and indigenous peoples of India: the ethnic space (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas). MLBD Series in Linguistics, vol. 10. Delhi: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, 1997. Pp. xiv + 494, introduction, appendix, index. Rs 595.

Given the fact that the 1981 Census of India calculates the population of Scheduled Tribes at 51.63 million, comprising nearly eight percent of the total population of the country, it is a pity that not more attention is being focused on this neglected sector of Indian society. Part of the reason, of course, is political. Gaining access to the communities in question is often difficult, if not impossible. Thus, at a time when the study of adivasi languages is in decline in Europe and North America, this volume is a welcome addition to the sociological and linguistic literature on the tribal peoples of India. Moreover, it demonstrates the strength of sociolinguistic research in India, for many of the contributions in the volume are written by scholars working in Indian institutions. Not only does the volume cover a broad range of topics, but it also includes a number of useful charts, maps, and tables to assist the non-initiated reader in visualizing the demography and areal spread of India’s indigenous languages.

In addition to the introduction written by the editor, the volume consists of twenty-six essays arranged in seven sections, beginning with two thematic sets – quest for identity (Abbi, Annamalai, Emeneau, K. S. Singh, Kubchandani, Hasnain) and contact/convergence (Mohanty, Israel, Abbi) – then followed by the linguistic designations Indo-Aryan (Zoller), Dravidian (Andronov, Pilot-Raichoor, Mahapatra), Austro-Asiatic (Bhat, A. Zide, Starosta, N. Zide, Ishtiaq, Nagaraja, Philip), Tibeto-Burman (Sharma, Yashwanta Singh, Subbarao and Lalitha, Abbi and Victor, Aggarawal), and Andamanese (Manoharan).

Although the introduction by Abbi begins in a romantic tone, noting that the “peace-loving, self-contented” tribal groups “fell back on Nature [sic], the forest for shelter and sustenance” (p. 5) in the face of modernization and industrialization, it soon moves on to important issues relating to ethnolinguistic identity. Abbi reaffirms that allegiance to a specific tongue is a basic marker of tribal identity, and she also underscores the need to move away from the false notion that tribal languages should somehow be equated with the “primitive” or the “underdeveloped.” Without a doubt, India’s indigenous languages are as complex, if not more so, than the modern IA vernaculars.

1.    Abdallah, Abdallah (2013), ‘Let Justice Prevail’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Ramallah, April 30, 2013.

Casulties of palestine attacked and detained by the Occupying Power and Settlers. Settlers cut trees. All and much more contribute to the prolongation of conflict, deepening hatred. Those interested in seeing end to the conflict and justice, what’s their role in the face of these provocation. No one can claim they don’t know. Israeli newspapers and TV clearly show all this. So everything is in the open. See or read what comes from the Israeli themselves. The coalition of the Knesset is based on who is the most brutal twoards the palestinians. New law that makes it impossible to pass any agreement with Palestinian in the name of the security. The security of the Israelis is important but in the Palestinian territory there shouldn’t be any israeli soldiers, but this was rejected which continues the occupation, something unacceptable for palestinian. We accepted to have only 22% of our historic land as long as it’s sovereign and continuous. Meet the Europeans which are interested in the stablilty of this region. Each has to take his own responsibilities and to address the state which is still wrong doing. Israel is a democratic country. The palestinians in the west of Jordan will soon be more than israelis. Our role is to make sure that justice is prevailing

Abelin, P. (2012). Daniel Cohn-Bendit in Basel: “Israeli und Palästinenser müssen ihre Traüme begrenzen! Tachles. Zürich.

Fast auf den Tag genau 115 Jahre nach dem ersten Zionistenkongress stand das Stadtcasino Basel erneut im Zeichen des Nahen Ostens.(…) Das Keranliengen des NIF (New Israel Fund) sei das Existenzrecht Israels, aber auch die “kompromisslose Einhaltung der Demokratie” auf der Basis der jüdishen Werte und der Unabhängigkeitserkrärung.(…)Es gebe keinen Konflikt, den man nicht lösen könne -man müsse es nur wollen.As Erster habe (Dani) sich schon 1973 für ene Zweitstaatenlösung ausgesprochen und dabein in Israel zunächst aggressive Kritik geernted. Und auch heute noch vertrete er diese Position. “Wir leben weder in der Thora norch im Koran, sondern in der Uno”, rief der begnadete Rhetoriker in den bis auf den letzen Platz gefüllten Saal: “Palästinenser und Israeli müsen ihre Träume begrenzen”. Mit einem Israel in den Grenzen von 1967 und einem Verzicht der Palästineser auf das Rückkehrrecht liesse sich auch dieses Problem lösen. Dabei sei die Sicherong der Demarkationslinien in einer Übergangszeit von einer internationalen Schutztruppe zu gewährleisen. Und Europa komme die Rolle einger “Hebamme”(ndrm: midwife) für die zwei Staaten zu. Die einzige Alternative zu dieser Lösung besteht gemäss Cohn-Bendit in einem gemeinsamen Staat: “dort hätten die Juden aber nicht mehr die Mehrheit”

Abella, Irving, and Harold Troper. 1991. None is Too Many. Toronto: Lester. Cité par Neil Bisoondath, Bissoondath, N. (1995). Le Marché aux Illusions: la méprise du multiculturalisme. Montréal, Boréal. p. 49:

Irving Abella et Harold Troper écrivent: pp. xxii-xxiii”Si, contrairement aux Etats-Unis, le Canada n’a jamais fixé de quotas à des groups particuliers, le gouvernement appliquait néanmoins une politique d’immigration restrictive avec des préférences ouvertement raciales et ethniques. Soutenu par le public, il savait quels groupes ethniques ou raciaux il voulait et comment s’y prendre pour fermer la porte à ceux dont il ne voulaient pas (…). Les groupes qui ne cadraient pas dans cette conception nationale – en particulier les Juifs, les Asiatiques et les Noirs- étaient le plus souvent relégués au bas des listes” 

Abid-Houcine, S. (2006). Plurilinguisme en Algérie, Sidi Bel Abbès.

—————– (2007). Enseignement et éducation en langues étrangères en Algérie: la compétition entre le français et l’anglais. L’anglais et les cultures: carrefour ou frontière? . D. Romy-Masliah and L. Aronin (eds). Paris, Revue Droit et Cultures, L’Harmattan. 54.

Abou, Sélim. 1981. L’identité Culturelle: Relations interethniques et problèmes d’acculturation. Edited by P. Vallaud, Collection Pluriel. Paris: Anthropos.

Abu-Laban, Yasmeen and Stasiulus, Daiva (1992), ‘Ethnic pluralism under siege: popular and partisan opposition to multiculturalism’, Canadian Public Policy, 4 (18), 365-86.

Achard, P. 1993. La Sociologie du Langage, Que-Sais-Je? Paris: PUF.

Ackerman, Bruce (1980), Social justice in the liberal state (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Adachi, Ken. 1976. The Enemy that Never Was. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Adams, Phillip. 1994. A cultural revolution. In Australian Cinema, edited by S. Murray. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Adelaar, S. 1995. Borneo as a crossroads for comparative Austronesian linguistics. In The Austronesians: historical and comparative perspectives, 75-94, edited by P. Bellwood, J. Fox and D. Tryon. Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (ANU), Department of Anthropology. ref. trouvée sur le web

Adelman, H., A. Borowski, M. Burstein, and L. Foster, eds. 1994. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

146-147: The potential imnpact on multiculturalism of a hardeing of opinion against immigration was raised for debate in Australia during the deliberation of the Committee to Advise on Austraia’s Immigration Policies (CAAP 1988). tHE REPORT OF THIS  Committee argued that “community suspicion of multiculturalism is considerable” (p.11). The main reason for this was the perception that multiculturalism is a policy for sectional “ethnic interests”, rather than Australians as a whole. Nonetheless the committee reasserted the argument that immigration policy is not driven by multiculturalism. While this judgement is an accurate one, the existence of perceptions that policy is driven by sectional “multicultural lobbies” may have added to a hardening of attitudes to immigration iself.
The problem is rather one of conceptual ambiguity between multiculturalism as a form of separaatist cultural pluralism, and the current policy rationale for multiculturalism as a component of a liberal-democratic framework of social citizenship rights.
First, there is evidence in Australia, as in Canada, of a recent hardening of attitudes among the general public to prevailing levels of immigration, and more specifically, to refugees. Economic immigrants with relevant skills are the preferred category of immigrant.
148: Multiculturalism in Canada has been seriously contrained by funding limits, and increasingly limited to the “creative” and performing arts.
In Australia, push to “mainstream” access to and equity in particiation for non-Englis-speaking immigrants over the full range of governement programs and services. What remains unclear in Australia is how far public opinion accepts multiculturalism as one component of a universalistic social justice program, and how far it is perceived a s a particularistic and divisive “pro-ethnic” policy incompatible with social cohesion,
174: The politics of language is inherently more complex in Canada both because of the bilingual nature of the country and the earlier emergence of ethnicity as a salient socio-political factor in Canadian society. An official language politcy can be said to have been put in place with the British North America Act of 1867; the nation’s “official” bilingualism became more firmly entrenched after the  Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission of 1967 when the Trudeau pronouncements of 1971 linked bilingualism to multiculturalism.

Until 1987, Australia did not have an explicit official language policy. Prior to that time, English wa sde facto the official language and langauge policy was retricted to legislation which spelt out the responsibility of the federal goverment for the Adult Migrant Education Program (AMEP)  and the Child Migrant Education Program (CMEP) ; in both of which the teaching of English as a second language (TESL) was the central component. Australia, with a highly diversified population due largely to multi-ethnic immigration, approaches the twenty-first centruy with the domination of the English language basically unchallenged.
195: A significant aspect of Australia’s immigratio intatke, though outside its offical immigration  program, is the unrestricted entry into Australi of New Zealand citizens as part of the reciprocal arrangement between Australia and New Zealand which underpins the Closer Economic Relationship (CER). New Zealand entrants can be understood as an unregulated demand-driven category of “immigrants” outside the immigration program.
207: Mainstream langauge ability is important because it appears to be a key to successful settlmenet, both economic and social.
When the numbers were expanded in 1986, Hong Kong immigration skyrocketed (due to the politcial situation and new computerized processing facilities. A significant proportion of these entrants spoke neither English nor French. After 1988, this movment was partially squeezed out by family migration and “replaced” by “independent” migration destined for Quebec. This in turn increased the number of French-speaking or bilingual immigrants and accounted for the increase in the ratio beginning in 1989.
324: The volume of Mexican migration to the United States has been large and growing absulutedly from the 1960s to the 1980s, though the percentage have been relativeley constant, from 13,3 % in the decade of 1960 to about 12% in the 1980s (about 14.8% in 1988). A similar pattern applies for total Hispanic immigration from all souces to the United States.The major transformation in American migration patterns has been the drop in European migration and the increase in Asian migration.
In Canada, we note that the percetnage of Hispanic migrants rose form 0.2% for the years 1946-55 to about 8-9% for the years 1985-87 (Mata 1988, p. 16)
325: Asian migrants, including refugees, are most mobile. During the 1980s they have comprised 30-40% of the total immigrant proportion to Australia. But these percentages are similar to those for the US, and lower than those for Canada, where Asian immigrants comprised 440-50% of the intake throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. On the other hand, black Africans move least and if anywhere to Europe, though increasing numbers of Somalis are arriving in Canada. r
Refugees from Argentina, Chile, Haiti or Cuba move to the US (and Canada).
327: Countries like Canada, the United States, Australia, and to a lesser extent Western Europe are doubly fortunate. While they are the countries with the greatest economic ability (and land mass) to absorb refugees and additional population, they are also farthest remvoed from the source countries.
331-332: The advantaged position of Canada and Australia bears repeating. Each country has a very low density, three per square kilometer. Many of the currently non-habitable or un-inhabited areas may be still judged to be preferable alternative sites for refugees, particularly when adequately financed and perhaps developed. Of cournse, th ere would be enormous expense associated with making parts of Canaea and Australia habitable for large populations, and encouraging settlers to remain in the presently uninhabited areas.
270: it has become a truism that australia is a “lucky country” which has run out of luck. but when Donald Horne invented this term, he was not referring to the luck of its resources, whether minerals or beaches, but rather to “the idea of Australia as a derived society” and particularly the lcuck lived on by the second-rate provicial-minded leites which were reared in an era of self-congratulation on “national achievements that came mainly from foreign innovation .

Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer. Max (2002), Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott. (Stanford: Stanford UP).

cité par Barber dans Barber, B. (2007). Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults and Swallow Citizens Whole, W.W. Norton and Company. p. 216 et dans les notes p. 366 Chapitre “Totalizing Society: The End of Diversity” :

216: The new culture industry, purveying the myth of what I have called consumer empowerment, claimed

That standards were based in the first place on consumer’s needs…(a)circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger”

Adelman, H., A. Borowski, et al., Eds. (1994). Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press.

146-147:  The potential imnpact on multiculturalism of a hardeing of opinion against immigration was raised for debate in Australia during the deliberation of the Committee to Advise on Austraia’s Immigration Policies (CAAP 1988). tHE REPORT OF THIS  Committee argued that “community suspicion of multiculturalism is considerable”  (p.11). The main reason for this was the perception that multiculturalism is a policy for sectional “ethnic interests”, rather than Australians as a whole. Nonetheless the committee reasserted the argument that immigration policy is not driven by multiculturalism. While this judgement is an accurate one, the existence of perceptions that policy is driven by sectional “multicultural lobbies” may have added to a hardening of attitudes to immigration iself.

The problem is rather one of conceptual ambiguity between multiculturalism as a form of separaatist cultural pluralism, and the current policy rationale for multiculturalism as a component of a liberal-democratic framework of social citizenship rights.

First, there is evidence in Australia, as in Canada, of a recent hardening of attitudes among the general public to prevailing levels of immigration, and more specifically, to refugees. Economic immigrants with relevant skills are the preferred category of immigrant.

148: Multiculturalism in Canada has been seriously contrained by funding limits, and increasingly limited to the “creative” and performing arts.

In Australia, push to “mainstream” access to and equity in particiation for non-Englis-speaking immigrants over the full range of governement programs and services. What remains unclear in Australia is how far public opinion accepts multiculturalism as one component of a universalistic social justice program, and how far it is perceived a s a particularistic and divisive “pro-ethnic” policy incompatible with social cohesion,

174: The politics of language is inherently more complex in Canada both because of the bilingual nature of the country and the earlier emergence of ethnicity as a salient socio-political factor in Canadian society. An official language politcy can be said to have been put in place with the British North America Act of 1867; the nation’s “official” bilingualism became more firmly entrenched after the  Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission of 1967 when the Trudeau pronouncements of 1971 linked bilingualism to multiculturalism.

Until 1987, Australia did not have an explicit official language policy. Prior to that time, English wa sde facto the official language and langauge policy was retricted to legislation which spelt out the responsibility of the federal goverment for the Adult Migrant Education Program (AMEP)  and the Child Migrant Education Program (CMEP) ; in both of which the teaching of English as a second language (TESL) was the central component. Australia, with a highly diversified population due largely to multi-ethnic immigration, approaches the twenty-first centruy with the domination of the English language basically unchallenged.

195: A significant aspect of Australia’s immigratio intatke, though outside its offical immigration  program, is the unrestricted entry into Australi of New Zealand citizens as part of the reciprocal arrangement between Australia and New Zealand which underpins the Closer Economic Relationship (CER). New Zealand entrants can be understood as an unregulated demand-driven category of “immigrants” outside the immigration program.
207: Mainstream langauge ability is important because it appears to be a key to successful settlmenet, both economic and social.
When the numbers were expanded in 1986, Hong Kong immigration skyrocketed (due to the political situation and new computerized processing facilities. A significant proportion of these entrants spoke neither English nor French. After 1988, this movment was partially squeezed out by family migration and “replaced” by “independent” migration destined for Quebec. This in turn increased the number of French-speaking or bilingual immigrants and accounted for the increase in the ratio beginning in 1989.
324: The volume of Mexican migration to the United States has been large and growing absulutedly from the 1960s to the 1980s, though the percentage have been relativeley constant, from 13,3 % in the decade of 1960 to about 12% in the 1980s (about 14.8% in 1988). A similar pattern applies for total Hispanic immigration from all souces to the United States.The major transformation in American migration patterns has been the drop in European migration and the increase in Asian migration.
In Canada, we note that the percetnage of Hispanic migrants rose form 0.2% for the years 1946-55 to about 8-9% for the years 1985-87 (Mata 1988, p. 16)
325: Asian migrants, including refugees, are most mobile. During the 1980s they have comprised 30-40% of the total immigrant proportion to Australia. But these percentages are similar to those for the US, and lower than those for Canada, where Asian immigrants comprised 440-50% of the intake throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. On the other hand, black Africans move least and if anywhere to Europe, though increasing numbers of Somalis are arriving in Canada.
refugees from Argentina, Chile, Haiti or Cuba move to the US (and Canada).
327: Countries like Canada, the United States, Australia, and to a lesser extent Western Europe are doubly fortunate. While they are the countries with the greatest economic ability (and land mass) to absorb refugees and additional population, they are also farthest remvoed from the source countries.
331-332: The advantaged position of Canada and Australia bears repeating. Each country has a very low density, three per square kilometer. Many of the currently non-habitable or un-inhabited areas may be still judged to be preferable alternative sites for refugees, particularly when adequately financed and perhaps developed. Of cournse, th ere would be enormous expense associated with making parts of Canaea and Australia habitable for large populations, and encouraging settlers to remain in the presently uninhabited areas.
270: it has become a truism that australia is a “lucky country” which has run out of luck. but when Donald Horne invented this term, he was not referring to the luck of its resources, whether minerals or beaches, but rather to “the idea of Australia as a derived society” and particularly the lcuck lived on by the second-rate provicial-minded leites which were reared in an era of self-congratulation on “national achievements that came mainly from foreign innovation .

Adnan, A. H. M. (2010). ““***k! It’s just the way we talk-lah!” Language, culture and identity in a Malaysian underground music community.”
Let me thank Airil for having sent me details about this research which actually contradicts some of my own conclusions on English…but which I welcome all the more!

ABSTRACT: The use of expletives and curse words is usually frowned upon in society and in all forms of communication. However, this is perhaps an essentialist statement given the fact that some social groups or sub-communities (of practice), deliberately choose to use expletives as a marker of common and shared identity. This qualitative study takes up the challenge of studying such a community made up of young Malaysians who are active in the urban underground music scene, based on their narratives of identity. Data was collected using semi-structured interviews and samples of written narratives from online discussions together with texts in weblogs maintained by members of the community and their fans. This research effort sought to find out firstly, the linguistic choices made by members of this community particularly in using English expletives from naming their underground bands to in-group communicative exchanges. The second focus was to understand the reasons behind the use of English and its expletives by members of this community vis-à-vis their mother tongues. The results of this study suggest that the linguistic choices made by members of this community are influenced by a complex interplay of discourse, groupthink, music genre, and a case of rebelling against the accepted social norms of a conservative South East Asian society. All of these led to the manifestation and expression of a new identity – the young Malaysian (English language user) underground music scene trendsetter – that transcends constrictive and prescriptive social categories like ethnic background, ethnic culture and Eastern morality.

(2010). Losing language, losing identity, losing out – the case of Malaysian Orang Asli (native) children.
ABSTRACT:
This study confronts critical issues in intercultural communication and the teaching of majority/minority languages to the wider population in developing nations. Using Malaysia and the English language as cases in point, this paper reports on the ‘stories’ of Malaysian Orang Asli (native or original peoples) who are being taught English as a third or even fourth language at primary and secondary levels. Through the voices of English language teachers and Orang Asli community leaders from two rural settings in Malaysia, this research suggests that the teaching and learning of English within these rural communities are fraught with intercultural misunderstandings and pedagogical complications, leading to the overall underperformance of young Orang Asli learners. Using a narrative approach to collect data, this research brings forward the intimate views of stakeholders in the teaching profession and the actual minority communities with reference to language, culture and identity – views that are normally lost within the national education system of developing nations. To conclude, I suggest that finding a way forward for Orang Asli children to acquire the national language Bahasa Malaysia, English and their own unique mother tongues will take more than just top-down planning and blanket policies. A language like English for example, is not only alien to most members of this minority group but the teaching of this language, in a way, could also be seen as systematically disempowering the Orang Asli within the Malaysian education system.

Adorno, T. W. and H. M. . (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford, Stanford UP.

cité par Barber dans Barber, B. (2007). Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults and Swallow Citizens Whole, W.W. Norton and Company. p. 216 et dans les notes p. 366 Chapitre “Totalizing Society: The End of Diversity” :
216: The new culture industry, purveying the myth of what I have called consumer empowerment that standards were based in the first place on consumer’s needs…(a)circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger”

AFP-Fiji. 1999. Crocodile Dundee’s Death Puzzles the Police. The Japan Times, Aug.6, 5. Darwin, Australia.

Australian police Thursday sought the girlfriend of Rodney who was gunned down after killing a police officer.

Cherie Hewson, 28, was seen with Ansell Monday night when he shot at houses in bush land south of Darwin 12 hours before killing Sgt Glen Huitson at a roadblock on a dusty isolated track.
The barefut Ansell, a crack shot, fired from thick roadside scrub, hitting a motorist in the back and piercing a gap in Huitson’s bulletproof vest. His colleagues returned fire, killing Ansell,w ho was carrying no identity documents. Assistant Commissioner John Daulby said police needed to speak with Hewson to find out what Ansell’s motive was, and why he did not flee
“If this person wanted to secret himself he could have easily done that. He was a bushman
Hewson had been with Ansell when he shot at a house around 2 hours before firing at another home where a man, woman and 10-year-old girl were sleeping.
It was a sorry end for the 44-year-old, who was the 1988 Territorian of the Year and the inspriation for the hugely sucessful “Crocodile Dundee” movies, which launched the endless Astralian outback into the movie theaters of urban US.
Paul Hogan based the Dundee character on Ansell after he survived starvation, isolation and  wild animals when lost in rugged Australian wilderness for 2 months in 1977.
He stayed alive by shooting shartks and buffaol and dinking their blood after a giant crocodile attacked his boat on the Fitzmaurice River. He was found by two Aborigines and a local white man who happened to be passing the remote area.
“I was sure no one would come looking for me, so I thought I’d wait until the wet season and then try to paddle out, but luckily there was an aboriginal station about 200 miles (320km) away and the tribe decided to visit their tribal land (the island) for the first time in 30 years” Ansell later said.
His story was picked up by the local paper , and Ansell became a hero.
Legend has it that when brought to Sydney to stay in a five-star hotel, he insisted on sleeping in his “swag”, a bushman’s canvas sleeping bag. But the blond, blue-eyed Ansell, who resembled Hogan, was reportedly bitter that he had never profited from the 2 multimillion -dollar blckbuster he inspired.
Many of the more memorable incidents in the first film came from Ansell’s own experience of being a fish out water when he traveled to sophisticated Sydney to publicise two books of his adventures.
Luke McCall, the white man who found Ansell in 1977 said he was unassuming and a “nice bloke”

Agarwal, S. (1995), Minorities in India: a study in communal process and minority rights (Jaipur: Arihant Publishing House).

Akcan, Sumru. 2004. Teaching Methodology in a French-Immersion Class. Bilingual Research Journal 28 (2):267-277.

