COSMO POLITIQUE

Links to my bibliography from A to Z:

A B C D E F G (this page) H I J K L

M N O P Q R S T U V W/X/Y/Z

Last update: 17 aug. 2020 

As for all my bibliographical entries, there are two sections: PART 1 is the full list which is detailed in PART 2

PART 1:

1. Gabizon, Cécilia. 2001. ‘A TOULOUSE, LES FILS DU VENT SE SEDENTARISENT’, Le Figaro, 10 septembre 2001, pp. 12.
2. Gabler, Neal. 1988. An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood (Crown: New York).
3. Gadet, Françoise , and Ralph Ludwigh. 2011. “synthèse finale et clôture du colloque.” In Langues en contact: le français à travers le monde. Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg.
4. Gagnon, Paul. 1989. Democracy’s untold Story: What American History Textbooks should Add. (American Federation of Teachers: Washington, D.C.).
5. Gal, Susan. 2012. ‘Sociolinguistic Regimes and the Management of “Diversity”‘.’ in Monica Heller and Alexandre Duchêne (eds.), Language in Late Capitalism: Pride and Profit (Routledge: lONDON).
6. ———. 2013. ‘Registers, schools and scales: comments on language and identity in twenty-first century Catalonia’, International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 16 225-29.
7. Galindo-Anze, Eudoro. 1999. ‘Immigration Centennial Enhances Close Relations’, The Japan Times, Aug.6, pp. 5.
8. Galloway, George 2014. ‘Bradford must be an Israel free zone’, YouTube link, Accessed 18 aug. 2020. https://youtu.be/ZMSM5vvAmYs.
9. Gal-On, Zahava. 2014. “‘The peace we never made.” In Israel Conference on Peace. David Intercontinental, Tel-Aviv.
10. Gamston, William A. . 2012. ‘Arab Spring, Israeli Summer, and the Process of Cognitive Liberation’, Swiss Political Science Review, 17 463-68.
11. Gates, Henry Louis , Jr. 1996. “Blacklash?Black facts Web Page.” In. http://www.blackfacts.com/index.asp.
12. Gauld, Greg. 1992. ‘Multiculturalism, the real thing?’ in Stella Hryniuk (ed.), Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures (St John’s College Press: Winnipeg).
13. Gautier, Maurice-Paul (ed.)^(eds.). 1992. Hommage à Maurice-Paul Gautier, Regards Européens sur le Monde Anglo-Américain (Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne,: Paris).
14. ———. 1995. ‘Langues vivantes et temps présent.’ in, Comprendre les langues aujourd’hui. (Tribune Internationale des Langues Vivantes: Dijon).
15. Gellner. 1983. Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell: Oxford).
16. Georges, Christian 2015. “La situation romande: disparités et synergies supracantonales.” In Journée d’étude internationale EDUCATION AU CINEMA: histoire, institutions et supports didactiques. Cinémathèque de Lausanne.
17. Gerard, Jean B. 1984. ‘Pourquoi les Etats-Unis ont du quitté l’UNESCO’, Revue des deux Mondes.
18. Germon, Marie-Laure 2004. ‘l’identité par la langue’, Le Figaro.
19. Gibbs, Jonathan W. 1994. “The use of words: How so-called foul words can have many meanings.” In. The City College: The City University of New York term paper for course on African-American English.
20. Giersberg, Sonja 2015. “Cartographie de l’éducation au cinéma en Basse-Saxe.” In Journée d’étude internationale EDUCATION AU CINEMA: histoire, institutions et supports didactiques. Cinémathèque de Lausanne.
21. Giesbert, Franz-Olivier. 2012. “‘La fin d’une époque.” In Le Point, 7.
22. Giglioli, P.P. 1972. Language and Social Context (Penguin Books: London).
23. Gillespie, M. 1995. Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change (Routledge: London).
24. Giordan, Henri. 1992. ‘Les Langues Minoritaires, Patrimoine de l’Humanité.’ in Hervé Guillorel and Jean Sibille (eds.),
25. Langues, dialectes et écriture (Institut d’Etudes Occitanes et Institut de Politique Internationale et Européenne: Paris).
26. Giraudoux, Jean 1939. Pleins pouvoirs (Gallimard: Paris).
27. Gitlin, Todd. 1992. ‘On the Virtues of Loose Canon.’ in Paul Berman (ed.), Debating PC: The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses (Laurel: New York).
28. Givoni, Michal. 2005. ‘Des victimes pas comme les autres. Réactions israéliennes face à la catastrophe du Biaffra.’ in William Ossipow (ed.), Israel et l’Autre (Labor et Fides: Genève).
29. Glazer, Nathan. 1975 (1987). Affirmative Discrimination (Harvard University Press: Cambridge).
30. ———. 1995. ‘Individual Rights against Group Rights.’ in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
31. ———. 1997. We are all Multiculturalists Now (Harvard University Press: Cambridge).
32. Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1963. Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City (MIT Press: Cambridge).
33. Godbout, Jacques. 1989. ‘(à propos de Montréal)’, Globe and Mail.
34. Godreche, Dominique. 1999. ‘FESTIVAL DE DOUARNENEZ : Le Yiddishland au cinéma’, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE: 19.
35. Gohard, Aline. 1997. “D’une multiculturalité reconnue vers un plurilinguisme construit.” In Multilinguisme et Multiculturalité, edited by Peter Lang. Fribourg: Peter Lang.
36. ———. 1997. ‘Publics spécifiques: quels enjeux ? quelles démarches? pour quels nouveaux besoins’, Revue de Linguistique et de Didactique des langues (LIDIL), 16.
37. ———. 1998. “Peut-on former à l’interculturel? quels concepts et quelles démarches.” In Bulletin de l’Association pour la recherche interculturelle (ARIC). Montréal-Paris-Genève.
38. ———. 1999. Communiquer en langue étrangère. Des compétences culturelles vers des compétences linguistiques. (Peter Lang: Bern).
39. Gold, David. 1987. ‘The speech and writing of Jews.’ in Charles A. Ferguson and Shirley Brice Heath (eds.), Language in the USA (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge).
40. Gold, Robert. 1960. A Jazz Lexicon (Knopf: New York).
41. Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. ‘The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world’, The Atlantic.
42. Goodman, D., D.J. O’Hearn, and C. Wallace-Crabbe (ed.)^(eds.). 1991. Multicultural Australia (Scribe: Melbourne).
43. Gordon, Philip. 2014. “Special assistant to the US. Message from President OBAMA.” In Israel Conference on Peace. David Intercontinental, Tel-Aviv.
44. Görlach, Manfred. 1997. ‘Language and Nation: the concept of linguistic identity in the history of English’, English World-Wide: 1-34.
45. Gorter, Durk , Heiko F Marten, and Luk Van Mense (ed.)^(eds.). 2012. Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape (Palgrave Macmillan: London).
46. Goudsblom, J. 1980. Nihilism and Culture (Basil Blackwell: Oxford).
47. Gour (Gur), Batya. 1994. Meurtre à l’Université: un crime littéraire (Arthème Fayard: Paris).
48. ———. 1995. Meurtre au Kibboutz (hébreu Leina Mechoutephet: coucher collectif) (Arthème Fayard: Paris).
    Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1867. “Constitution Act.” In.
49. ———. 1982. “Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés.” In.
50. ———. 1987. “Accord constitutionnel.” In.
51. ———. 1991. “Shaping Canada’s Future Together (Proposals ).” In. Ottawa: Supply and Services.
52. ———. 1991. “Shared Values: The Canadian Identity.” In. Ottawa: Supply and Services.
53. ———. 1992. “LES ACCORDS DE CHARLOTTEVILLE: Consensus Report On The Constitution Charlottetown.” In.
54. Gozlan, Martine. 2011. L’Imposture Turque (Grasset & Fasquelle: Paris).
55. ———. 2012. Israël contre Israël (l’Archipel: Paris).
56. ———. 2013. ” Autour d’Israël contre Israël.” In JCall conference. Société Nautique, Genève.
57. Green, Leslie. 1995. ‘Internal Minorities and their Rights.’ in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
58. ———. 1995. ‘ Internal Minorities and their Rights.’ in W. Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
59. Greilsammer, Ilan ” les Relations Diaspora-Israël.” In JCall. Communaute Israélite libérale de Genève (Gil).
60. Greilsammer, Laurent 2015. “Les murs font de la politique.” In Le1Hebdo.
61. Grin, François. 1994. ‘Combining Immigrant and Autochthonous language rights.’ in Tove Skuttnab-Kangas and Robert Phillipson (eds.), Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination (Mouton de Gruyter: Berlin-New York).
62. ———. 1996. ‘Economic approaches to language and language planning: an introduction’, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 121.
63. ———. 2001. ‘Kalmykia, victim of Stalinist genocide: from oblivion to reassertion’, Journal of Genocide Research, 3: 97-116.
64. ———. 2003. ‘Diversity as Paradigm, Analytical Device, and Policy Goal.’ in Will Kymlicka and Anthony Patten (eds.), Language Rights and Political Theory (Oxford University Press: Oxford).
65. ———. 2003. ‘La Suisse comme non-multination.’ in Michel Seymour (ed.), Etats-nations, multinations et organisations supranationales (Liber: Paris).
66. ———. 2007. ‘Pourquoi donc apprendre l’anglais? Le point de vue des élèves.’ in Daphné Romy-Masliah and Larissa Aronin (ed.), L’Anglais et les Cultures: carrefour ou frontière? (L’Harmattan: Paris).
67. Grin, François, Jean Rossiaud, and Bülent Kaya. 2003. ‘Les Migrations et la Suisses.’ in Hans-Rudolf Wicker, Rosita Fibbi and Werner Haug (eds.), Résultat du programme national Suisse de recherche Migrations et Relations Interculturelles (Editions Seismo et FNRS: Bern).
68. Grin, François, and Irene Schwob. 2002. ‘Bilingual Education and Linguistic Governance: the Swiss experience’, Intercultural Education, 13: 409-26.
69.  Grin, François, and François Vaillancourt. 1999. “The cost-effectiveness evaluation of minority language policies.” In. Flensbourg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
70. ———. 2002. ‘Minority Self-Governance in Economic Perspective.’ in Kinga Gal (ed.), Minority Governance in Europe (European Centre for Minority Issues: Flensbourg).
71. Grosjean, F. 1982. Life with Two Languages: An Introduction to Bilingualism (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachussets).
72. Grossman, David. 2011. ‘Ce que je connais de la guerre me donne le droit de parler de la paix.’ in David Chemla (ed.), JCall: les raisons d’un appel (Liana Levi Paris).
73. Grossman, David 2012. “Words are not enough.” In. society de lecture theatre de Carouge.
74. Grossman, David 2014. “On despair and hope.” In Israel Conference on Peace. David Intercontinental, Tel-Aviv.
75. Grossman, David. 2015. ‘citation par Finkielkraut dans La Seule Exactitude’.
76. Gruenais, M.-P. (ed.)^(eds.). 1986. Etats de Langue (Fondation Diderot/Fondation Arthème Fayard: Paris).
77. Grunwald, Yitzhak. 2013. “Un éducateur humaniste au Goush Etsion.” In JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories. Tel Aviv: JCall.
78. Guerrero, Ed. 1993. Framing Blackness (Temple University Press: Philadelphia).
79. Guest, Edwin 1838. History of English Rhythms.
80. Guggenheim, Evi, and Yair Oron. 2012. “Névé Shalom-Wahat al-Salam.” In JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, edited by David Chemla. Nevé Shalom.Wahat al-salam: JCall.
81. Guillaume, P., Lacroix M., Pelletier R., and Zylberberg J. 1986. Minorités et Etat (Presses de l’Université Laval et Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux: Québec et Bordeaux).
82. Guillorel, Hervé. 1992. ‘De l’utilisation politique de la variété dialectale.’ in Hervé Guillorel and Jean Sibille (eds.), Langues, dialectes et écriture (Institut d’Etudes Occitanes et Institut de Politique Internationale et Européenne: Paris).
83. Guillorel, Hervé, and Geneviève Koubi. 1999. Langues du droit, droit des langues
    (Bruylant: Bruxelles).
84. Gumperz, John. 1971. Language in Social Groups (Stanford University Press: Palo Alto).
85. Gumperz, John, and Dell Hymes. 1964. ‘The ethnography of Communication’, American Anthropologist, Special Publication: No. 6, part 2: 137-53.
86. Gunew, Sneja. 1993. ‘Multicultural Multiplicities: US, Canada, Australia.’ in David Bennett (ed.), Cultural Studies: Pluralism & Theory (Department of English, University of Melbourne: Melbourne).
87. Gunning, Tom. 1991. D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph (University of Illinois Press: Urbana).
88. Gur(Gour), Batya. 1992. The Saturday Morning Murder: A psychoanalytical Case (HarperCollins: New York).
89. Guy, Gregory. 1988. ‘Coping with Diversity: Australia and the Soviet Union.’ in James Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples (Clarendon Press: Oxford).
90. Guy, Gregory R. . 1989. ‘ International Perspectives on Linguistic Diversity and Language Rights’, Language Problems and Language Planning: 45.
91. Guy, Gregory R., Feagin Crawford, Deborah Schiffrin, and John Baugh (ed.)^(eds.). 1997. Towards a Social Science of Language: Papers in honor of William Labov. : Social interaction and discourse structures.
92. Gwyn, Richard. 1980. The Northern Magus (McClelland and Stewart: Toronto).
93. Gyldén, Axel. 2000. “Brésil: Un géant du XXIème siècle.” In Le Point Edition Affaires avec Business Week, 74-79.