Akrish, Roni (2013), ‘Expérience d’un habitant de Kiryat Arba, implantation’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Tel Aviv.

A grandi à Paris, Villejuif, a étudié à l’Institut du Parti Marxiste Léniniste. Juin 78 a étudié Abraham Léon, puis est venu en Israel pour entendre ce que les juifs avaient à me dire à moi qui ne me supportais point. J’ai commencé à découvrir la ville. Mon grand-père maternel déporté, ancien colonel, ne m’avait rien laissé comme patrimoine culturel. Du coté paternel, juifs d’algérie. J’ai du tout redécouvrir j’étais un a-alphabet. Je n’arrivais pas à me mettre en tête que les ancêtres étaient les gaulois.

Mon copain mère de Kiryat Arba m’a fait venir. J’ai intégré le parti ouvrier istraélien et fondé Le Judaisme Rouge. Le rav cook m’a tourné la tête. Je suis venu en tant que réanimateur d’un policier qui en essayant de désamrcer une bombe. Je découvre ce qu’on a appelé les implantations. Je pensais encore rentrer en France. Je découvre Kyriat Arba, je découvre en face de la maison que j’occupe maintenant, il y a l’histoire juive: Abraham, l’homme qui fait qu’un peuple aspire à un terroir, Homme et Terre Adam et Adama. Osmose de la rencontre. Conjugaison à la base de la conjugalité. Juillet 79 au sein d’un terroir, d’un peuple, d’une culture que je ne connaissais pas pour objectiviser mon analphabétisme, la bible en main. Rony est le prénom que je me suis choisie. Les jardins de lenotre ne sont pas les miens. Celui que j’arrose aujourd’hui l’est.

Il faut se battre pour cela. Vous avez devant vous un personnage qui a traversé les méandres de l’histoire et en se battant. ADAM (Avraham, David et Moshe).

Q: quelle est ta vision du futur pour les gens qui vivent entre jourdain et méditerranée?

Relents d’un amour inonditionnel.

J’ai choisi Qiriat arba. LA JUDEE samarie n’est pas encore reconnue. Les palestiniens relèvent d’une proglèmatique.

L’état d’Israel tel que nous le connaissons. cela ne représente que 23% de la Palestine décrite  en 1919 (Mandat britannique. Qu’on nous laisse ces 23%. Saucissonnage.

Je suis entièrement d’accord que les P aient un état. Je vote, contresigne et suis prêt à accepter que l’Etat Palestinien ait la majorité de la Palestine, à savoir la Jordanie.

S^’il y a une histoire d’Israel, elle m’appelle plus vers Chehem et Hebron que vers Haifa et Ashkelon. Le Tanach est notre seul passeport.

Terroir d’Israel cité par Rousseau.

Les palestiniens doivent être transférés en Jordanie. De l’autre côté du Jourdain, les juifs furent déportés de l’autre côté du jourdain.

Discours totalisant sinon totalitaire (Gérard Unger)

Alatis, J.E., and J.J. Staczek, eds. 1970. Perpectives on Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press.

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 2004. Une Question Post-Moderne. In L’identité. Paris: Editions La Decouverte.

Pour l’opinion publique, de toutes les régions du monde où la question est mise en avant comme le signe distinctif et totalisant du présent, le monde arabe apparaît , sans nul doute, comme la première(… ) le monde arabe semble marqué de façon indélébile, presque obsessionnelle: il y a les musulmans et les chrétiens du Liban et, à un moindre degré d’Egypte, les Arabes et les Berbères du Maghreb, les Arabes et les Kurdes, les sunnites et les chiites, les Assyriens et les Turkmen d’Irak, les Arabes et les Juifs de Palestines, les nationalistes et les islamistes partout.
12: A mesure que l’histoire et la société s’effacent devant la culture et que le politique est surdéterminé par l’identité, les affirmations qui en relèvent, qu’elles soient de l’ordre du discours ou du symbole, en viennent à englober le monde. Et à cet égard, le monde arabe actuel apparaît comme le site de l’exceptionnalité elle-même

Al-Azmeh, Aziz, Wang Bin, David A. Holliger, N Jarayam, Mahmoood Mamdani, and Emmanuel Renault. 2004. L’identité. Edited by N. Tazi. French ed, Les Mots du Monde. Paris: Editions La Decouverte.

Ali, M.O. 2003. Enseignement du Tamazight à Sidi Bel Abbès. Le quotidien d’Oran, samedi 10 mai 2003, 13.

L’enseignement de la langue tamazight a vu près de 2000 élèves par le  biais de leurs parents, formuler de voeu de voir s’inscrire officiellement cette langue dans le cursus scolaire de leurs enfants. Les recensements menés par les services concernés de l’organisation pédagogique en collaboration avec leurs chefs d’établissements et inspecteurs font ressortir le nombre de 1360 élèves dans le cycle primaire et répartis comme suit: 85 élèves en première année, 230 en deuxième année, 232 en troisième année, 254 en quatrième année, 305 en cinquième année et 254 en sixième année. En ce qui concerne le cycle moyen, il a été relevé 175 élèves de septième année, 139 en huitième année et 138 en neuvième année. Des voeux ont également été formulés dans l’enseignement secondaire de l’apprentissage de la langue tamazight. Par ailleurs, une bonne partie de la réforme du système éducatif rentrera dans sa phase opérationnelle dès la prochaine rentrée après les décision relatives aux aménagements apportés au cycle moyen et la réductin d’une année dans le primaire.

Alimi, E. Y. and D. S. Meyer (2012). “Seasons of Change: Arab Spring and Political Opportunities.” Swiss Political Science Review : 17(4): 475-479.

475: The events that began in Tunisia with Mohamed Bouazizi’s dramatic suicide in December of 2010 and continue to develop throughout the Middle East challenge our politics and our

political imaginations. The challenges to social science theories of movements, revolutions and social change are likely less pressing than those to contemporary politics, but they are

the ones that we are better prepared to engage. (…) (…) A better understanding of the utility and limitations of natural science can help provide more realistic expectations for how the social sciences can help make sense of the world around us. To start with the metaphor of Arab Spring, we know that climate scientists can identify with precision the date on which Spring will begin.

They can’t, however, tell us very much about what the weather on that day will be like very far in advance. They can explain with analytical precision how wind and water interact with

the Earth’s gravity and rotation, but can’t tell you whether you’ll need to carry an umbrella next March on the 20th.

People make history, to be sure, as Marx wrote long ago, but not as they choose, nor in the circumstances they choose. We do not know of any psychologist who could have predicted the particular set of provocations that would lead Bouazizi to try to take his own life publicly, nor even to predict why an inspector would try to confiscate the vendor’s fruit on a particular day. We would

hope, however, that a psychologist could offer some explanatory leverage in making sense of how people focus anger and frustration in making sense of their lives. As political scientists

and sociologists, we are less concerned with this particular event, an individual tragedy, than in the collective responses to it. In this way, we are most concerned with the constellation

of grievances, organizational resources, provocations, and institutions of social control, the kindling, containment, and climate, surrounding that individual choice.

476: We are analytically invested in a political process, or political opportunities framework (Meyer 2004), which places great importance on the contexts that surround contentious

collective action.

(…) We also believe that Bouazizi’s self-immolation was not necessarily the single spark that would provoke an Arab Spring, but that the conditions across the Middle East and North Africa had made it possible for such sparks to create contagion at this time.

(…)

The political opportunity framework promises to offer explanatory leverage on the emergence,development, and outcomes of contention by paying attention to the world outside a

social movement. It posits that most people—though certainly not all—are most likely to engage in protest when they believe it is both necessary and potentially successful. (…)  Fighting against injustice may not have a good chance of success, for example, but in a situation that is highly repressive or seems hopeless (see Alimi 2009; Boudreau 2004; Einwohner and Maher 2011), it may be the best that activists can do. When some people take to the streets, it can make repression appear more difficult and less likely, and collective action a little safer and its prospects for influence a little stronger (Granovetter 1978; Oliver and Marwell, 1988). Many elements are in play with opportunities, including organizations, emotions, and identities; the question is how much analytical leverage focus on any of those elements provides.

(…)Tunisians took to the streets against the regime of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, whose government had raised expectations by expanding higher education, but had failed to deliver economic performance.

The fall of the Ben Ali government—and family—suggested possibilities to publics across the Arab world. People who could find in the Tunisian episode similarities between themselves

and the governments they challenged emulated the protesters (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Furuyama and Meyer 2011; Tarrow 2005), copying tactics and rhetoric.

Although the visible and dramatic protests in the streets, some peaceful, took most Western observers by surprise, people familiar with the Arab world knew that there were long standing dissident communities in all of these countries, including reformers committed to democratic reform and others committed to the primacy of religious law.

477: The unity of the ruling elite is a critical variable in virtually all political process analyses of social movements and revolutions.

(…) And of course, each event affects the constellation of possibilities in the future: as the numbers and diversity in the streets grew, repression would be more difficult and costly; as the visibility of regime defectors increased, more diverse elements in society saw their interests served by throwing in with the protesters.

(…)For analysts concerned with understanding the emergence, development, and outcomes of unrest, it makes sense to start by paying attention to the states that are challenged. This

means taking care to assess the unity of the ruling coalition and the opportunities for defection or exit available to those within it. Although episodes of unrest appeared in more than

a dozen countries, sustained, visible and disruptive activism that threatened the government emerged in only about half of them. Where the state could depend upon repression (Iran),

dissidents could be stifled. Where activists could find other ways to make claims (Algeria), protests fizzled and institutionalized.

We would add that the stability of those ruling alignments is nested in a larger international structure of political alliances, based on interests, values, norms, or prejudices (Rothmanand Oliver 1999; Meyer 2003). A generation ago, insurgents in the Middle East would have tried to look for outside assistance from one superpower or the other, and the regimewould have depended upon a superpower to protect it for reasons that had little to do with democracy or justice. Since the end of the Cold War, this is no longer the case. Dissidentsroutinely look beyond their governments and make judgments about the likelihood of support from outside their state.

478: (…)the chances of dissidents in authoritarian regimes to attract international support and intervention for their cause by marketing their rebellion internationally (Bob 2005) is, to varying degree, a function of their state’s political opportunity structures. The first structurally-laden dimension is exclusivity, by which we mean the degree to which a state is dependent on a particular nesting institution (think about the high degree of exclusivity of claim exerted by NATO on Mubarak-led Egypt as a major non-NATO member ally). The second agency-laden dimension is autonomy, by which we mean the degree to which the larger institution needs the service of the nested state and the resulting maneuvering space the latter enjoys (think about, for example, the high degree of autonomy Assad-led Syria has given its geopolitical strategic value for western powers, Iran, and Russia). It follows then that the tighter the integration of a given state into a larger nesting institution the less autonomy it will have in responding to dissidents’ challenge, and vice versa.
(…)
To conclude, while there are certainly many factors and mechanisms affecting the emergence, development, and outcomes of the recent revolutionary wave of contention throughout

MENA, we believe that focusing on the multilevel nature of political opportunity structures increases our analytical leverage. Examined through the interrelated dimensions of exclusivity and autonomy, this kind of analysis promises to enhance understanding of why under specific political circumstances domestic dissident groups may have greater leverage in promoting their claims. Given the great risks and costs of insurgency, it’s important to recognize how the world outside the rebels’ camp influences their prospects for success.

 Alimi, Eitan Y. (2009). Mobilizing Under the Gun: Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure in Highly Repressive Setting. Mobilization, 14(2): 219–237.

Although episodes of contentious politics in undemocratic regimes constitute the lion’s share of contentious political events worldwide, the theorizing of political opportunity structures is based largely on contentious episodes in democratic/liberal political settings. This anomaly hampers recent attempts to redefine the boundaries among episodes of contention across time and place. Employing the case of the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992), I critically examine three theoretical aspects of political opportunity structures (POS): (1) how the link between POS, strateg, and tactics is forged; (2) how different levels of POS interact; and (3) the ability of multiactor movements to cope with the shifting nature of POS. I conclude by briefly illustrating the relevance of my findings to other structurally similar cases, and discuss the implications of my analysis for further sensitization of the Dynamics of Contention research program.

Allievi, Stefano ( 2003), ‘Multiculturalism in Europe’, paper given at Muslims in Europe Post 9/11: Understanding and Responding to the Islamic World, St Antony’s College, Oxford.

http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/princeton/papers.shtml

First of all I would like to revisit something Minister Sahlin already said. The presence of more and more significant percentages of immigrants in the European countries changed the social landscape and it has a lot of consequences on social and cultural dynamics. Different quantitative levels on so many indicators implies a qualitative change of our societies – it’s not only a quantitative change. The societies we are living in are quite different from the societies that were imagined by the founding fathers of the national states. So to speak, we have no plans, no rules, we learn through experience by attempts and errors. It is a new type, a new form of society under construction. Among those changes, of course, one of the more visible, in any case, one of the more ‘visibilised’ and discussed in the public space, is the so-called return of cultures and religions. Cult and cultures are heavily embedded in each other, – not by chance do they share the same etymology. Even though in western tradition, in western scholar’s tradition, we tend to separate too much these two causes. So they are embedded and they are present, and they are pluralising our religious, social, political landscape. Indeed the presence of migrants of different cultural and religious backgrounds is one of the engines, so to speak, that pushes society into a change that is much larger than their presence. It changes the host society – I use the word host with some irony nowadays, but it doesn’t matter. Immigrants do not arrive naked. They bring with themselves, in their suitcase, among other things, visions of the world, traditions, faiths, histories, practices, values, moral systems, images and symbols. And all these ‘identity references’ – I call them references, because I don’t like the idea of talking about ‘identity systems’ because system is too much a coherent word in practice – play an important role. We are not coherent and we do not belong coherently, we don’t play or apply coherently what we believe and so on. So they use these references, but not only: they use these references as individuals, but also as collective social groups; as communities, we often say. So this is the big change. This produces a radical change of paradigm in the strong sense of the word used by Kuhn. In our interpretative criteria of our own society, we usually have a clear definition of the nation state, the one that we found in the doctrine, the classical doctrine. Which are the elements of this definition? One territory – clear. One people – also clear. And one normative system. This is the basic definition; every student learns it at the first exam or law in the university. While an implicit element, which is not officially part of the doctrine, but it is rooted in the collective unconscious is also one religion, or at least one collective religious heritage – a common reference. Well, things have changed completely. Territories are multiplicating. If I think to my country, Italy, the process of revolution and so on, but also we live a process of federation, Europe is the case. Peoples are multiplicating, let’s say, but also religious and cultural references. And not only, also normative systems are pluralizing. We have national systems, European systems and so on, but also we start to include elements from foreign systems, elements of ‘Fikh’ for instance.

There is secondary effect to this change that is interesting. As a lot of people working and thinking and writing about democracy and multiculturalism, say that this pluralization of cultures makes democracy more difficult. I think there is another possible response, which is that this plurality of reference renders actually impossible something we have known in the past century, the application of ideologies such as “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer” – impossible with so many cultures, with so many peoples. Many Volks! I think that pluralization into the culture asks for the system for more democracy, not for less. But a different democracy. So plurality from pathology is becoming physiology – it’s becoming normal, it’s becoming ‘norm’. And what’s interesting is that this factual, empirical happenings makes sociologically implausible theories like Huntington’s clash of civilizations for a simple reason. Because civilizations are not separate, here or there, but on the contrary, they are rooted in each other, in different territories. They mixed a lot. This doesn’t mean they will be no clashes, maybe on the contrary, but the clashes happen for the opposite reasons than Huntington says. More because of an effect of the contact, the interconnection, than of separation. I believe Huntington is like some doctors that make a wrong analysis of the causes, a wrong diagnosis, but he understood the evolution of the illness. So this is what we are living right now. So homogeneity is, if it ever existed and I think it didn’t, it was a myth, but a myth with real social and political, etc, consequences. Now it doesn’t exist anymore – this is our situation already. And the problem is, of course, due to the definition of identities, collective identities in particular. And this is a problem we have already amongst scholars. I think that political philosophers who talk about multiculturalism simply do not understand sociologists and vice versa. They mean different things when they use the same words. Multiculturalism is cultural.

“What is culture?” is not by chance the title of this year’s international conference of sociologists, for instance. We still don’t know. Community, identity, etc, and I think that the debate would gain a lot if it would use Islam in Europe as a case study, instead of Aborigines in Australia or French population in Quebec or homosexual rights or women’s rights. I think this particular empirical case in which culture and religion mean a lot, might challenge a lot of theorizations about multiculturalism. And probably might reject a lot of them. We need a socio-historic sensitivity. Why do I say socio-historical and not sociological? Because there is what I call a ‘T’ Factor. T as time, which is important. The same immigrant, the first day of the first year of migration, after ten years, after twenty years, is not the same. Neither culturally nor religiously. Through generations there are a lot of changes happening. We know them already. But also the cultural references change. Islam changes. Islam as it is taught in Europe and through time and through generations. We find the same discourses among second generation intellectuals and converts, for instance, about individualization, gender, de-ethnicization of Islam, de-traditionalization of Islam, I’m sorry for the nasty words, de-territorialization of Islam, re-Islamization in a word, which is not the same Islam. So we need to keep a strong attention to these changes, a form of hybridization, metissage, or bricolage, or what you prefer, without ideologizing them and these terms, because both things are happening: constructions of communities and use of community for individual purposes. And this is important. Society is becoming a sort of, not a mosaic of cultures, but I would say a kaleidoscope, continually moving its pieces, continually changing and superposing and creating new landscapes. By the way there is also a conceptual problem about multiculturalism. Ironically, I would say paradoxically, the debate on multiculturalism is heavily monocultural. 95 percent of books about multiculturalism only quote books in English. An Anglo-Saxon debate, I would say, internal to the scholarly community. And this is also a problem of comprehension. This process of construction of non-ethnic Muslim communities in Europe or not only ethnic Muslim communities in Europe is very important with enormous consequences. And the construction of transnational networks through these links is also important and produce changes. In a way I would say we don’t have to study identities, stressing on identities. What does it mean ‘identities’? What is supposed to be at the core, at the centre, of someone believing and thinking? Well what happens on the borders of identities, so to speak, is much, much more interesting. People are crossing borders continuously, being inside and outside at the same time, not only in or out. And this makes a big, big change again to our situation. World Globalization had a lot of implications, of course, it produces changes, destroyed borders, and pushes to the construction of new identity borders, again ethnic, religious, political, etc. So consequence on the individual level. Identity change, the simple idea of identity change. The measure of adopted or elective identities, but also reactive identities – as those who rediscover to be Christians because there are Muslims in Europe. We have a long tradition in Italy, among the seculars by the way: Oriana Fallaci is just a name – fallacious arguments, but very heavily spread in society. So we are building a society of minorities. This is important. We normally think we know what is a minority. We define it identifying themselves as minorities. The problem is we don’t know if there exists a majority. What is a majority? My personal belief that we are already in a society in which there are majorities, of course, but contextual majorities depending on the argument. Or majorities of what I call, I don’t know if in English it works, ‘variable geometry majorities’, like the wings of some military planes that are used these days. So what are the implications? Among other things, conflict. Society is conflictual by definition, there are conflicts, there will be conflicts. It’s normal, it’s physiological. The problem is that we don’t have to avoid conflicts. We have to interpret them as they are, which is not done often. Paradoxically, conflict is the only way to avoid war. Through conflict, we know each other, we know the borders, we know until where we can go until where we cannot. So going to the conclusion, of course, things are changing. The spectacular change in the Netherlands, from a heavy multiculturalism to individual integration – well these also pose new questions. One, for instance: Holland invested 100 million Euros for the training of recent immigrants in order to let them learn Dutch society. My further question: is what about doing the same for all the members of the nation states? Why any man should take an exam about what it is the functions of the parliament and why not the priest? Are we sure they do know? Why only imans and immigrants? Of course there is an imposing literature and reflection about what is a community and so on. I only want to stress on this fact that I already mentioned. Community is important, but it is used by individuals for individual goals. Also, something that we often forget. So we don’t have communitarianism or individual integration, we have already communitarianism and individual integration. And networks, media, and so on, they help a lot in maintaining these links. Through media, and because I go back often and so on, I can be here and there. Not only here or there. This is a massive change, which is not present enough in the debate. So, going to my conclusion – I promise it’s real – Well, of course, we have a lot of feedback effects happening. We don’t study them enough, because the fact that Muslims are in Europe change Islam also there. Which is interesting. Islam here changes enormously. One of my interviewees once said “I am shafii, but I follow the hanafi school here because it is the most diffuse, but for the Hajj, I am hanafi, for jihad I am maliki, for the idea of minority I am hanbali“. So this changed. What is the massive change in the end? It’s something that is quite new . In my opinion, a new cleavage, a new divide, not only between or among cultures, but inside the autochthonous population and inside the minorities: between those who like, who wish or at least are willing to accept, with minor criticisms, to include the others in their way of life and in their way of thinking. And those who are not likely to accept the others. We might say between dialoguers and non-dialoguers. In this period, particularly after September 11th, but even before, I fear that the dialogue is much more difficult between these two positions in the same supposed minority or majority, than between people of different cultural and religious background. So there is a new divide that is important, between these two attitudes that are separated in our society. But, of course, it’s already happening. Muslims are part of European history and Europe is part of the Muslim future. Thank you.

CF. Full paper pdf version

http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/princeton/allievi-full.pdf

Al-Mulhim, A., S. O. 2012, et al. (2012). Forget Israel. Arabs are their own worst enemy. Arab News ©. Jeddah.(click on link for full paper…or ask me in a few years as this is ©)

Thirty-nine years ago, on Oct. 6, 1973, the third major war between the Arabs and Israel broke out. (…)From the period of 1948 and to this day many confrontations have taken place.

On the anniversary of the 1973 War between the Arab and the Israelis, many people in the Arab world are beginning to ask many questions about the past, present and the future with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The questions now are: What was the real cost of these wars to the Arab world and its people. And the harder question that no Arab national wants to ask is: What was the real cost for not recognizing Israel in 1948 and why didn’t the Arab states spend their assets on education, health care and the infrastructures instead of wars? But, the hardest question that no Arab national wants to hear is whether Israel is the real enemy of the Arab world and the Arab people.
I decided to write this article after I saw photos and reports about  (…) the destruction and the atrocities (…) not done by an outside enemy. The starvation, the killings and the destruction in these Arab countries are done by the same hands that are supposed to protect and build the unity of these countries and safeguard the people of these countries. So, the question now is that who is the real enemy of the Arab world?
(…) The Arab world has many enemies and Israel should have been at the bottom of the list. The real enemies of the Arab world are corruption, lack of good education, lack of good health care, lack of freedom, lack of respect for the human lives and finally, the Arab world had many dictators who used the Arab-Israeli conflict to suppress their own people.
And what made the Arab states start sinking into chaos?
On May 14, 1948 the state of Israel was declared. And just one day after that, on May 15, 1948 the Arabs declared war on Israel to get back Palestine. (…) The Arabs lost the war and called this war Nakbah (catastrophic war). The Arabs gained nothing and thousands of Palestinians became refugees.And on 1967, the Arabs led by Egypt under the rule of Gamal Abdul Nasser, went in war with Israel and lost more Palestinian land and made more Palestinian refugees who are now on the mercy of the countries that host them. The Arabs called this war Naksah (upset). The Arabs never admitted defeat in both wars and the Palestinian cause got more complicated. And now, with the never ending Arab Spring, the Arab world has no time for the Palestinians refugees or Palestinian cause, because many Arabs are refugees themselves and under constant attacks from their own forces. Syrians are leaving their own country, not because of the Israeli planes dropping bombs on them. It is the Syrian Air Force which is dropping the bombs. (…) Finally (…) what happened to the Arabs’ sworn enemy (Israel)? Israel now has the most advanced research facilities, top universities and advanced infrastructure. Many Arabs don’t know that the life expectancy of the Palestinians living in Israel is far longer than many Arab states and they enjoy far better political and social freedom than many of their Arab brothers. Even the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip enjoy more political and social rights than some places in the Arab World. Wasn’t one of the judges who sent a former Israeli president to jail is an Israeli-Palestinian? The Arab Spring showed the world that the Palestinians are happier and in better situation than their Arab brothers who fought to liberate them from the Israelis. Now, it is time to stop the hatred and wars and start to create better living conditions for the future Arab generations.