PART 2

Gabizon, Cécilia (2001), ‘A Toulouse, les fils du vent se sédentarisent ‘, Le Figaro, 10 septembre 2001, p. 12.

Dans dix ans, le voyage, ce sera fini. Plus le stationnement sera facile, moins les caravanes bougeront…car personne ne voudra plus quitter (…)

Gabler, Neal. 1988. An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood. New York: Crown.

Gadet, Françoise and Ludwigh, Ralph (2011), ‘synthèse finale et clôture du colloque.’ paper given at Langues en contact: le français à travers le monde, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 16-18 septembre 2011.

Colloque entendait évoquer les questions générales des contacts de langues et applications au français et les interventions tant théoriques qu’empiriques ont été diversifiées et reflétait la problèmatique. Discussions cristallisées autour de certains problèmes qui nous tenaient à coeur depuis le départ:

SUJETS, BASES THEORIQUES ET BASES EMPIRIQUES.
1) que peut-il se passer en situation de contact= transfert ou pas, une structure menacée de disparition est restaurée par effet de convergence, remise en cause de ce qu’est le contact (entre humain, entre façon de parler) donc la réponse n’est ni banale, ni évidente, ni réglée dan sla linguistique actuelle
2) pourquoi un phénomène se produit dans un cas et pas dans d’autres? Ecologie de facteurs souvent évoquée, théorie écolinguistique
4) Histoire, media, systèmes scolaires, différents ordre linguisitques…les mêmes situations se produisent-elles à tous ces niveaux?
5) role du type de langue, des familles de langues, des généalogies linguistiques et typologies en général.
6) difficulté de maintenir dichotomie interne-externe, comment se passent les interactions et imbrications?
7) termes théoriques tels que schéma interactionnels, sont-il internes ou externes?
8) reflexion terminologique est à reprendre et poursuivre sur code mixing, code switching, copiage, emprunts, repliques, alternances codiques, mécanismes de convergence. Recherche terminologique ou constat de faiblesse dans ce domaine. Il faudrait être très précis sur quoi désigne quoi.
9) terme de corpus: base empirique de notre travail. Doit être défini, exige une définition des pistes epistémologiques qu’il ouvre. Décallage générationnel? Là encore nécessité d’une reflexion écologique

Gagnon, Paul. 1989. Democracy’s untold Story: What American History Textbooks should Add. Washington, D.C.:American Federation of Teachers.

Je suis venu vous dire…Gainsbourg par Ginzburg (ARTE TV, 2014), Gainsbourg, Serge (dir.).

Intellectuellement, je suis français quoique d’origine russe

Gal, Susan (2012), ‘Sociolinguistic Regimes and the Management of “Diversity”‘, in Monica Heller and Alexandre Duchene (eds.), Language in Late Capitalism: Pride and Profit (Routledge), 22-37.

— (2013), ‘Registers, schools and scales: comments on language and identity in twenty-first century Catalonia’, International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 16 (2), 225-29.

225: (…) Recent years have seen an apparently contradictory development in European language ideologies.Monolingual speakers of a national language continue to be the ideal figures on which national identites and senses of community are buit. Yet this longstanding equation between nation and language is being contested by other ideologies.
European unionnow advocating for trilingualism as the mark of the’ truly’ European {Gal, 2012 #3958}, and urban schools ad neighborhoods (…)
Significantly, Barcelona lies at the intersection of several scales of political organization, each with language policies that arise from and impact ideologies and practices. As an economically dynamic urban center with a folow of incresingly diverse immigration, it is located within an autonomous (and linguistically distinct) community, in a large state that has a linguistic project of its own, and is itself a member of the European Union.
226: How speakers locate themselves vis-à-vis their inoterlocutors, as they inhabit peron-type, that are imagined within evelopes of space-time (chronotopes).
New regimes in schools
The mandated use of Catalan as language of instruction (…) Catalan government’s policies designed to extend the social and situational use of Catalan, to counteract the effects of the Franco dictatorship and to counterblanace the dominance of Castilian in mass media and the Spanish state. The language of education remains a highly politicised issue (…) . Catalan language schools now socialize not only the children of the old immigration from the south of Spain, but also the new migrant populations from North Africa, China, South Asia and Latin America.
(…) discourse of cohesion that is explicitly non-assimilationist.
In practice, teachers and students seem to agree that the educational ideal is a fluid use of both Castilian and Catalan.
In the working class migrant district(…) , children of the new migrations learn Castilian first. (…) For the new migrants, it is Catalan-previously banned and unofficial- that becomes the language of school and of established authority.
(…)
If we understand the making of registers as theideological construction of an indexical and iconic linkage between some linguistic form and the socially recognized ‘voice’ of a person-type in a relation of contrast with another (Irvine, 2001) then ‘plurilingualism’ is also a kind of register.
226-7(…) personae linked to a different politics , one that insists not only on the separation of the two languages -while knowing them both- but also on the inappropriateness of speaking Castilian to tourists and strangers (Frekko 2011). Both personae exist as cultural facts, both are understood to be bilingual. A single person can adopt either voice. Yet the two personae are socially and politically quite different, tehy posit different ‘alters’ against which to define themselves and are buttressed and explained by different ideologies.
(…) finding that at least one quite new stereotype has been recently created int he schools. It picks out and indexes young migrants from Latin America (…) does not correspond to the Spanish of their countries of origin.
Troubles with schools
The significance of schools in th elives of children is not in doubt but scholars increasingly question the assumption that schools have uniquely lasting impact on linguistic practice. Woolard (2011) has noted that scholars’ language ideologies about ‘critical periods’ of language learning and the unique malleability of linguistic competence before adolescence have underwritten assumptions abut the long-term impact of schooling.
(…) Indeed, in the wake of the European Union’s expansion of influence, language and elementary schooling are among the very few issues that remain within the jurisdiction of nation-states or substates.
Thus, researchers rightly see schools as major training grounds for ethnolinguistic ideologies.(…) for us as scholars, schools have been ready-made research environment offering controlled situations that provide all too easy-to-hand definitions of difficult yet crucial questions like the nature of dominance and the configuration of social differenciation.
(…) the identities of high school may not be relevant elsewhere and ‘else-when’. Speakers later recognize and adopt different personae than those relevant to school.
228: Scales beyond schools
Not only speakers’ purposes but also their modes of narration change and diversity once they leave high school.
(…) Invitation to see oneself as an inhabitant of the whole continent, is being promulgated by the European Union.
(…) the EU is now trumpeting trilingualism as the ‘essence of the European idea’. The true European citize is an elite, urban, mobile consumer who -according to an official motto- has ‘A mother tongue, a language for business and a language for pleasure (see Gal 2012). This could be a version of the progressive ‘cosmopolitan’ European.
(…) de-ethnicization of Catalan and Castilian in Barcelona
229: It is becoming hard to distinguish Castilian-first bilinguals from Catalan-first bilinguals. But perhaps it is easier to distinguish Barcelona-natives from provincials.
A different development in Kyiv, Ukrain, is revealing by contrast. In a city where everyone can speak both Ukrainian and Russian, Ukrainian was long stigmatized as rural and uneducated, while Russian was the code of the dominant, urban sophisticate. Since independence and the elevation of Ukrainian to the status of national language, an accent register many are calling ‘Ukrainianized Russian’ has enabled urbanites to present themselves as sohisticated Russian-speakers who are nevertheless deeply Ukrainian. (Shpigel, Tanya 2012)

Galindo-Anze, Eudoro. 1999. Immigration Centennial Enhances Close Relations. The Japan Times, Aug.6, 5.