Alvarez, Lizette. 1997. It’s the Talk of Nueva York: The Hybrid called Spanglish”. New York Times, 25 March.

“The journalist Lizette Alvarez, after describing and illustrating the mixed English-Spanish conversation of two Hispanic American Women (an actress and a media executive) on a late-night TV talk show,  made the following comment in March 1997Never mind that the talk show “later” appears on NBC and is geared to an English-speaking audience. Ms. Galan, born in Cuba and reared in New Jersey, and Ms. Torres, Puerto Rican and raised in Hell’s Kitchen in Manhattan, were speaking the hybrid lingo known as Spanglish -the langauge of choice for a growing number of Hispanic-Americans who vew the hyphen in their heritage as a metaphor for two coexsting worlds.  “I thing Spanglish is the future” said Ms. Galan, 32, ….”It’s a phenomenon of being from two cultures. It’s perfectly wonderful. I speak English perfectly. i speak Spanish perfection, and I choose to speak both simultaneously. How cool is that?”….As millions of Hispanic-Americans, first, second, and third generation, take on more prominient roles in business, media and the arts, Spanglish is traveling right along with them.

Amador-Moreno, Carolina P and McCafferty, Kevin (2012), ‘Linguistic identity and the study of Emigrant Letters: Irish English in the making ‘, Lengua y migración / Language and Migration, 4 (2).

Communicated by Maria Sancho, SLonFB member, in November 2012. Other papers in this issue:

1.  Caravedo, Rocío  and Klee, Carol A. (2012), ‘Migración y contacto en Lima: el pretérito perfecto en las cláusulas narrativas’, Lengua y migración / Language and Migration, 4 (2).

3. “Reducción de /-s/ final de sílaba entre transmigrantes salvadoreños en el sur de Texas” – José Esteban Hernández y Rubén Armando Maldonado

4. “La migración sefardí en la Amazonia brasileña: lengua hakitía e identidad” – Carlos Cernadas Carrera

5. Reseña: Francisco Lorenzo, Fernando Trujillo y José Manuel Vez, Educación bilingüe. Integración de contenidos y segundas lenguas – Olga Cruz Moya

Amar, Akhil Reed. 1998. The Bill of Rights. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Amar, Akhil Reed. 2000. Allow the Electoral College to Do Its Usual Job, and Then Abolish It. New York Times and International Herald Tribune, November 10, 2000, 8.

ARTICLE ENTIEREMENT REPRODUIT ET PARU DANS LA SECTION EDITORIAL/OPINION DU HERALD TRIBUNE.
If George W. Bush, having apparently lost the popular vote, does indeed win at least 270 electoral votes when the Electoral College meets, he is the lawful victor, who played by the constitution’s rules and won.
After which Americans will need to realize that the Electoral College is a hopelessly outdated system and they should abolish it. Direct election should resonate far better with the American value of one person, one vote.
The college was designed at the founding of the country to help one group, white Southern males, and this year it has apparently done just that.
In 1787, as the constitution was being drafted in Philadelphia, James Wilson of Pennsyslvania proposed direct election of the president. But James Madison of Virginia worried that such a system would hurt the South, which would have been outnumberd by the North in a direct lection system.
The creation of the Electoral College got around that. It was part of the deal that Southern states, in computing their share of electoral votes, could count slaves (albeit with a two-fifths discount), who of course were given none of the privileges of citizenship.
Virginia emerged as the big winner, with more than a quarter of the electors needed to elect a president. A free state like Pennsylvania got fewer lectoral votes even though it had approximately the same free population.
The constitutions’s Sounthern bias quickly became obvoious. For 32 of the Constitution ‘s first 36 years, a white salveholding Virginian occupied the prsidency. Thomas Jefferson, for example, won the election of 1800 against John Adams from Massachusetts in a race in which the slavery skew of the Electoral College was the decisive margin of victory.
The system’s sex bias was also obvious. In a direct presidential election, any state which chose to enfranchise its women would have automatically doubled its clout. Under the Electoral College, however, a state had no special incentive to expand suffrage -each got a fixed number of lectoral votes, regardless of how many citizens were allowed to vote.
Now fast forward to Election Night 2000. Al Gore apears to have received the most popular votes nationwide but may well lose the contest for electoral votes. Once again, the system has tilted toward white Southern males. Exit polls indicate that Mr. Bush won big amont this group and that Mr. Gore won decisively among blacks and women.
The Electoral College began as an unfar system and it remains so. Why keep it?
Advocates of the system sloganeer about “federalism”, meaning that presidential candidates are forced to take into account individual state interest and regional variations in their national campaigns.
But in the current system, candidate don’t appeal so much to state interest (what are those, anyway?) as to demographic groups (elderly voters, soccer moms) within states. And direct popular electons would still encourage candidates to take into account regional differences, like those between voters in the Midwest and the East. After all, one cannot win a national majority without getting lots of votes in lots of places.
Direct election could give state governments some incentives to increase voter turnout, because the more votes a state turned out, the bigger its role in national elections and the bigger in overall sare in the national tally. Presidential candidates would begin to pay more attention to the needs of individual states that had higher turnouts.
The founders sought to harness governmental competition in health ways, using checks and balances within the federal governemnt and preserving roles for state governments. Direct presidential elections would be true to their best concept- democracy and healthy competition- rather than to their worst compromises.

Amisimov, Myriam. 1999. radio interview. Paris: France Inter.

“Quand j’entends parler Yiddish, ma compréhension n’est pas la même qu’avec le français”.

Amon, Ulrich, and Marlis Hellinger, eds. 1992. Status Change of Languages. 1 vols. Vol. 1, Change of Language Structure and Language Status. Berlin/London: Walter de Gruyter.

This book is issued from the proceedings of a  workshop which took place in Göttingen, Germany, in 1989, under the title: “Change of Language Structure and Language Status”. Additional contributors were invited to participate to the book afterwards.

Amselle, Jean-Loup. 2001. Vers un multiculturalisme français. Paris: Flammarion.

Anaya, S. James. 1995. The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims. In The Rights of Minority Cultures, edited by W. Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, B. 1983.
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Anderson, Digby. 2000. When words change meaning -and do violence to the truth: Social affairs Unit has celebrated its 20th anniversary with a dictionary that analyses the linguistic abuses of political correctness. The Daily Telegraph, Nov.23d, 28.


Exerpts from :  SAU.   The dictionary of Dangerous Words.  London: Social Affairs Unit, 2000.

community: Formerly refered to the people as a whole and its connotations were friendliness, co-operatoin and warm-heartedness. Now it has been hijacked by every special interest group going. So we hear of “the  black community”, “the irish community” and “the homosexual community”. The Independent once referred to “London’s sadomasochistic community”. The new usage is far from benign. It is self-defeating, for it does not produce the old usage’s homely sese of unity, but actually creates a ghetto metality. It exactly reverses the the word’s original meaning. In the mouths of hundred special interst groups, community now means “sect” (Peter Mullen).
diversity: the prerty of differing in any respect (especially race, sexe or sexuality). Usually used in reference to a group. However by extensionk, it may refer to an individual characteristic as in the case of the Harvard undergraduate who, when students were asked to list what they considered their virtues, worte: “I am diverse”. As a virtue, diversity bears the peculiar advantages of needing to be neigher acquired nor practised, but merely possessed, and of being immediately available to anyone (at least anyone who does not live an assuming or traidtional life) . (Marc Shiffman).
violence: A word of abuse applied by ideologues to anything they don’t like. Thus the perverted expressions: the violence o0f poverty, the violence of capitalism, the violence of silence, the violence of language, the violence of inequality and the violence of global warming. (Graeme Newman).

Anderson, Elijah. 1999. The social situation of the black and white identities in the corporate world. In The Cultural Territories of Race: Black and White Boundaries, edited by M. Lamont. University of Chicago Press.

4: Historical Basis of Affirmative Action
Over the past half century, America society has changed profoundly in the are of race relations. (…)Largely as a consequence of affirmative-action programs, black Americans, long segregated in ghettos and treated as second-class citizens, have only recently begun to participate in the wider society in ways previously restricted to privileged members of the white majority groups.
Major policy responses included the civil right legislation of 1964, 1965, and 1968. Perhaps most important (…) was the executive order issued and signed by President John F. Kennedy and then revised by President Lydon Johnson in 1964 prescribing “affirmative action” as an important remedy for racial discrimination, social injustice and the resulting inequality.
6: (…) such efforts to include blacks worked to create a growing backlash and resentment amoung a number o fthose whites with whom individual black beneficiaries would share work settings. Indeed, many whites, and some blacks, have gone so far as to mount legal and ideological challenges to affirmative action programs, arguing “reverse discrimination” (see Regents of the State of California v. Bakke., Bearak, B. (1997). Between Black and White. New York Times. New York: sec.1, p.1., Glazer, N. (1975  (1987)). Affirmative Discrimination. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Skrentny (1996). The Ironies of Affirmative Action. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.)
All this has culimated in a greowing nationwide movement to legally dismantle affirmative action programs through state initiatves. Proposition 209 has outlawed affirmative action in California, forwhadowing what could happen throught the United States.
8: With respect to the “tribal” stigma of race, such an analysis is weakened by the fact that, since the beginning of the civil rights and black (cultural) nationalist movements that have culminated in today’s Afrocentrism, many back people, but not all, appear increasingly black and pround and would cringe at the thought of giving up their blackness for promises of racial inclusion or assimilation. Such  positions have their parallels among feminists, gays and various ethnic groups. In fact, in present day American there seems to be an emerging concern with valuing one’s differences, playing up one’s particularity.
13: According to one male black senior vice president with whom I discussed my analysis:
“in terms o ftheir lifestyses, some do the opera thing and the art museum thing. Btu all black executives will also do the jazz. THe also do the house party. They wouldnt do it with the core group, but it would be a high-class house party. You’d have some where you’d do some socializing and you’d bring a few whites into it. But the ones that were really serious parties were kind of isolated. You’d have two different sets of agendas: one where you’d want to create some some cohesion with some of the withtes so they could see how nice you could socialize, but where ypou’d really want to let yoursef go and get down and talk about issues, then it would be blacks only.

Andreas, Huyssen. 1988. After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture and Postmodernism. London: Macmillan.

Andreoni, G. 1967. Australitalian. University Studies in Australian (5):114-119.

Appel, René, and Pieter Muysken. 1987. Language Contact and Bilingualism. London: Edward Arnold.

Archer, Margaret. 2005. Comments. Paper read at 37th International Institute of Sociology Conference: Sociology and Cultural Sciences, at Folket Hus, Kongresshallen A.other Presenters: [Peter Wagner, 2005 #10] [Hannerz, 2005 #9] funnily introduced as Margaret Thatcher…by George Bush.