E. Galindo-Anze est l’Ambassadeur de Bolivie au Japon.
“100 years ago, a group of young Japanese pioneers, who had emigrated to Peru, decided to cross the high ranges of the Andes Mountains to enter the mighty Amazonian jungles within Bolivian territory.
100 years later in June this year, Her Imperial Highness Princess Nori visited Bolivia to commemorate the first contact between our 2 countries. Her visit honored the twons of San Juan de Yapakani and Okinawa, two prosperious settlement of people descended from Japanese emigrants in the heartland of the Santa Cruz tropical plains, where Bolivia granted free land to displaced Japanese farmers after WWII.

Galloway, George (2014), ‘Bradford must be an Israel free zone’, (Leeds). YouTube link.

quoted in french by Alain Finkielkraut in La Seule Exactitude (2015)
“We have declared Bradford an Israel free zone,” he told party activists at the meeting in Leeds.

“We don’t want any Israeli goods. We don’t want any Israeli services. We don’t want any Israeli academics, coming to the university or the college. We don’t even want any Israeli tourists to come to Bradford if any of them had thought of doing so.

“We reject this illegal, barbarous, savage state that calls itself Israel. And you have to do the same.”

Note de DRM: Juste un crétin sans cervelle. Si on devait généraliser comme il le fait, la violence serait un état permanent de notre planète. Personnellement et bien que pas directement visée je ferai un détour pour éviter sa circonscription tant qu’il en sera le représentant. Après tout, l’Angleterre offre bien d’autres resources bien plus accueillantes et intelligentes!

Gal-On, Zahava (2014), ‘The peace we never made’, paper given at Israel Conference on Peace, David Intercontinental, 8 July 2014.

Those who instigate war wants to reoccupy gaza and annex the territories should instead consider peace seriously.
I’d like to take extend my blessings to Haaretz for initiating this conference. No further bloodshed is necessary to acknowledge that today is better than never. Terrible crimes aroused many anxiety. Innocent citizens are paying the price. These horrors are the result of the conflict of incitement. The prime minister after the murder called for blood revenge. The PM mustn’t condemn but prevent. Bennett said after these murders called the Palestinians a nation of murderers. Who can express afterwards any surprise that youth march in the streets calling for the death of all Arabs.
Lapid has been sitting in a government that for 9 months has demonstrated its lack of willingness to negotiate.
I confess that I have no expectation from this government but I still hope it stops this bloodshed. We refuse to hear death to the arabs. These are mere products of an education system that has failed and coyed their basic instincts.
We are not ashamed to say out loud that we call for values on which iSRAEL should be based.
This governement is limited after all.
Shame that we haven’t learnt the lesson of our 6 wars.
to conclude, we have experienced so many wars to show that we have the courage to fight but now we have to find the courage to compromise. We have to understand that we, the left have the responsibility of pursuing to fight for our right to mold our country and make our voice heard for the sake of our future.

We are the land of patience and tolerance.

Gamston, William A. (2012), ‘Arab Spring, Israeli Summer, and the Process of Cognitive Liberation’, Swiss Political Science Review : 17 (4), 463-68.

The burst of collective action in Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab countries in the Spring of 2011 was a surprise to almost everybody – including students of social movements who were knowledgeable about those countries. Similarly, the tent city demonstrations for a new social contract in Israel in the Summer of 2011, culminating on Sept. 3rd, 2011, with the largest demonstration in Israeli history, were similarly unexpected. And I will argue here that, in spite of the adversarial relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Israeli movement for social justice was heavily influenced by the Arab Spring.

To understand the nature of the connection, I will attempt to unpack the flawed social movement concept of “cognitive liberation.” The basic problem is that the concept tends to conflate and blur different simultaneous but at least partially independent processes. One phase of the process, for example, is said to involve the withdrawal of legitimacy from authorities. The concept assumes that people oppressed by structures of domination identify with the system and accept its supporting ideology. But there is massive evidence that what appears to be acceptance or support, is merely compliance because of a sense of resignation and fear. While I have no direct evidence on this score, it seems highly unlikely that the Egyptians who filled Tahrir Square were in the process of withdrawing legitimacy. A much more likely explanation is that the regime had long since lost its legitimacy and what was changing was the sense that, by acting together, it was possible to do something about it. Furthermore, the actions of the regime in attempting to control the collective action often exacerbate the pre-existing anger and righteous indignation.

Furthermore, as Sharon Nepstad (1997, p. 471) argues, the concept of cognitive liberation tends to emphasize a state of consciousness rather than a process or set of processes. “It conveys what people believe but not how they change their beliefs. . . How do the disempowered begin to believe that they can alter their lot in life? How is resignation converted into insurgency?”

Finally, the concept of cognitive liberation does not recognize one of the most important of the simultaneous cognitive processes taking place as collective action develops – the construction of a collective identity. Both the Arab spring and the Israeli summer required overcoming a number of potential cleavages in creating the “we” who are acting. Would the “we” of the insurgency against Mubarak, for example, be defined as Islamist or as a much broader group that involved secularists and more token observers of Islam? Would the Israeli protestors demanding a new social contract be explicit in their opposition to spending money on expanding settlements in the territories? Or would there be silence on this point to avoid internal division and to keep the “we” more inclusive? One cannot really understand the success of this mobilization effort without closely examining the movement’s internal negotiation over collective identity.

The problems with the concept of cognitive liberation can be overcome by using, instead, the concept of collective action frames with their three components: injustice, agency, and collective identity (Gamson 1992). These frames, to quote Snow and Benford (1992), are “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns.”

The injustice component refers to the moral indignation expressed in this form of political consciousness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgment about something being unfair but also what cognitive psychologists call a hot cognition – one that is laden with emotion (see Zajonc 1980). An injustice frame requires a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering.

The agency component refers to the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. This implies some sense of collective efficacy and denies the immutability of some undesirable situation. It suggests not merely that something can be done to change things but that “we” can do something.

The identity component refers to the process of defining this “we,” typically in opposition to some “they” who have different values or interests. Without an adversarial component, the potential target of collective action is likely to remain an abstraction –e.g., hunger, disease, or poverty.

Unlike the concept of cognitive liberation, there is no idea here of phases but rather of simultaneous processes. The sense of injustice, for example, may come from “suddenly imposed grievances” (cf. Walsh 1981) but it is often a gradual process with the advanced stage hidden by a fear-driven lack of public acknowledgment. Once the process is set in motion, the social control actions of authorities may fuel it by suddenly imposing new grievances.
Collective Action Frames in the Arab Spring and Israeli Summer

There is little doubt that publicity about collective action in one country can and does influence the occurrence of such action in other countries. But, I will argue here, that is it almost exclusively the agency component that produces such influence and that the identity and injustice components are almost entirely based on local conditions and actions.

The Injustice Component in Arab Spring and Israeli Summer

I doubt that anyone would seriously argue that the sense of injustice in Tunisia which started the Arab spring came from a suddenly imposed grievance. When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, it was a message of “I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore.” The sense of injustice had a long build-up from, high unemployment, food inflation, widespread corruption, lack of political freedoms, and generally poor living conditions. While Egyptians may have had some sympathy for the injustices that their Tunisian brothers and sisters were facing, it had little or nothing to do with their own locally grown sense of injustice.

Similarly, it was not the injustice component of Israeli collective action frames where there was borrowing from Arab spring. Israel has undergone a sharp increase in economic inequality over the last two decades, much like the experience of the United States. “The Israeli society that stand here – and also, it’s important to note, also the Israeli society that chose to stay home this evening – reached its red line,” Daphni Leef1 told the crowd of 300,000 gathered in Tel Aviv’s State Square (Kikar HaMedina) on Saturday, September 3rd. “And then it stood up and said: Enough! No more! You can cheat some of the people some of the time, but you can’t cheat everyone all the time.”

What began as a protest against the high cost of housing quickly spread to other issues – transport, childcare, food and fuel, low salaries paid to many professionals, tax reform and welfare payments. Student leader Itzik Shmuli told the rally, “We are the new Israelis. And the new Israelis want only one simple thing: to live with dignity in this country.”2 Daphni Leef talked of a government that had “abandoned its elderly, its sick, its immigrants, its weak. . . We are not here just to survive, we are here in order to live. . . We’ve replaced the word ‘charity’ with the word justice.”“The demand for social justice,” Ariella Azoulay writes3, “contains more than the call for a fairer allocation of resources. This demand embodies the fundamental right . . . not to harm others.”
The Agency Component in the Arab Spring and Israeli Summer

While the injustice component is home grown, the agency component of collective action frames is very much subject to influence by example. In Tunisia, it took less than a month of protests and civil unrest to oust President Ben Ali who resigned and fled the country, ending 23 years in power. The rapidity with which this happened in what was essentially a campaign of non-violent protest and civil disobedience must have emboldened Egyptian protesters and enhanced their sense of collective political efficacy.

The Egyptian uprising began on January 25th as a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience, popular demonstrations, marches, and strikes directed against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. The campaign spread from Cairo to other cities in Egypt and it took only until February 11th for Mubarak to resign from office. A sense of agency is greatly increased by the failure of social control measures on the part of authorities. In this case, the government imposed a curfew but the protesters defied it and the police and military did not enforce it. The rapid success of the collective action in Tunisia and Egypt undoubtedly increased the sense of agency by demonstrators in other Arab countries including Yemen, Syria, and Libya.

One would expect citizens of other Arab countries to take heart from the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions but it is more surprising that Israelis would also take the example to heart. Harriet Sherwood (Manchester Guardian, Sept. 4, 2011) interviews a journalist, Ruti Hertz, under a banner a banner saying “Walk like an Egyptian.” Some Israeli wags labeled the tent-city demonstration as the “tentifada” and re-christened Kikar HaMedina as Tahrir Square.

Azoulay (Sept. 19, 2011) shows an active-stills photograph of demonstrations holding up a giant banner in Hebrew and Arabic. The Hebrew says “Egypt is here.” The Arabic shows the call which Egyptians shouted at Mubarak –“Irhal”– which means “leave.”

Leef’s speech to the assembly in Tel Aviv is full of references to an increased sense of collective agency. “We’ve created a new discourse here,” she intones. We’ve replaced the word consumer with the word citizen. We’ve replaced the verb ‘to wait’ with the verb ‘to change’. We’ve replaced the word alone with the word together.”
The Identity Component in the Arab Spring and Israeli Summer

The challenge for movements in both the Arab world and in Israel is to create a “we” that cuts across potential lines of cleavage in the society. The major challenge in the Arab world is across the divide between the more radical elements of the Islamist movement and efforts by those who are experiencing poor living conditions, regardless of the intensity or nature of their religious convictions.

I lack any systematic data on how this difficult challenge was negotiated in Tunisia and Egypt. It appears to have been met successfully but the mechanism and dynamics remains, for me, an untold story. My impression is that the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt exercised deliberate restraint and made a conscious effort not to have the uprising defined as an Islamist movement. I would guess that the more secular elements also made a conscious effort not to exclude Islamist elements but to work with them in a broad coalition. But these are impressions without any solid empirical foundation.

In Israel, I have some incomplete but suggestive evidence. First, it is clear that the demonstrations did not succeed in overcoming one major cleavage in Israeli society – between secular and non-orthodox Jews and the ultra-orthodox (“haredim”). I could find no evidence that haredim participated in the tent-city movement in any significant way. But this was not for lack of effort on the part of the organizers who made a point of including the daughter of Ovadia Yosef on their “experts” committee and gave her high visibility in their initial press announcements.4

However, the movement did succeed in overcoming several other social cleavages in appealing to concerns about economic and social injustices in Israeli society. Leef warns the crowd that there is not one decisive moment but a process. “Was there one fateful day when the social gaps became unbearable? Did swinish capitalism make a particular moment of victory? Can we put our finger on that one privatization too many? There was no such moment. There was a process. . . This process of ours is just beginning now. We have demands of the government . . . because things must change:

***If you are a resident of Yerucham – things must change.5
***If you are a child whose parents have no money to pay for your school trip – things must change.
***If you are a pensioner or holocaust survivor – things must change.
***If you a Gaza evacuee – things must change.
***If you are a woman in Rahat6– things must change.”
Azoulay (Sept. 19, 2011) writes of the refusal of the movement to accept conventional, socially constructed cleavages. “Jews versus Palestinians, the religious against the secular, middle class and workers, Ashkenazi and Misrachi – are now forming new coalitions of interest groups that clearly cut across these lines: those demanding safe shelter, mothers claiming the economic rights, [or] victims of the banking system. . .”

To a limited degree, the tent-city demonstrations succeeded in cutting across the cleavage between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians. Sherwood’s report in the Guardian quotes an Israeli-Arab at the Haifa rally, “Today we are changing the rules of the game. No more coexistence based on hummus and fava beans. What is happening here is true coexistence, when Arabs and Jews march together shoulder to shoulder calling for social justice and peace.”Azoulay (Sept. 19, 2011) describes “the slogan heard time and again during these weeks –‘Jews and Arabs refuse to be enemies’.”

The efforts to create an inclusive “we” that cuts across cleavage lines is undoubtedly the subject of internal strategic debates on which I have limited evidence. The major issue is over how much to emphasize the connection between the issues of social justice inside the green line and the large amount of money spent on expanding settlements in the occupied territories and providing security for them. While there is widespread recognition that this money could, instead, be spent on building housing and other infra-structure inside Israel, movement leaders have generally preferred to keep the connection implicit rather than using it to call for an end to the occupation.
Conclusion

To understand the spread of the Arab spring among different Arab countries and to the movement for social justice in Israel in the following summer, the concept of collective action frames is much more useful than the flawed concept of cognitive liberation. Unlike the latter which conflates analytically distinct processes and ignores the crucial process of negotiating a collective identity, the concept of collective action frames distinguishes the components and problematizes the connection among them. The injustice component is crucial for integrating all three into a coherent collective action frame.

In accounting for the spread of collective action from one country to another, the agency component is crucial; the other components depend more on local conditions. Even with the agency component, while a sense of collective efficacy may be inspired by events elsewhere, it is heavily influenced by the social control response of authorities. If some of the agents of the regime are equivocal or refuse to carry out the repressive orders of the authorities, this can greatly reinforce the sense that collective action can make a significant difference and even overthrow the existing regime.

The ultimate outcomes that will flow from the collective actions of the Arab spring and Israeli summer remain uncertain. It is a lot easier to unite groups with different grievances against a particular regime in oppositional action than it is to maintain solidarity in exercising power. Once the common enemy is gone, the solidarity maintained during collective action may vanish as well. Nor does the sense of collective efficacy that one could topple the regime lead to efficacy in solving the injustices that originally energized collective action.
Footnotes

1
The 25 year-old Leef was one of the organizers of the original tent protest.

2
Quoted in Harriet Sherwood, Manchester Guardian, Sept. 4, 2011.

3
Azoulay is an Israeli visual theorist who runs a popular blog, In the Moment. The September 19, 2011 entry was a long essay, “Civil Awakening,” with numerous photographs of the demonstrations.

4
Ovadia Yosef was the former Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel and a founder and spiritual leader of the ultra-orthodox Shas party that is part of the governing coalition.

5
Yerucham is a poor development town in southern Israel, originally settled by religious Zionists.

6
A Bedouin village.

Gates, Henry Louis , Jr. 1996. Blacklash?Black facts Web Page. http://www.blackfacts.com/index.asp. Web page.

kennyg@innercity.com.
Granderson, Ken
BLACKLASH?

All prejudices are not equal. But that doesn’t mean there’s no comparison between the predicaments of gays and blacks.
For some veterans of the civil-rights era, it’s a matter of stolen prestige. “It is a misappropriation for members of the gay leadership to identify the April 25 march on Washington with the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.’s 1963 mobilization,”one such veteran, the Reverend Dennis G. Kuby, wrote in a letter to the editor that appeared in the Times on the day of the march. Four days later, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearings on the issues of gays in the military, Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, United States Army (retired), was more vociferous. General Waller, who, as General Norman Schwarzkopf’s second-in-command, was the highest-ranking black officer in the Gulf War’s
theatre of operations, contemptuously dismissed any linkage between the gay-rights and civil-rights movements. “I had no choice regarding my race when I was delivered from my mother’s womb,” General Waller said. “To compare my service in America’s armed forces with the integration of avowed homosexuals is personally offensive to me.” This sentiment–that gays are pretenders to the throne of disadvantage that properly belongs to black Americans, that their relation to the rhetoric of civil rights is one of unearned opportunism–is surprisingly widespread. “The backlash is on the streets among blacks and black pastors who do not want to be aligned with homosexuals,” the Reverend Lou Sheldon, chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, crowed to the Times in the aftermath of the march.

That the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People endorsed the April 25th march made the insult all the deeper for those who disparage the gay-rights movement as the politics of imposture–Liberace in Rosa Parks drag.
“Gays are not subject to water hoses or police dogs, denied access to lunch counters or prevented from voting,” the Reverend Mr. Kuby asserted. On the contrary, “most gays are perceived as well educated, socially mobile and financially comfortable.” Even some of those sympathetic to gay rights are unhappy with the models of oppression and victimhood which they take to be enshrined in the civil-rights discourse that many gay advocates have adopted.
For those blacks and whites who viewed last month’s march on Washington with skepticism, to be gay is merely an inconvenience; to be black is to inherit a legacy of hardship and inequity. For them, there’s no comparison. But the reason the national conversation on the subject has reached an impasse isn’t that there’s simply no comparison; it’s that there’s no *simple* comparison.

Prejudices, of course, don’t exist in the abstract; they all come with distinctive and distinguishing historical peculiarities. In short, they have content as well as form. Underplaying the differences blinds us to the signature traits of other forms of social hatred. Indeed, in judging other prejudices by the one you know best you may fail to recognize those other prejudices *as*prejudices.

To take a quick and fairly obvious example, it has been observed that while anti-black racism charges its object with inferiority, anti-Semitism charges its object with iniquity. The racist believes that blacks are incapable of running anything by themselves. The anti-Semite believes (in one popular bit of folklore) that thirteen rabbis rule the world.

How do gays fit into this scheme? Uneasily. Take that hard-ridden analogy between blacks and gays. Much of the ongoing debate over gay rights has fixated, and foundered, on the vexed distinction between “status” and “behavior.” The paradox here can be formulated as follows: Most people think of racial identity as a matter of (racial) status, but they respond to it as behavior. Most people think of sexual identity as a matter of (sexual) behavior, but they respond to it as status. Accordingly, people who fear and dislike blacks are typically preoccupied with the threat that they think blacks’ aggressive behavior poses to them. Hence they’re inclined to make exceptions for the kindly, “civilized”
blacks: that’s why “The Cosby Show” could be so popular among white South Africans. By contrast, the repugnance that many people feel toward gays concerns, in the first instance, the status ascribed to them. Disapproval of a sexual practice is transmuted into the demonization of a sexual species.

In other respects, too, anti-gay propaganda sounds less like anti-black rhetoric than like classical anti-Jewish rhetoric: both evoke the image of the small, cliquish minority that nevertheless commands disproportionate and sinister worldly influence. More broadly, attitudes toward homosexuals are bound up with sexism and the attitudes toward gender that feminism, with impressive, though only partial, success, asks us to re-examine.

That doesn’t mean that the race analogy is without merit, or that there are no relevant points of comparison. Just as blacks have historically been represented as sexually uncontrollable beasts, ready to pounce on an unwilling victim with little provocation, a similar vision of the predatory homosexual has been insinuated, often quite subtly, into the defense of the ban on gays in the military.

But can gays really claim anything like the “victim status” inherited by black Americans? “They admit to holding positions at the highest levels of power in education, government, business and entertainment,” Martin Mawyer, the president of the Christian Action Network, complains, “yet in the same breath, they claim to be suffering discrimination in employment.” Actually, the question itself is a sand trap. First, why should oppression, however it’s measured, be a prerequisite for legal protection? Surely there’s a consensus that it would be wrongful, and unlawful, for someone to discriminate against Unitarians in housing or employment, however secure American Unitarians were as a group.
Granted, no one can legislate affection or approval. But the simple fact that people enjoy legal protection from religious discrimination neither confers nor requires victimization. Why is the case of sexual orientation any different?