Comments cn her books: problem is analytical and explanatory. Poor relation structure in culture: holistic take on culture
relation between whole and structure what place to give culture in struggles for a supreme organ. swing due to heavy anthropological heritage that saw culture as a whole.cf Meir Shapiro, Mary Douglas, Gellner (on berbers): impasse distinction between culture as:

a  corpus of ideas, logical
b social relationship and intersection

cultural system: proposition and practices in S1/TQ
Compatibility in difference or clashes.

Arendt, Hannah (1979 , 1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace.).

Arendt, Hannah  (1993), ‘Réexamen du sionisme’, Auschwitz et Jérusalem, Paris (Presse Pocket Agora: Deuxtemps Tierce), 117.

citée par William Ossipow dans Israel et l’autre, notamment « l’insistance des révisionistes en faveur d’un Etat national et leur refus d’accepter purement et simplement un « foyer national » avaient triomphé (p. 101)

et p. 95, ce qu’il qualifie de « très beau texte de Hanna ARENDT »

Arendt, Hannah (1997), ‘ Seule demeure la langue maternelle , .’ La Tradition Cachée-  Le Juif comme Paria (Paris: 10/18).

La religion juive est une religion nationale. Mais le concept du politique ne valait cependant qu’avec de grande restriction. Cette perte du monde que le peuple juif a subie dans la dispersion et qui, comme chez tous les peuples parias, a engendré une chaleur très particulière chez tous ses membres, c’est tout cela qui a été modifié au moment de la fondation de l’Etat d’Israël. (…). Oui, la liberté se paie cher. L’humanité juive spécifique, sous le signe de la perte du monde, était quelque chose de très beau (…) C’est tout cela qui a naturellement subi des préjudices extrêmement graves. On paie pour la libération »

A propos de ce recueil: Ecrits entre 1932 et 1948, les textes que rassemble ce recueil ont pour thème central le Juif comme paria, figure dont Hannah Arendt trace le contour par différence avec la figure du parvenu. La tradition du paria est une tradition minoritaire. Elle repose sur le choix d’un statut, celui du paria conscient, par lequel sont revendiqués simultanément la particularité juive et le droit à l’existence dans la vie européenne. C’est pourquoi elle est également marginale à l’égard de la tradition et de la communauté juives elles-mêmes. Cette tradition, toutefois, est désormais close. Ce dont la première moitié de ce siècle fut le théâtre, en Europe, n’autorise plus aux yeux de Hannah Arendt ce type d’écart social. La voie que suggérait Kafka s’est révélée proprement utopique : les droits de l’homme ne peuvent s’accomplir par la seule force de l’individu. Telle est la raison pour laquelle Hannah Arendt plaide en faveur de l’insertion dans un peuple et de la coexistence avec d’autres peuples. Ce livre est une analyse lumineuse et profonde, reconnue depuis longtemps comme décisive, de la condition juive.

Arieli, Shaul (2011), People and Borders (Tel-Aviv: Kapaim) 477.

39: CHAPTER 4 (Haaretz, 30/1/2011) Palestinian critics shouldn’t be so hasty to dismiss Abbas: The Palestinian criticism of Abbas stems from the fact that he agreed to grant Israel much more than what was considered the accepted Palestinian interpretation of UN Resolution.
(…)First, we learned that  when there is a frame of reference, you can seriously negotiate all the details. Benjamin Netanyahu, who is not interested in bridging the gaps with the details, has for two years avoided agreeing on the principles for negotiations, even though they were accepted in the past by Ehud Barka and Ehud Olmert.
Second, the publication of the Palestinian proposals proves there is no base to the slogans spread by Netanyahu that the Palestinians’ position on the two core issues threatens the Zionist vision.
40: Abu Mazen acknowledged that it is not reasonable to flood Israel with Palestinian refugees that would threaten the existence of a Jewish majority. So the issue is an argument over a symbolic return of refugees, which is demographically negligible in the light of the transfer of 300,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty.
(…)
Third, it was “revealed” that the border proposed by Israel did not give it spatial control in any of the regions that Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman ((anachronistically) declare as “vital interest” (The Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, the western security area, main routes and water). From the days of Camp David and up to Annapolis, the border line proposed by Israel was based on solely one lement: the number of Israelis who will have to be evacuated. That is a real Isreali demand that the Palestinians are indeed trating with diplomatic insensitivity. The Palestinian proposal refuses to accept the annexation to Israel of Ma’aleh Adumim and the Givat Ze’ev bloc, and lacks typographic and geographic logic. Based on past experience it can be assumed that these settlements will remain under Israeli sovereignty when a final agreement is signed.
Fourth, the real point of dispute was and remains the “historic basin” in Jerusalem, with the Temple Mount at its heart.
41: The territorial dimension is dwarfed in comparision with the national, and especially the religious dimension. Therefore, Olmert’s proposal to internationalise the area makes it possible to overcme the obstacle of sovereignty far more succsessfully that the Palestinian partition proposal, which is based on the Clinton parameters. Bridging this point of dispute requires creative formulation, because in any proposed solution, the actual administrtion of the holy places will stay as it has been for years.
(…)The critics either deliberately ignore or do not see the return for which Abu Mazen is willing to declare an end to conflict and the end of claims -an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, which puts an end to the refugee issue and to the lack of citizenship of half the Palestinian people.

42: CHAPTER 5 (Haaretz, 30/12/2010): what is Netanyahu hiding about the peace process? The prime minister has not disclosed to the public the extent of an agreement with the Palestinians that has already been formulated 

Like an electric tea kettle, Israeli policy on the Israli-Palestinian conflict during the past decades boiled and cooled during the plethora of genuine and fictitious attemps to achieve an agreement, all lacking the willingness to pay the price established by the United Nations, the United States, the Arab League and the Palestine leberation Organization.  Like an electric tea kettle, unrealistic expectations left something behind in the Israeli psyche, a solid residue of “we tried it all”. Benjamin Netanyahu is using it to hide from the public the extent of the agreement that has, nonetheless,  accumulated at the bottom of the kettle, which was presented by the Palestinian Authority president at the Muqata recently to representatives of most Israeli political party invited there by the Geneva Initiative.(…)
44: Over the past decade, we have learned that unilateral or interim steps do not move us forward but strengthen those who oppose an agreement on both sides, and their illusion that the time “they have gained” will allow them to defeat the other side. Netanyahu is faced only with two options: a permanent agreement or, in its absence, a unilateral withdrawal to the planned fence line. So, the public must demand that Netanyahu expose the breadth of possible agreement at the bottom of the keetle during the past decade, and post it to Abbas, in order to decede the question of whether there is a partner for resolving the conflict.
45: CHAPTER 6: (Haaretz 15/12/2010) Israel paying full price of Netanyahu’s hollow policy of survival.
The fire in the Carmel demonstrated the painful cost in human life of continuig neglect of the emergency services, which are supposed to provide a response during the war Netanyahu regularly threatens us with. Similarly, his rejection of the American attempts to persuade him to renew the settlement building freeze could exact a high price from Israel in the form of American bidging proposals that are closer to the Palestinian position and a “reassessment” of the American veto as the Palestinians ignite a diplomatic intifada.
These failures expose the fraudulent play staged by Netanyahu in which the audience, as usual, pays the price.
46: Firstly, which it is again becoming clear to everyone that the nuclearization of Iran is a threat to the entire Arab world, Netanyahu has almost succeeded in appropriating it for Israel.

(…)Secondly, despite his declarations about the importance of the strategic alliance with the United States, he is straddling the wedge between the president and Congress.

Thirdly, despite his declaration regarding “two states for two people”, no significant move has been made to advance it.On the contrary (…).

47: Fourthly, Netanyahu did not forget to “promote” the regional picture. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has contributed more to the loss of the strategic partnership with Turkey, but the events aboard the provocative flotilla to Gaza, the humiliation of the Turkish ambassador and Foreign Prime Minister Avigdor Lieverman’s trheat are certainly not helpful.

Finally, we should not forget the priminister’s efforts to improve relatinships between Jews and Arabs through the loyalty declaration law, and to widen the circle of workers and burden-sharing through the draft-dodging law.

Arieli, Shaul (2012), ‘Abu Mazen wants a state, not the right of return: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas sees the UN bid as his last, best chance to negotiate with Israel.’ Haaretz, 18.11.12.

On November 29, the Palestinian Authority will ask the United Nations General Assembly to recognize Palestine as a non-member state. That is on the assumption that pressure on the PA to delay until after the election in Israel does not bear fruit. Many of those close to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas consider this step to be the last bullet in his revolver and the final chance of renewing the negotiations with Israel Apparently that explains the moderate text it is expected to contain.

 The PA leadership has learned a lesson from last year’s petition to the UN Security Council. It is hoping to reveal how absurd the American and European opposition is and to provide Israel with the most convenient parameters for renewing the negotiations for a final-status agreement.

 The results of the presidential election in the United States do not augur well for the Palestinians, as Nabil Shaath so succinctly phrased it last week: “Obama is better than Romney, compared with Richard the Lionheart, but he is not Salah ad-Din.” The Palestinians are aiming first and foremost for the support of the Europeans.

 The legal basis for the Palestinians’ bid to implement their right to self-determination can be found in 15 UN resolutions that have been passed on the issue – from Resolution 181 on the partition plan for Palestine in 1947, to Resolution 146/66 in December 2011. The wording of the current petition is intentionally similar to that of Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, in order to obtain the united support of EU member states. The Palestinians will emphasize the status of the territories as occupied areas, the lack of international recognition of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem, the Palestinians’ readiness to bear the burden of an independent state, and the broad support of 132 countries for Palestinian statehood.

 Above all, the Palestinians will stress that the 1967 borders (with exchanges of territory ) should be the borders of their state alongside Israel, which they recognized in the exchange of letters between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993. They will refrain from mentioning the right of return for Arab refugees, and the proposed solution to this issue is to base it on the Arab League proposal for “a just and agreed-on solution.”

 Senior officials of the PA and the PLO are not upset about the Israeli threats of punishment, such as a refusal to transfer tax funds, reducing commerce and decreasing the number of permits to work in Israel, which would lead to the collapse of the PA. In addition, there are Palestinians who share the opinion of Abbas Zaki of the Fatah central committee – who has been mentioned as a possible successor to Abu Mazen – that if the bid to the UN fails, this will be “a sign of the end of the stage of the Oslo accords, in anticipation of the next stage which is expected to be a violent conflict.”

 If that is the case, the PLO will fall into line with Hamas, which believes there is no point to the bid because “a state will not be achieved at the UN but by force.” The current escalation in the Gaza Strip is also meant to demonstrate, among other things, the concept that armed opposition is preferable to a pointless diplomatic move.

 Abbas, however, is determined to go ahead with his bid to the UN. The way he sees it, this is the last best chance to negotiate with Israel, backed by a sweeping international decision on the borders of the Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. It is clear to him that, when they have their own state, the Palestinians will not be able to demand the return of refugees to Israel. This order of priorities has accompanied the Palestinian position since 1988. The territorial issue is the most substantive, while the refugee issue is the main bargaining chip.”

Arieli, Shaul (2013), ‘Israel Peace Initiative’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, April 27th and May 2nd.

2002 Saoudi King came up with a peace solution, rectified by arab league. Saoudi plan was: sit down with Palestinians, withdraw from all conquered territories and let the feugees return by UN Decision 194 BY A MUTUAL AGREEMENT. Wording was very carefully worded. Palestinians never dealt with it.

A group of Israeli businessmen decided to come up with an IPI. first had to be sold to arab leadership. They met with everybody and talked to everybody. Mirror image of what Saoudi said with slight modifications. We want to focus the people of Israel on the plan. Now we start working very hard to sell it to Israel as well.

Tour of Jerusalem on Thursday and a clear vision of the “ring&lock” strategy to prevent a continuity of Palestinian territories by implementing settlements, outposts, legal or illegal. Visit to Schmuel Tomb, Mount Scopus and Mount of Olives.

Armitage, A. 1995. Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Asante, Mlefi Kete. 1990. Kemet, Afrocentricity, and Knowledge. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press.quoted by Binder, A. (1999).

Friend and Foe: boundary work and collective identity in the afrocentric and multicultural curriculum movement in american public education. The Cultural Territories of Race: Black and White Boundaries. M. Lamont. University of Chicago Press: 221-248.

ASCD. 1987. Building an Indivisible Nation: Bilingual Education in Context. Alexandria, Virginia: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

Ashworth, M. 1988. Blessed with Bilingual Brains: Education of Immigrant Children with English as a Second Language. Vancouver: Pacific Educational Press.

Associated Press. L’anglais est la langue de l’avenir pour les Suisses, selon deux sondages. AP Wire, dimanche 24 septembre 2000, 15h16.dimanche 24 septembre 2000, 15h16

ZURICH/LAUSANNE (AP) — Les Suisses estiment que l’anglais est la langue de l’avenir, selon deux  sondages parus dimanche dans la presse helvétique.
Cet avis est partagé dans les principales régions linguistiques du pays. En revanche, les Alémaniques acceptent que l’anglais soit enseigné comme deuxième langue à l’école, contrairement aux Romands.
L’institut Isopublic, mandaté par la ”SonntagsZeitung”, a demandé à 1.000 personnes quelle langue de communication devrait être utilisée à l’avenir dans l’ensemble du pays. L’anglais arrive en première position, aussi bien en Suisse alémanique avec 27%, qu’en Suisse romande avec 28%. L’allemand -par opposition au dialecte alémanique- n’arrive qu’en deuxième position avec 22% en Suisse allemande, devant le français avec 17%.
Par contre, l’allemand ne récolte que 18% d’avis favorables en Suisse romande, derrière le français avec 23%. Les personnes interrogées qui pensent que plusieurs langues doivent être utilisées comme langues de communication représentent une part de  21% en Suisse romande, contre 15% en Suisse alémanique. Le dialecte alémanique ne compte que 10% de partisans au nord de la frontière linguistique et 1% dans la partie francophone du pays.
Les deux sondages font suite à la décision du canton de Zurich d’introduire l’enseignement de l’anglais avant celui du français à  l’école primaire.
Ainsi, 62% des Romands pensent que l’anglais doit être enseigné en priorité dès l’école primaire, en pensant à l’avenir de leurs enfants, selon l’enquête effectuée auprès de 1.200 personnes par l’institut IHA-Gfm à la demande du journal ”Le Matin” et de  ”SSR-Idée suisse”. Cette proportion passe à 73% en Suisse alémanique.
Ces résultats sont corroborés par les chiffres publiés dans la ”SonntagsZeitung”: 65% des Alémaniques donnent la priorité à  l’enseignement de l’anglais, au détriment des langues nationales. Cette proportion tombe cependant à 45% en Suisse romande, 48% donnant la priorité à l’allemand. Compte tenu de la marge d’erreur de plus ou moins 3,2%, il ne se dégage donc pas de majorité en Suisse romande.
Dernier point, une majorité de citoyens romands (80 et alémaniques (83 considère que privilégier l’enseignement de l’anglais à l’école ne représente pas un danger pour l’unité du pays, en réponse à une question du ”Matin”.

Atkinson, Michael M., ed. 1993. Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy. Toronto: Harcourt Brace.

Aufheide, Patricia (ed.), (1992), Beyond PC: Toward a Politics of Understanding (Cincinati: Graywolf Press).

Attabi, S. (2012). Algérie : paysage sociolinguistique et alternance codique. El Watan.com. Alger: 1.

Le paysage sociolinguistique de l’Algérie, produit de son histoire et de sa géographie, est caractérisé par la coexistence de plusieurs variétés linguistiques. La situation en Algérie est assez diversifiée et complexe.

En effet, comme bon nombre de pays dans le monde, l’Algérie offre un panorama assez riche en matière de multi ou de plurilinguisme. Cette situation ne manque pas de susciter des interrogations quant au devenir des langues et du français dans ce pays. Il est à signaler que les langues en présence sont le berbère et ses diverses variétés (le mozabite, le kabyle, le chaoui, etc.), l’arabe dialectal algérien, l’arabe classique ou littéraire et le français.

La langue arabe

Après l’indépendance de l’Algérie, l’arabe standard est devenu la langue officielle et nationale pour des raisons politiques et idéologiques plus que linguistiques. Pourtant, cette langue   n’est pas utilisée couramment par la population dans la vie quotidienne.  C’est une langue essentiellement écrite et absolument incompréhensible à l’oral pour un public arabophone illettré. Il faut ajouter qu’actuellement, des administrations telles que celles du secteur industriel et financier continuent à travailler en langue française(1) et que la presse écrite est en grande partie francophone.

L’Algérie a mis en place l’arabisation  par le biais du système éducatif. Cela a donné une place importante à cette langue qui est utilisée dans la littérature moderne et les mass media. La Constitution de 1989, dans son article 3, stipule que «l’arabe est la langue nationale officielle» ; c’est ainsi que cet idiome tend à s’imposer dans des secteurs tels que l’administration, l’enseignement, la presse et les médias (de plus en plus utilisé par la catégorie cultivée du monde journalistique, surtout lors des interviews et des débats politiques ou littéraires).

Cependant, en raison d’un fort taux d’illettrisme, cette forme de langue n’est comprise que par le public scolarisé. Nous pouvons, approximativement, évaluer que la quasi-totalité des Algériens ne communiquent qu’en arabe algérien ou en berbère. L’arabe standard reste donc en dehors de la pratique linguistique quotidienne,  cette situation est résumée par GrandGuillaume lorsqu’il explique que «sans référence culturelle propre, cette langue est aussi sans communauté. Elle n’est langue parlée de personne dans la réalité de la vie quotidienne (…) »(2)

L’arabe algérien

L’arabe algérien est dénommé péjorativement dialecte et considéré inapte à véhiculer les sciences et à être enseigné à l’école. Les textes officiels n’en font pas, ou rarement, mention. Cependant, l’arabe dialectal algérien demeure la langue largement majoritaire, il est la langue maternelle d’une grande majorité d’Algériens (première langue véhiculaire en Algérie). C’est la langue orale (nourrie de nombreux emprunts étrangers). L’intégration de ces emprunts, notamment français, est marquée par des flexions phonologiques résultant de l’influence du substrat local. Par ailleurs, des accents typiques caractérisent les parlers régionaux. En outre, on constate des variations linguistiques(3) propres à chaque région ; on distingue ainsi le parler oranais, algérois, de l’Est algérien… Avec ces variantes régionales, leurs fluctuations et leurs nuances, elles ne constituent cependant aucun obstacle à l’intercompréhension.

Selon l’origine socioculturelle des locuteurs, nous sommes en mesure de distinguer, en Algérie, les parlers ruraux des parlers citadins – en particulier ceux d’Alger, Constantine, Jijel, Nedroma et Tlemcen – et de voir se dessiner quatre grandes régions dialectales : l’Est  autour de Constantine ; l’Algérois et son arrière-pays ; l’Oranais, puis le Sud, de l’Atlas saharien aux confins du Hoggar. Ainsi, l’arabe dialectal constitue la langue de communication de tous les jours, l’outil d’expression spontané. En effet, cette langue est le véhicule d’une culture populaire riche et variée. C’est la langue du monde affectif des locuteurs, de la production culturelle, de l’imaginaire. Nombreux sont les pièces théâtrales, les chansons, les films produits dans cette langue. Par ailleurs, cette langue témoigne d’une formidable résistance face à la stigmatisation que véhiculent à son égard les normes culturelles dominantes.

La langue berbère

Etymologiquement, le mot berbère remonte à une période lointaine : «Le terme berbère est dérivé de barbare, cette dénomination est étrangère aux communautés qui utilisent cette langue, il est le produit de l’ethnocentrisme gréco-romain qui qualifiait de barbare tout peuple, toute culture et toute civilisation marquée du sceau de la différence.»(4) Le statut de cette langue a connu de grands changements à travers les siècles (conquêtes arabes du Xe siècle, colonisation, arabisation à l’indépendance, revendications linguistiques, culturelles et identitaires des populations berbérophones).

La langue berbère est la langue maternelle d’une communauté importante de la population algérienne. Elle est principalement utilisée en Kabylie, dans sa variante la plus répandue d’ailleurs, le kabyle, dans les Aurès, le chaoui, et dans le M’zab, le m’zab, mais aussi dans d’autres régions du Sahara, du Maghreb et de l’Afrique subsaharienne. C’est une langue essentiellement orale qui ne peut être fusionnée avec d’autres langues comme l’arabe classique ou l’arabe dialectal, mis à part certaines analogies au niveau de la structure (langue de la famille chamito-sémitique).

Grâce à une prise de conscience des  berbérophones quant à leur acculturation par une arabisation généralisée, d’une part, et la volonté politique du pouvoir de désamorcer un risque de déséquilibre national, d’autre part, le berbère est devenu une langue nationale depuis avril 2002. Cette langue sera intégrée par la suite au système éducatif (certaines régions assurent un enseignement en langue berbère au primaire et au collège) et même introduite à la télévision avec un journal télévisé diffusé en chacune de ses variétés. Par ailleurs, c’est aussi une branche à l’université (licence en tamazight).

La langue française

Le français, langue imposée aux Algériens, a constitué un des outils fondamentaux utilisés par le pouvoir colonial pour parachever et accélérer l’entreprise de francisation qui a abouti à une «déberbérisation» des Algériens. Ce processus n’a pas pris fin après l’indépendance, mais s’est au contraire élargi à cause de la généralisation de l’enseignement du français. En une vingtaine d’années, le taux de scolarisation est passé de 5 à 70%.

De nos jours, le français est enseigné en tant que langue étrangère. Cependant, cette langue bénéficie d’un statut particulier parmi les autres langues étrangères. En effet, c’est encore la langue d’enseignement des matières scientifiques et techniques à l’université. Actuellement, après la réforme du système éducatif, l’enseignement du français est obligatoire à partir de la troisième  année en tant que première langue étrangère. C’est dire que le français jouit encore d’une place privilégiée par rapport aux autres langues étrangères et que le plurilinguisme restera un fait national. De plus, le français est largement utilisé dans les médias (radio, télévision…), presse écrite, surtout avec le développement des paraboles et d’Internet. A. Queffec  souligne qu’«on peut évaluer à 8 millions environ le nombre de locuteurs maîtrisant correctement le français».5)

Outre des phénomènes sociolinguistiques liés aux pratiques langagières des locuteurs algériens et des parlers régionaux du pays, nous enregistrons la présence de langues étrangères résultant de raisons historiques, politiques, socioculturelles, économiques ou autres. Le domaine des langues étrangères est très largement dominé par le français, l’anglais et l’espagnol occupant un statut inférieur circonscrit essentiellement dans les programmes scolaires et dans certaines sphères limitées du secteur tertiaire.

La situation de plurilinguisme en Algérie demeure complexe, en raison de la présence et de l’imbrication de plusieurs variétés. Cette diversité linguistique favorise l’apparition du phénomène de l’alternance codique assurant l’intercompréhension au sein de la société algérienne. Nous pouvons concevoir cette situation comme un élément positif qui met l’accent sur la capacité des locuteurs algériens à se mouvoir dans leur espace linguistique.

En effet, d’un point de vue sociolinguistique, la pratique de l’alternance codique est un acte volontaire et individuel et les déclencheurs de cette pratique discursive chez les Algériens sont aussi nombreux que variés et notamment complexes : (déficit lexical  touchant les échanges verbaux des  locuteurs, recours aux sujets interdits,  poids de d’habitude, l’ensemble des contraintes sociologiques et situationnelles contribuant à l’émergence de cette pratique langagière).