Second, trying to establish a pecking order of oppression is generally a waste of time: that’s something we learned from a long-standing dialogue in the feminist movement. People figured out that you could speak of the subordination of women without claiming, absurdly, that every woman (Margaret Thatcher, say) was subordinate to every man. Now, the single greatest predictor of people’s economic success is the economic and educational level of their parents. Since gays, like women, seem to be evenly distributed among classes and races, the compounding effect of transgenerational poverty, which is the largest factor in the relative deprivation of black America, simply doesn’t apply. Much of black suffering stems from historical racism; most gay suffering stems from contemporary hatred. It’s also the case that the marketing surveys showing that gays have a higher than average income and education level are generally designed to impress potential advertisers in gay publications; quite possibly, the surveys reveal the characteristics only of gays who are willing to identify themselves as such in a questionnaire. Few people would be surprised to learn that secretiveness on this matter varies inversely with education and income level.

What makes the race analogy complicated is that gays, as demographic composites, do indeed “have it better” than blacks–and yet in many ways contemporary homophobia is more virulent than contemporary racism. According to one monitoring group, one in four gay men has been physically assaulted as a result of his perceived sexual orientation; about fifty percent have been threatened with violence. (For lesbians, the incidence is lower but still disturbing.) A moral consensus now exists in this country that discriminating against blacks as teachers, priests, or tenants is simply wrong. (That doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.) For much of the country, however, the moral legitimacy of homosexuals,as homosexuals, remains much in question. When Bill Crews, for the past nine years the mayor of the well-scrubbed hamlet of Melbourne, Iowa, returned home
after the April 25th march, at which he had publicly disclosed his homosexuality for the first time, he found “Melbourne Hates Gays” and “No Faggots” spray-painted on his house. What makes the closet so crowded is that gays are, as a rule, still socialized–usually by their nearest and dearest–into shame.

Mainstream religious figures–ranging from Catholic archbishops to orthodox rabbis–continue to enjoin us to “hate the sin”: it has been a long time since anyone respectable urged us to, as it were, hate the skin. Jimmy Swaggart, on the other hand, could assure his millions of followers that the Bible says homosexuals are “worthy of death” and get away with it. Similar access to mass media is not available to those who voice equivalent attitudes toward blacks. In short, measured by their position in society, gays on the average seem privileged relative to blacks; measured by the acceptance of hostile attitudes toward them, gays are worse off than blacks. So are they as “oppressed”? The
question presupposes a measuring rod that does not and cannot exist.

To complicate matters further, disapproval of homosexuality has been a characteristic of much of the black-nationalist ideology that has reappeared in the aftermath of the civil-rights era. “Homosexuality is a deviation from Afrocentric thought, because it makes the person evaluate his own physical needs above the teachings of national consciousness,” writes Dr. Molefi Kete Asante, of Temple University, who directs the black-studies program there, one of the country’s largest. Asante believes that “we can no longer allow our social lives to be controlled by European decadence,” and argues that “the redemptive power of Afrocentricity” provides hope of a cure for those so afflicted, through (the formulation has a regrettably fascist ring) “the submergence of their own wills into the collective will of our people.”

In the end, the plaintive rhetoric of the Reverend Mr. Kuby and those civil-rights veterans who share his sense of unease is notable for a small but significant omission: any reference to those blacks who are also gay. And in this immediate context one particular black gay man comes to mind. Actually it’s curious that those who feel that the example of the 1963 march on Washington has been misappropriated seem to have forgotten about him, since it was he, after all, who organized that heroic march. His name, of course, was Bayard Rustin, and it’s quite likely that if he had been alive he would have attended the march on Washington thirty years later.

By a poignant historical irony, it was in no small part because of his homosexuality–and the fear that it would be used to discredit the mobilization –that Rustin was prevented from being named director of the 1963 march; the title went to A. Philip Randolph, and he accepted it only on the condition that he could then deputize Rustin to do the arduous work of co-ordinating the mass protest. Rustin accepted the terms readily. In 1963, it was necessary to choose which of two unreasoning prejudices to resist, and Rustin chose without bitterness or recrimination. Thirty years later, people marched so his successors wouldn’t have to make that costly choice.

Gauld, Greg. 1992. Multiculturalism, the real thing? In Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures, edited by S. Hryniuk. Winnipeg: St John’s College Press.

Gautier, Maurice-Paul, ed. 1992. Hommage à Maurice-Paul Gautier, Regards Européens sur le Monde Anglo-Américain. Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne.

By the way, Prof. Gautier was my Ph.D. Director and someone who never once questioned my methods and always supported me with great friendship!

____1995. Langues vivantes et temps présent. In Comprendre les langues aujourd’hui. Dijon: Tribune Internationale des Langues Vivantes.

Gellner. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Georges, Christian (2015), ‘La situation romande: disparités et synergies supracantonales’, paper given at Journée d’étude internationale EDUCATION AU CINEMA: histoire, institutions et supports didactiques, Cinémathèque de Lausanne, 31 janvier 2015.

Formation aux MITIC
– 4 à 7 ans: sensibiliser entre image et réalité, produire réalisation médiatique (cf festival de l’ultracourt), questions de cadrages, couleur lumières
– 8-12 ans mise en scène, plans, champs, identification des stéroéotypes, dessins animés et production de séances filmiques
– 13-16 ans: recours naturel aux séances filmées pour se documenter, grammaire de l’image et du son et analyse subliminales.
Vaste programme…mais quelle réalité???
Faible dotation à la grille horaire entre 30 mn et 275 mn par semaine selon les cantons mais dans la réalité, seule Genève attribue une période hebdomaitre en 11ème année pour aborder le domaine Image-Média et en primaire bientôt.
Freins à la mise en oeuvre: formation insufisante du corps enseignant en matière de cinéma. Chaque établissement devrait disposer d’enseignants spécialistes (personnes ressources MITIC) mais grande disparité entre les cantons.
Coûts liés à la projection en salle ou à l’inviation d’experts externes.
absence d’évaluation ou de suivi de compétences acquises.
Certains cantons ont mis en place un carnet de suivi des compétences de l’élève mais encore à l’état de projet.
Elements facilitants:
parc étendu de salles 176 écrans en Suisse romande, nombreuses médiathèques scolaires et bien dotées en films et émissions de vultagrisation telles que Mission Ciné sur la RTS, offre scolaire des festivals de cinéma (projection t formation).
Matériel pédagogique mis à disposition par Site e-media ou mis à disposition de leur pairs par des enseignants cinéfiles (CO Genève) et offres d’entités spécialisées dans la mpdiation culturelle cinéma (Roadmovie, la Lanterne magique…)
Au PO
Maturité arts visuels cf slide
ciné-clubs
dispositifs spécifiques tels que les festivals,
Festival de l’ultracourt et réflex 1er festival romand du cinéma des écoles et de la jeunesse

Gerard, Jean B. 1984. Pourquoi les Etats-Unis ont du quitté l’UNESCO. Revue des deux Mondes (Juin).

Germon, Marie-Laure. 2004. l’identité par la langue. Le Figaro.

ntéressant entretien du Figaro avec Claude Hagège (linguiste bien connu), dans la série consacrée à la question de l’identité française.« Qu’est-ce qu’être français aujourd’hui ? »

Claude Hagège : « L’identité par la langue »
Chercheur en linguistique, professeur au Collège de France et directeur d’études à l’École pratique des hautes études, Claude Hagège est l’auteur d’une vingtaine d’ouvrages traduits en plusieurs langues et étudiés dans le monde entier. Parmi eux, L’Homme de paroles (Fayard, 1985) ou Halte à la mort des langues (Odile Jacob, 2000) où l’auteur avertit des menaces qui pèsent sur l’existence d’innombrables langues. Claude Hagège fut par ailleurs le premier récipiendaire de la médaille d’or du CNRS dans le domaine des sciences humaines.

LE FIGARO. – On dit l’identité française en crise. Le linguiste que vous êtes partage-t-il ce point de vue ?

Claude HAGÈGE. – À mon sens, ni la langue ni l’identité françaises ne sont en crise. Les crispations communautaires dont on parle tant sont le fait de minorités qui ne demandent qu’à s’intégrer. Ces minoritaires sont souvent à la solde de pouvoirs étrangers au discours de revendication nationaliste d’autant mieux entendu qu’il réveille les humiliations de l’époque coloniale, ainsi que le souvenir d’un «âge d’or», notamment celui de l’islam conquérant dont les élites arabes ont souvent la nostalgie. Mais la témérité revendicative d’une frange aussi marginale ne doit pas faire oublier qu’une grande proportion de Français demeure habitée par un rêve d’intégration. Dès lors, on pourrait avancer que s’il existe une crise de l’identité française, elle doit s’entendre en référence à un bien dont on manque, et que beaucoup rêvent de s’approprier. La maîtrise de notre langue est vue comme le meilleur moyen d’acquérir un «brevet de francité». S’en approprier les mécanismes, c’est aussi acquérir les mécanismes du pouvoir. Et partant, se donner la possibilité de déjouer les pièges de cette redoutable «langue de bois» politique qui opacifie la pensée au lieu de la transmettre, jusqu’à devenir un outil de pression. Une bonne maîtrise de la langue conditionne la liberté de pensée et d’agir.
La renommée de notre langue semble se circonscrire aux seules sphères de la réflexion, du luxe et de l’élégance. Est-elle trop élitaire ?