Ainsi, le recours au code switching est parfois obligatoire, notamment dans certaines situations de communication où les locuteurs font appel à des sujets tabous ou interdits. Dans de telles situations, le français va intervenir, d’une part, pour éviter un éventuel   blocage communicatif, d’autre part, il s’agit, d’une stratégie expressive d’évitement. Le recours à la langue française dans certains cas peut produire un effet un peu particulier chez le locuteur et peut créer une autre attitude chez l’interlocuteur.

Encore, la question du poids de d’habitude se pose comme une raison de l’alternance codique. Il convient de noter que ce phénomène qui relève du domaine du bilinguisme devient  une stratégie langagière omniprésente dans toutes les couches sociales et au cours de la plupart des échanges verbaux. A titre illustratif, l’emploi fréquent du français dans le milieu universitaire par exemple obéit à une stratégie d’apprentissage. Les deux systèmes linguistiques en présence (français/arabe algérien notamment) sont fortement privilégiés au cours des conversations. L’utilisation alternée des langues chez les étudiants les mettent à l’aise et en confiance dans les situations de communication. Elle favorise l’échange et l’expression sans problème de compréhension.

Nous pouvons déduire à travers les échanges verbaux des Algériens que le code switching peut devenir une pratique courante chez le sujet bilingue, ce dernier se l’approprie et la manipule en tant que langue à part entière. Le discours métissé permet aux sujets parlants d’être dans le bain et de l’utiliser comme véritable instrument de communication et dans des contextes différents. Ils peuvent développer aussi leur compétence linguistique et socioculturelle.

Notes :

1 – Ajoutons que leur personnel ayant été formé en français.

2 – G. Grandguillaume, (1983), Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb, Paris.

3 – Nous nous référons à l’accent

et à la géographie linguistique.

4 – A. Boukous, (1995), Société, langues et culture au Maroc : Enjeux symboliques.

5 – A. Queffec, Derradji. Y, Debov.

V, Smaali D, Cherrad. Y, Le français en Algérie : Lexique et dynamique des langues, Edition Duclot.
A. U. F, 2002.

Auer, P. (2012). Standardization and diversification: the urban sociolinguistics of German. Languages in the City. Berlin, 2012.

Berlin is the perfect venue for the Conference topic. Berlin vernacular., Kidsdeusch vernacular,. Pluricentric language area, regions and territories predating the German State, since the Middle-Ages. Not one city dominating the others. We have to take into account large and medium size cities. Urban sociolinguistics didn’t date from the 60s, but their methodology did. Field includes:

phonological variables that have changed their social meaning over time

cf. Michael Silverstein 2003 Indexical order and the dialectics of sociolinguistic life. Language and Communication 23, 3-4, 193-229 (theory of the indexical order)

and

Penny Eckert’s theory of social style and the indexical field.

Bern, Berlin, Studtgart, Hamburg examples.

two scenarios of urban sociolinguistic change in the Germanspeaking language area:

scenario A: SINCE APProx. 1500 urban centers have functioned as catalysts for the spread of the standard language.

SCENARIO B: URBAN CENTERS ARE THE PLACE IN WHICH NEW VARIETIES EMERGE

B1- NEW VERNACULARS EMERGE IN THE LOWER CLASSES OF THE CITIES DUE TO FREQUEENT FACE-TO-FACE CONTAC BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS WITH DIFFERENT LINGUSTIC BACKGROUNDS

B-2: This new urban vernacular disseminates into the rural surrounding through frequent face-to-face contact.

BERN: the vocalization of the coda /l/ in the city dialect of berne:

miuch (mix) instead of milch

löffu instead of löffel

fauwe (fallen)

awwäg (immerI

vocalized is totally adopted nowadays. If you don’t you are considered snobbish.

this is clearly a change from below finally accepted by upper classes adopting it.

cf. Baumgartner, 1940 study.

“in times such as the ones we live in, an artifically driven affection for the dialect favors the spread of linguistic features of the lower class” H. Baumgartner, 1940, Stardtmundart/stat….

so from lower marker, it became an authenticity marker.

In H. Christen, 1988, Sprachliche Variation in der deutschespragigen Sschweiz, Dargestellt am Beispeil der L.-Vokaliesierung in der Germeinschaft Knutwil und in der Stadt Luzern, Stuttgart:: Steiner.

Hamburg

onset /sp/ and (st/ clusters in the Hamburg city vernacular (the SPITZER STEIN-variable)

written variety of low german lost only in the second half of the 20th century.

They started shifting around 1526.

(low s/ high ch ) Uber einen Spitzen Stein stumbeln syndrom;-)

cf. P. Auer 1998, Hamburgr Phonologie, ZGL65, 2, 179-197 (Welt Online: “Loki Schmidt…” from speaking good german, it became urban hanseatic identiby, posh and now old-fashioned.

Berlin

the Berlin ik-  and gloob-variables.

IK: /ç/ is replaced by ik and ö becoming o

cf. P. Schlobinsi, Stadtsprache Berlin, Berlin 1998, p. 65

Low german dialect area. in 1500 everyone spoke low german. 1605, the shift started.

Part of the features are linked to Upper Saxonian influence, others are from the low german substrate.

This might be attributed to the fact that Berlin upper class was educated in Hanseatic area.

the family names such as Ryke, Schum and Berlin were switched to Reiche, Schaum and Berlein.

the language they spoke was a copy of the Leipzig language. Prestige of upper saxonian declined later and by 1800 it was montré du doigt.

ik variable: vernacular scenario belonged to the shift from below (scenario 2). 19century, when Berlin exploded, interference from lower german. ik became the low class index.

In 1980s, shortly before the Wende, cf. P. Schobinski.

The reason for GLOOB-Variable can be tattibuted to the conflation with group variables: in West Berlin, uneducated, rough, in East Berlin: anti-Upper saxonian

Stuttgart

the coronalization of /ç/ in Stuttgart

large scale immigration explain this advent of the palatal fricative.

poligenesis theory.

Feature linked to young speakers with ethnic background

“Wo bist du, mein Sonnenlischt?

Isch suche disch und vermisse disch.

Isch respktier nur disch

damit du’s weisst….”

primary index is urban working class, became a feature of regional identity, then polyethici lower class to become an urgan young street class (kanaksprak.

conclusions:

look into changing social meanings, not only changing forms!

analyse social meanings as indexes in an indexical field!

deal with soiolinguistic change in long durée!

Aufheide, Patricia, ed. 1992. Beyond PC: Toward a Politics of Understanding. Cincinati: Graywolf Press.
Australia. 1982. Towards a National Policy. Canberra: Department of Education.

August-Zarebska, A. (2010). Judeo-Spanish proverbs as an example of the hybridity of Judezmo language and Sephardic culture  Languages in Contact 2010: A Book of Abstracts Wroclaw, Philological School in Higher Education, Wrolaw (Poland).

language and Sephardic culture  Languages in Contact 2010: A Book of Abstracts Wroclaw, Philological School in Higher Education, Wrolaw (Poland).

The aim of my paper is to present some selected features of JudeoSpanish as a result of the hybrid condition of the  culture of the Sephardim. The Jews who were expelled from Christian Spain in 1492, or who decided to leave it later, used to speak Castilian or other Romance dialects. Their use of Hebrew and Aramaic was limited to prayers, liturgy and official contacts between rabbis. Outside their motherland, their Spanish evolved in its own way and started to differ from that used in Spain. The new language which developed in this way, called Ladino, Judezmo or Judeo-Spanish, combined Hispanic, Hebrew-Aramaic and Arabian elements with the influences of the languages of the peoples which the Jews co-existed with in new countries. It reflects the history of the Sephardim and the hybrid character of their culture. In the so-called western Diaspora the descendants of the Spanish Jews, after one or two centuries, adopted local languages (e.g., French, Dutch, German,  etc.). In the former Ottoman Empire as well as in North Africa they continued to speak Judezmo until WW II. Nowadays there are still people in the world who can speak it and treat it as their heritage. In my presentation, different components of Judeo-Spanish will be described with the help of Sephardic proverbs – treated as samples both of the popular culture and speech of the Jews in Diaspora. Languages in Contact 2010  13

Australia (1982). Towards a National Policy. Canberra, Department of Education.

Australia. 1992. A Matter of Survival: Language and Culture. Canberra: House of Representatives Enquiry into the Maintenance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Languages.

Australia. 1994. Asian Languages and Australia’s Economic Future: Council of Australian Governments.

Avneri, Uri (2013), ‘Civil War?’ http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1375385593, accessed 14 dec 2013.

Aysenberg, Lydia (2013), ‘Maps of the Puzzle’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Tel Aviv.

Born in Britain. Worked her over 25 years. Jewish. Only jewish family in Wales. Her grandparents from Poland, my parent, one of the youngest born in wales.

I was asked to come to jewish school to explain about the Arabs. You become a bridge in GH, you open curiosity box of young people.

First school I went to speak to, I noticed on the desk of a 14 year old desk, grafitti, of magen david and Israeli flag and I began to realize even with my 5 children, at the age of 4 in kindergarten, they are drawing the flag of Israel. This creates identity, nationalism. So I took my welsh flag to ask them to draw my flag. I only saw that flag on someone died, in a rugby match, when the queen came to her castle. This is one of the many points of discussion: the flag of the country, do you see yourself represented in the country flag if you are an arab.

I’m a zionist and not asking to change this flag. I left Wales because of antisemitism. In Wales Jesus Christ story: Lidya, tomorrow, it’s our Lord Jesus Birth. Lydia come and tell your comrades how your family kill Christ.

I’m trying to make a difference in this country, not only because I’m an old hippy, but to make a  change for Israel in the future.

I drew the maps I gave you will help you understand the problem.

Green line: 1949 armistice line. It’s the seam of this country. It’s not shown on a tourism map. Asking for it will cause you trouble. At the best, you’ll have disconnected spots.

Netanya is 15 km from Tulkarem. That’s the distance my son runs every morning. Can you imagine your son coming to tell you I ran the width of my country before breakfast.

The 2 State solution is seen as the only solution by the majority, but the fear is there and generally, they wish this second state should be a bit further away and if possible not on the mountains above you! Narrowness and flatness of this country.

First phase of peace process was Gaza and Jericho withdrawal.

The Wall is a actually a fence mostly. I wasn’t demonstrating against the fence. I don’t have all the answers but my son was injured and in the next bed was an arab terrorist from Fatah who had killed 4 arabs accused of being traitors.

There is a ditch in the middle of the Barta village since 1949. One extended family became citizen of two different states and in conflicts with each other.

This is the world of Monty Pithon if you didn’t realize yet.

In Lebanon, French and Brits cooked the mess we are still trying to sort out today!

Dayan, Rabin, Yigal Alon, Yigal Yadin, young officers then in the army drew that green line with Ralph Bunch, an Afro-American from the UN who received the Nobel Peace Prize the next year in Rhodes.

We are here to break down stereotypes! There is selective education in all country. Only at the age of 17 did I hear in Wales about the Holocaust.

orange: security fence.

On the map they used for the green line, the village wasn’t on the map and was in the continuation of the valley…thus the division of the Bartaa village. Never assume on your own logic. Example o fthe man who chose the jordanian part because that’s where he had more sons.

Bartaa is in Limboland,not here, not there, the only area B under palestinian authority. thriving commercial center.

Pink is route 65, since biblical times has been a road to Damascus for the merchants. Wadi Ara.

Blue is Route No 6.

4 Jewish settlements in yellow. the crosses were expelled by Sharon. TM: TEL MENASHE. Over the fence is the Dotan Valley. That’s where Joseph was thrown down the pit by his brothers.

Zion Oil and Gaz company, evangelical from Texas strongly believe Joseph was thrown into an oil Well!

7 stars of sharon created in the 80s. Settlements to create a larger jewish presence in the area by Sharon. Created after the Judaization of the Gallilee. Katzir, Harish, Bat Her

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