Il me semble au contraire que nous ne réfléchissons pas suffisamment à cette particularité. Nous devrions jouer plus habilement sur ce registre, notamment sur le plan de l’exportation de nos produits de gastronomie et de luxe, en conservant les appellations françaises. En effet, les traditionnelles chasses gardées de la langue française s’amenuisent comme peau de chagrin. L’anglo-américain conquiert des territoires qui, par tradition, étaient plutôt francophones, jusque, d’ailleurs, sur le domaine du savoir et des débats. C’est tout à fait nouveau. Les Européens – et en particulier les Allemands – ont souvent fait valoir qu’une éducation conduite en langue française se révélait le prélude indispensable à une bonne dissertation. Beaucoup de francophiles étrangers aiment à se persuader que nos tournures idiomatiques, notre grammaire et notre syntaxe enseignent mieux celles de toute autre langue l’art d’un agencement fluide des idées. Le revers de cette appréciation est qu’elle alimente une image d’élitisme associée au français, vu comme lieu d’une connivence naturelle avec une certaine mondanité – voire d’une tendance au «divertissement» pris au sens pascalien du terme. Par ailleurs, les puristes et autres prêtres vétilleux de la sauvegarde de notre langue contribuent malgré eux à la statufier, et à donner l’image d’une langue aussi difficile à maîtriser qu’intimidante. Il en va très différemment de l’anglo-américain, dont les locuteurs, habitués aux fautes des étrangers, s’en émeuvent assez peu. Cette attitude tolérante, si éloignée de celle qui prévaut en France, pourrait bien être un des moteurs de la popularité de l’anglo-américain.
Pourtant, vous avez plusieurs fois dit et écrit que l’anglais était tout sauf facile à maîtriser…

La réputation de facilité de l’anglais est totalement absurde. Winston Churchill remarquait avec esprit que l’anglais était certainement la langue la plus facile à parler mal. Seulement, les entreprises françaises vivent dans l’illusion que l’anglais fait vendre, et sa «maîtrise» est donc devenue le préalable à la tenue de n’importe quelle réunion scientifique ou projet à visée extra-nationale. Cette situation n’altère en rien mon optimisme, car l’usage de ce mauvais anglais, lié à des mécanismes marchands, n’excède guère un cadre strictement commercial et ne s’introduit dans notre quotidien qu’avec parcimonie. Cet usage s’assortit souvent d’une maladresse telle que les mots anglais employés avec l’accent français deviennent incompréhensibles aux anglophones. Les formules commerciales telles que «rapid’pressing» ou «modern’hôtel» ne se transposent pas dans le langage quotidien. On parle un français qui a encore sa propre norme. Certes, on peut s’alarmer que la pression exercée par l’anglais sur le français soit de plus en plus considérable. Ce qu’elle traduit en fait, c’est une réalité politique peu flatteuse et qui ne fait aucun doute, à savoir le magistère politique et économique incontestable des Etats-Unis.

Vous conviendrez donc que le français ne cesse de perdre de son influence dans le monde ?
Naturellement, la réduction de son influence ne fait que refléter celle de la France en tant qu’entité politique. D’autant plus que la France a, depuis la nuit des temps, usé de sa langue comme d’un outil de ralliement populaire ainsi que de domination stratégique et politique. Que la langue des Etats-Unis soit celle de la première puissance mondiale, cela a pour conséquence la diffusion et l’impact universels de l’idéologie américaine. Gardons-nous, cependant, de tout confondre ! Le déclin du français est irréductible du déclin de la France, même s’il représente indiscutablement une perte de pouvoir à l’échelle mondiale.

Le dynamisme de la francophonie a-t-il le pouvoir de nuancer ce constat ?
C’est même le correctif essentiel de ce tableau plutôt sombre. A bien observer la francophonie et ses composantes, on remarque tout d’abord que ceux qui l’ont portée sur les fonts baptismaux étaient plus demandeurs de français que les Français eux-mêmes. La persistance du petit fief que s’est taillé le français grâce à la fédération des francophones, à l’intérieur de laquelle figurent certes des pays économiquement faibles mais aussi des entités puissantes comme le Québec, prouve au monde que la domination considérable et continue de l’anglo-américain n’est pas inéluctable. Cette résistance est précieuse. Le Général de Gaulle l’avait bien pressenti qui déclara aux fondateurs que la France approuvait leur action. Aujourd’hui, à quoi assiste-t-on ? A l’organisation d’une coalition d’énergies et de francophones luttant pour la survie du français au sein des institutions internationales, de l’ONU à Bruxelles, et refusant de céder à une forte pression anglophone. Il faut bien constater que cette situation contraire produit un bon effet en imposant à la France de se battre vaillamment, sans épargner efforts et sacrifices. Sachons bien que le coût de notre politique de promotion linguistique est très élevé et que cet argument est utilisé par ceux qui ne sont pas favorables aux dividendes purement culturels.

Certains seront tentés d’entendre dans ce discours «une voix crier dans le désert»…

Certes, mais cette entreprise qu’on pourrait juger de prime abord stérile, comporte également une importante dimension politique. Tous les sommets francophones accueillent des pays pauvres demandeurs d’aide économique ; la promotion du français est liée, chez les Africains en particulier – ainsi que d’une manière générale dans les pays du Maghreb – à la réalité d’une tutelle économique. Ce qui rend ce combat unique au monde, c’est que ce que nous payons si cher n’est autre que l’exportation d’une valeur purement culturelle. Du temps de l’empire, l’enjeu principal était le commerce à des tarifs très favorables avec les pays colonisés. Aujourd’hui, en revanche, l’aide financière apportée à ces pays, si elle leur demeure essentielle, a pour objet principal la promotion du français. Engager des sommes aussi importantes dans une entreprise de promotion de la langue n’est pas un geste anodin.

Pensez-vous que l’accession de pays traditionnellement francophiles – tels que la Pologne – à l’Union européenne puisse contribuer à cet effort ?

L’adhésion des pays d’Europe centrale constituerait plutôt à mes yeux une grave menace pour le français. Leurs populations préfèrent manifestement l’anglais, langue des affaires, au français, perçu comme élitiste et économiquement peu rentable. Ni la Scandinavie ni les pays d’Europe du Nord ne semblent se soucier de nous. Helsinki, Copenhague ou Oslo se préoccupent fort peu de parler français. Ayant une langue nationale qui n’est parlée qu’en deçà de leurs frontières, les Européens du nord voient dans l’anglais un moyen d’ouverture sur un monde économique florissant auquel ils veulent s’associer.

Peut-on déduire des évolutions du français un indice sur des modifications d’ordre sociologiques ?

Déceler dans les évolutions langagières un indice sur les modifications dans lesquelles s’engagerait la langue ne va pas de soi ; que déduire, en effet, d’accords grammaticaux innovants, de cette nouvelle manière d’accentuer les mots en y rajoutant, par exemple, des «e» finaux, sinon simplement un rapprochement des normes écrites et orales ? Un grand nombre d’usages propres à l’oral sont en train de pénétrer l’écrit, alors même que jusqu’à une période récente, le français était une langue où ces deux normes se distinguaient radicalement. Certes, le français change, mais pas plus que par le passé. En déduire, par exemple, une modification de notre rapport au temps serait faire preuve d’une myopie bien contemporaine… Source : http://www.lefigaro.fr/

Gibbs, Jonathan W. 1994. The use of words: How so-called foul words can have many meanings. The City College: The City University of New York term paper for course on African-American English.

Giersberg, Sonja (2015), ‘Cartographie de l’éducation au cinéma en Basse-Saxe’, paper given at Journée d’étude internationale EDUCATION AU CINEMA: histoire, institutions et supports didactiques, Cinémathèque de Lausanne, 31 janvier 2015.

La responsabilité de l’éducation revient à chaque Land allemand.
1- Le Niederachsische Landsinstitut fûr schulische Qualitätstentivcklung NLQ
grande région à très faible densité de population, difficile d’assurer enseignement à la cinématographie. cependant disponibilité tant dans les espaces urbains que ruraux. Travaille surtout avec les enseignants à qui on offre des formations continues.

2- cadre de l’enseignement aux médias:
changement de communication
infinité d’informations
chances pédagogiques
idées directrices:
a-décentralisation sur tout le Land, par un renforcement des capacités locales et régionales
b- continuité par la création de réseaux
c- mise en oeuvre dans l’enseignement général: le film est omniprésent, l’image en mouvement est partout, il n’est plus suffisant d’apprendre les matières cinématographie dans une matière mais dans toutes! Analyser mais aussi réaliser des films.
Loi de 2012: gesammkoncept. Projet clairement établis et ressources humaines et financières garanties jusqu’à 2016…Obligation faite aux enseignants de se former. Les communes sont forcées d’acheter caméras et ordinateurs pour former au montage.
Education au cinéma:
1- travail de conseil:
6 régions de basse-saxe: 80 conseillers pédagogiques qui sont des enseignants bénéficiant de décharge. 48 centres médias environ, le NLQ les chapeaute.
2- projet à travers le land: créer des occasions pour les élèves de produire. Niedersachsen Filmklappe: concours sans thème. Seule compte l’idée de l’histoire et la réalisation par les jeunes en autonomie.Chaque anée, les gagnants sont invités pour la finale à Aurich. Nieexdersachsen Filmkanon: matériel pour anlayse de films nécessite des licences de films, du matériel didactiques, la mise à disposition par les centres des média et Merlin. 15 films réalisés à ce jour dont la qualité didactique varie et progresse vers plus d’interactivité. Taschengeldkino: les élèves doivent faire leur propre film ce qui implique que les professeurs soient eux-mêmes qualifiés. Formation d’un an par 7 modules de 3 jours. Certification ardue car elle implique une réalisation avec les éllèves. en partenariat avec filmlehrer.de
Filmsummit: Congrès de l’éducation au cinéma tous les deux ans, exposés de stimulation, ateliers et forums de discussion.
Base de donnée des conseillers: recherche en combinaison de critères divers.
Portal: Filmbildung-Niedersachsen.de en cours.
Mise en réseau: conseillers pédagogiques, professeurs, conseillers en films etc…en réseau pour échanger expériences, idées, mettre en place projects conjoints…ET partager les frais.

Giesbert, Franz-Olivier (2012), ‘La fin d’une époque’, Le Point, 20 septembre 2012, sec. Editorial p. 7.

L’islamisme et l’antiaméricanisme sont les deux mamelles d’une pathologie qui continue de se développer dans le monde arabe et s’invite, avec quelques braillards salafistes, jusque dans nos quartiers chics.
Les 3/4 des Egyptiens étant convaincus que l’attentat du 11 septembre contre les Twin Towers est l’eourvre d’un complot fomenté par la CIA, le mot pathologie ne paraît pas vraiement inapproprié.
Nous sommes tous les enfants de notre Histoire et il faut rechercher les racines du mal dans le seniment d’humiliation et le complexe d’infériorité qui ronge une partie du monde arabe où l’islam a tôt fait, comme d’autres relgions, de se sentir agressé par la modernité. Mais, devant lui, ce n’est pas une raison pour tomber dans l’angélisme acculturé, la nouvelle idéologie dominante.(…) Les perroquets de la bien-pensance ne nous autorisent qu’à rappeler à l’ordre l’Eglise catholique, à qui, pourtant, la société semble échapper peu à peu. Ils nous interdisent, en revanche, d’interpeller l’islam, corseté dans une posture victimaire, sous prétexte qu’il ne faudrait pas le froisser. C’est tout ce qui leur reste du christianisme, cette stratégie de l’apaisement. Au premier soufflet, ils tendent toujours l’autre joue.

Giglioli, P.P. 1972. Language and Social Context. London: Penguin Books.

Gillespie, M. 1995. Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change. London: Routledge.

Giordan, Henri. 1992. Les Langues Minoritaires, Patrimoine de l’Humanité. In Langues, dialectes et écriture, edited by H. Guillorel and J. Sibille. Paris: Institut d’Etudes Occitanes et Institut de Politique Internationale et Européenne.

Giraudoux, Jean (1939), Pleins pouvoirs (Paris: Gallimard).

pp. 65-66 citées par Finkielkraut, Alain (2015), La seule exactitude (Paris: Éditions Stock) pp. 97-98:
(…) Pleins Pouvoirs, le livre publié par Giraudoux en 1939, quelques semaines seulement avant la déclaration de guerre: “nous ne sommes plus dans une époque où l’orateur ou l’écrivain ait le loisir de choisir ses sujets. Ce sont les sujets, aujourd’hui, qui le choisissent”. Et le sujet qui a choisi l’auteur de Siegfried et le Limousin, ce n’est pas la menace allemande, c’est l’invasion de la France par les immigrés d’Europe centrale: “Entrent chez nous tous ceux qui ont choisi notre pays, non parce qu’il est la France mais parce qu’il reste le seul chantier ouvert de spéculation ou d’agitation facile, et que les baguettes du sourcier y indiquent à haute teneur ces deux trésors qui si souvent voisinent: l’or et la naïveté. Je ne parle pas de ce qu’ils prennent à notre pays, mais en tout cas, il ne lui ajoutent rien. Ils le dénaturent par leur présence et leur action. Ils l’embellissent rarement par leur apparence personnelle. Nous les trouvons grouillants sur chacun de nos arts ou de nos industries nouvelles et anciennes, dans une génération spontanée qui rappelle celle des puces sur le chien à peine né”. Et Giraudoux représente à ses lecteurs terrifiés les “centaines de mille Ashkenazis, échappés des ghettos polonais ou roumains, dont ils rejettent les règles spirituelles, mais non le particularisme, entraînés depuis des siècles à travailler dans les pires conditions, qui éliminent nos compatriotes (…) de tous les métiers du petit artisanat(…) et, entassés par dizaine dans des chambres, échappent à toute investigation du recensement, du fisc et du travail”

Gitlin, Todd. 1992. On the Virtues of Loose Canon. In Debating PC: The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses, edited by P. Berman. New York: Laurel.

Givoni, Michal (2005), ‘Des victimes pas comme les autres. Réactions israéliennes face à la catastrophe du Biaffra.’ in William Ossipow (ed.), Israel et l’Autre (Genève: Labor et Fides), 195-242.

195: Les premiers rapports sur les atrocités du Biafra furent publiés dans la presse israélienne en juillet 1968 et eurent un retentissement considérable. Dès le début, la détresse des Biafrais et leur lutte pour faire sécession du Nigéria furent directement et explicitement reliés à l’extermination des Juifs et à leur lutte pour l’indépendance politique.
196: Les événements du Biafra posèrent un défi particulier à une collectivité qui se percevait à la fois comme l’incarnation de la victime éternelle et comme une victime devenue un jujet souverain et un acteur à part entière de l’Histoire.
198: Dans une série d’articles intitulée “la socité israélienne: tendances et transformations”, Yehoshua A. Gilboa identifia “une dévaluation drastique de la monnaie appelée “la conscience humaine” et qui s’exprime par une conviction que “le monde n’a rien à attendre de nous tout comme nous n’attendons rien du monde”. La désillusion, déclara l’auteur, est liée essentiellement nos propres problèmes, s’appuie sur nos expériences juive et israélienne” pour lesquelles Auschwitz et Treblinka constituent “les symboles…de l’indifférence du monde””.
(…)
Le débat attisa la critique de Georges Steiner qui, lorsqu’il se rendit en Israel durant l’été 1969, déplora le provincialisme de la culture israélienne ainsi que son étroitesse d’esprit. Par cette prise de position, Steiner suscita à son tour les critiques des intellectuels isréiens, qui furent appelés à se définir par rapport au cosmopolitisme juif qu’il affichait. Dans une conversation mirelle mi imaginaire avec Steiner, Shulamit Hareven (Haaretz 16/8/1968) plaidait pour la nécessité de distinguer – et cruellement- ce dont je me soucien, en toute sincéàrité et de toute mon âme, de ce qui me préoccupe de façon moindre”. Hareven situa Steiner dans une cluture distincte don tle défaut est “que tout la préoccupe au même degré”. “vous pouvez être demain un Ibo, après-demain un Vietkong et cela ne vous oblige, en réalité, à aucune action. Moi, je suis contraiente d’agir et de ce fait, je me dois de savoir ce qui est à moi et me préoccupe, ce qui n’est pas à moi et l’est moins.
199: l’enjeu fut donc la Weltanschauung d’Israël et ses concptions particulières du monde (ou lus précisément, sa manière d’être au monde), et ceci en se distinguant de celles des juifs, tout en intégrand leur vécu.
203: (…)bien qu’il existe bien des bases d’action humanitaire en Israel, il seù s’est manifesté un souci pour les victimes palestiniennes (il s’agit de la gauche détestée), l’humanitaire transnational et ses victimes ne sont quasiment pas présents dans l’espace public israélien. L’action humaintaire transnationale que l’on trouve en Israël est par conséquent apolitique dans le sens où ell ene prend pas part aux luttes symboliques dont l’enjeu est la formulation du nomos, le principe de vision et de division du monde social (cf. Bourdieu, Propos sur le Champ Politique, Lyon: PU de Lyon, 2000, p. 64-64).
204: La catastrophe du Biafra, présentée à l’époque tour à tour sous le nom de famine, de guerre civile et de génocide, demeura en plusieurs sens un nom propre, un événement inclassable.
(…)
Dans la conscience collective humainitaire, le Biafra est considéré comme un événement fondateur jalonnant la courte histoire de l’humanitaire non convernemental (cf. Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes, Politics and the Disaster Relief Industri in Africa, Oxford, African Rights and the International African Institute, avec James Currey, Bloomington et Indianapolis, Indiana University press, 1977 p. 72-77; )
206: Le sujet humanitaire qui se constitua dans le sillage du biafra avait d nombreux prédecesseurs: des mouvements civils luttant contre l’esclavage, des coalitions transnationales de femmes, des organisation cariataives liées aux Eglises, des agences internationales telles que le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, ainsi que des organsiations humaintaires non gouvernementales comme le CICIR, Oxfam et Save the CHildren Fund.
210: Bernard Kouchner fit entendre le cri de détresse du peuple biafrais à la gauche dogmatique sourde dont “le désir de faire l’Histoire fait oublier les peuples qui la font” (Bernard Kouchner, Biafra et Moyen-Orien (extrait d’éléments), Biafra. Une leçon à méditer, CID édition spéciales, janvier 1970 pp. 16-19)
214: Durant le mois de juillet 1968, le Parlement israélien tint deux débats passionnés sur la question du Biafra, au cours desquels certains députés s’opposèrent aux propos du ministre des Affaires étrangères Abba Ebban, pour qui les événements qui avaient lieu “à l’Est du Nigéria” auraient constitué une affaire interne à laquelle Israël ne devait pas se mêler.
(…) Face à ce qui fut perçu comme un discours froid (…), certains députés de l’opposition exigèrent de tenir un débat spécial sur la question du Biafra, afin d’engager “un discours extraordinaire et unique en son genre et susceptible d’ébranler la conscience du monde confiné dans la sérénité” (cf. Uri Avneri, la routine maudite, Ha’olam Haze, 27/7/1968).
(…) Les manifestants -parmi lesquels le célèbre pilote de la paix Abie Nathan, le cinéaste et comédien Uri Zohar et le rabbin Israël Lau, rescapé de Buchenwald-portaient des pancartes sur lesquelles on pouvait lire “contre Auschhwitz au Biafra”
216: Ainsi l’action civile était censée réaliser un “devoir sacré” imposé à l’Etat hébreu “dans lequel avaient trouvé refuge les vestiges du massacre du peuple juif”. On exigea de l’Etat qu’il s’érige en “exemple et modèle de tous les peuples” à partir du postulat qu’il a “un devoir de conscience” singulier et que le massacre d’un peuple le regarde tout particulièrement.
217: Les événements au Biafra furent appréhendés comme touchant aux racine de l’existence souveraine de l’Etat hébreu en son effort même à devenir une telle entité. L’Etat ne fut pas perçu comme celui qui se doit de vnir en aide aux Biafrais parce que capable de le faire, mais, en tout premier lieu, comme celui qui porte une obligation particulière de courir à leur secours, et cela sans aucun rapport avec les moyens dont il dispose. “Toute nation peut se permettre de considérer ce qui se passe ua Biafra avec une indifférence qui convient à son éloignement des centres du monde” établit un éditorial de Ha’aretz au début juillet, ” toute nation, sauf les Juifs” (Itzhak Shani, “L’aide israelienne au Biafra, in: La mort du Biafra (P. de Bonneville), Tel-Aviv, Orpaz Press, 1969, p. 148
218: En réalité, les Biafrais eux-mêmes, grâce à l’aide d’agences de communication européennes, furlent les premiers à désigner comme un génocide ce qui aurait pu passer pour un conflit politique controversé, et par là même contribuèrent de façon décisive à l’édification du discours comparatif les référant au génocide des juifs (cf. de Waal, op.cit p. 74-77: article publié par le bureau de propagande biafrais en novembre 1968 établissant une comparaison expliciete entre le génocide juif et le génocide biafrais aisni qu’entre la revendication de souveraineté d’Israel et celle du Biafra)
224 (à propos de l’assimilation refoulée entre les Biafrais et les Palestiniens). Sur cette ressemblance déroutante, qui fonctionna comme l’interdit du débat public, le député Tufic Tubbi (du parti communiste Rakah) s’interrogea: “Comment peut-on s’inquiéter sincèrement des souffrances des réfugiés du Nigéria, du Biafra et d’autres encore et ignorer la souffrance des centaines de milliers de réfugiés arabes, issus de ce pays” (cf. Knesset Israël, Procès-verbaux de la Knesset, vol.52, 1968, p. 2767-2789 ici p. 2797)

L’Etat des Juifs, p. 225
Dans le débat qui porta ni plus ni moins sur les limites du politique, la problématique de l’Etat des Juifs dévia vers trois positions différentes (…)la première affirma qu’Israël ne pourra pas toujours opérer en tant qu’Etat souverain s’il se comporte comme l’Etat des Juifs; la seconde prétendit qu’Israël est un Etat juif tant que la sécurité du pays est incertaine et que sa souveraienté est constamment menacée; et la troisième affirma, à l’encontre des deux précédentes, que l’Etat et les Juifs ne s’excluent pas l’un l’autre et seulement si l’Etat agit en faveur des “Juifs”terme synonyme de peuples opprimés et de ceux qui luttent pour leur liberté, quels qu’ils soient-il pourra réaliser alors sa souveraienté.

Epilogue p. 237
La catastrophe du Biafra fut absorbée tout entière dans le cadre de la victimisation souveraine édifiée par le procès Eichmann et renforcée à la veille des préparatifs de la Guerre de 1967.

Glazer, Nathan. 1975 (1987). Affirmative Discrimination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

I can still remember reading this as a very young student researching on a topic for my masters…good old days;-)) One of my sources of inspiration still guiding me 30 years later!

Glazer, Nathan. 1995. Individual Rights against Group Rights. In The Rights of Minority Cultures, edited by W. Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Glazer, Nathan. 1997. We are all Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1963. Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City. Cambridge: MIT Press.

This book is probably the reason why I got hooked to the issue of multiculturalism…and still am!

Godbout, Jacques. 1989. (à propos de Montréal). Globe and Mail.

C’est la nature cosmopolite de Montréal qui lui assurera un avenir. Je ne parle pas des restaurants exotiques, des boutiques à la mode ou des cafés; j’entends une population qui provient de toutes les parties du monde, pour qui le français est un fait naturel, l’anglais un moyen commode de communication, et qui produira une culture diversifiée greffée à un tronc francophone

Godreche, Dominique. 1999. FESTIVAL DE DOUARNENEZ : Le Yiddishland au cinéma. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (AOÛT): 19.

PETIT-FILS de George Méliès, professeur de yiddish et d’hébreu, Jean-François Malthète est également un passionné de 7e art. C’est à son initiative que le Festival de Douarnenez – consacré au cinéma des cultures minoritaires ou minorisées (1) – a programmé, en juillet dernier, une série de films et de débats sur le « Yiddishland ». L’expression, explique-t-il, est un néologisme inventé dans les années 20 par le linguiste Max Weinrech pour décrire cette langue sans territoire. Langue transversale, car elle unissait les diverses communautés juives d’Europe centrale et orientale, langue de la honte pour certains, de la résistance pour d’autres, le yiddish était autrefois parlé par six millions de personnes. Cinquante ans après le génocide, on ne compte plus qu’un million de yiddishisants.
Présentée en avant-première, l’oeuvre d’Emmanuel Finkiel, Voyages (2), premier film tourné (principalement) en yiddish depuis 1945, évoque cette perte en retraçant le parcours de trois femmes en quête de leur passé. Ou d’un impossible présent – comme cette immigrante russe qui, à son arrivée en Israël, tente vainement de s’exprimer en yiddish et s’exclame finalement : « J’ai l’impression qu’il n’y a plus de juifs en Israël ! » Pour l’un des comédiens du film, Michel Feldman, « Voyages aborde la Shoah sans en parler. On sent celle-ci sans voir de cadavres. Notre génération va disparaître, et il faut témoigner ».
Longtemps oublié, le yiddish réapparaît depuis une quinzaine d’années, explique Gilles Rozier, directeur de la bibliothèque Medem (note de DRM, cf. http://www.yiddishweb.com/medem/ j’y suis allée à l’occasion d’une réunion de JCall, des yiddishisant s’y réunissent autour de la cuisine notamment…mais pas seulement!). Quel avenir pour cette langue ? Reprenant la définition du linguiste Simon Doubnov – « La patrie du yiddish, c’est le monde entier » -, l’historien Henri Minczeles souligne : « Ce que véhicule cette langue, c’est la yiddishkeit, cette culture propre à la civilisation juive ashkénaze qui a failli disparaître. » Le yiddish conserve un rôle de lien entre les populations de la diaspora – du moins celle des juifs occidentaux. « Le yiddish a des ramifications universelles : il existe en Afrique du Sud toute une littérature contre l’apartheid. La revue Aleph Beth, dirigée par des juifs de Johannesburg, avait pris parti pour Mandela », témoigne le poète Charles Dobzinski, auteur d’un ouvrage sur la culture yiddish (3).
A travers les témoignages d’historiens, de journalistes et de créateurs s’est profilée la place actuelle de cette langue qui survit. Sans doute parce que le yiddish – comme le définit le parolier Boris Bergman – représente « un état d’esprit, cette sorte d’humour qui est la politesse du désespoir. L’esprit yiddish, c’est cette volonté de légèreté de l’être dans des situations où on n’en a pas envie ».
LE yiddish perdure comme véhicule d’un monde disparu où le shtetl – bourgade juive d’Europe centrale – habite toujours les mémoires des survivants, incitant leurs enfants à la quête d’un passé qui leur a été dérobé. Parce qu’il « fallait montrer que le monde juif n’est pas un et indivisible », explique Erwan Moellic, un des fondateurs du Festival de Douarnenez, une sélection de films yiddish des années 30 à nos jours en a illustré l’évolution. Entre silence et fureur, le yiddish révèle des univers aussi divers que celui du Dibbouk, tourné en 1937, par Michael Waszynski, film emblématique des kabbalistes de Pologne, ou, plus actuel, Choix et destin de l’Israélienne Tsipi Reibenbach.
« La culpabilité de ne pas être mort avec les autres et d’avoir immigré avant l’extermination oblitéraient la possibilité de transmettre le yiddish », explique Gilles Rozier. Mais, pour Michel Feldman, ancien déporté originaire du ghetto de Lodz, aujourd’hui membre de l’Aedcy (4), « il y a un travail de mémoire à accomplir. Lorsque nous sommes arrivés au camp, mon père m’a dit : “Essaie de vivre, et de témoigner !” Notre génération souhaite que la suivante parle et transmette ».
(1) La prochaine édition du festival aura lieu du 19 au 26 août 2000.
(2) Voyages sortira en salles le 22 septembre 1999.
(3) Charles Dobzinski, Le Monde yiddish. Une légende à vif, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1998.
(4) Association pour l’enseignement et la diffusion de la culture yiddish.
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE – AOÛT 1999 – Page 19
TOUS DROITS RÉSERVÉS © 1999 Le Monde diplomatique.

Gohard, Aline. 1997. D’une multiculturalité reconnue vers un plurilinguisme construit. Paper read at Multilinguisme et Multiculturalité, at Fribourg.

_____1997. Publics spécifiques: quels enjeux ? quelles démarches? pour quels nouveaux besoins. Revue de Linguistique et de Didactique des langues (LIDIL) 16 (dec.1997).

_____ 1998. Peut-on former à l’interculturel? quels concepts et quelles démarches. Bulletin de l’Association pour la recherche interculturelle (ARIC).

_____1999. Communiquer en langue étrangère. Des compétences culturelles vers des compétences linguistiques. Bern: Peter Lang.

Gold, David. 1987. The speech and writing of Jews. In Language in the USA, edited by C. A. Ferguson and S. Brice Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

273: For over threee thousand years of recorded history, Jewish communities have had distinctive patterns of language use: they have been exposed to non-Jewish languages and have created about two dozen Jewish languages of their own.
Despite losses from assimilation, exogamy and conversion, the cohesiveness of Jewish communities has generally remained high. The newly adopted langauge has been Jaized.
Jewish communities have characteristically used more than one language, each for different communicative funtion. Thre is Hebrew, a lashon hakodesh, a vernacular plus the language of the country.
The three Jewish languages of greatest importance in the US have been Yiddish, Hebrew and Dzudezmo.
Hebrew is a semitic language. The mothertongue of the Jewish people in ancient times and has been the vehicle of most sacred Jewish writings
274: Dudezmo si superficially most like spanish. It was once the chief languae of Sefardic jews but is now habitually used by only a handful.
Yiddish is superficially most like German, but a very different kind in fact. It was the native tongue of all ashekenazic jews (cenbtral and eastern europe).
Aside from these separate Jewish languages, the varieties of English used by Jews aare in many instances sufficiently distinctive to be collectively called Jewish English. The story of Jewish speech and wiritng in the US is a history of waves of immigration from differnt parts of the Jewish world.
Jewish settelement: 3 main periods: the sefardic period which lasted from the second half of the 17ème siècle until the second or thrid decade of the 19th, the Western ashkenazic period which lasted until the 1870s or 1880s. The most recent period has been the eastern ashkenazi one, form the 1870s till now. The breakdown into 3 period is a simplification, for at no time has Jewish immigration been homogenious.
274: Religiously, culturally, and linguistically, we find a multitude of Jewish groups in the US. They range, for example, for the least to the most americanized.
parler des loubavitchers de brooklyn.
282: Yiddish in the USA had a birghter history than other immigrant jewish languages, thanks tothe large numbers of native speakers who immigated and to the vibrancy of Yiddish culture in the old country.
283: Efforts to stem the erosion of Yiddish language and cultrue in the US were weak before the Holocaust.The period of greates vigor for Yiddish language and culture in the US extended form the 1890s to the 1950s, peaking in the 1920s or 1930s.
284: As Yiddish has declined, it has generally become a ludic language for many of its speaker’s children and grandchildrem, (shmock))
286: The best cover term for varieties of English used by Jews is Jewish Englis. It has sometimes been péjorativement called Yinglsih.
Speakers and wirters of Jewish English can usually cod-switch between this and a non-Jewish variety, such as In what sul does your zeydi daven on Shabes?
290: kosher, Chanuka, latkes
Most of the the loans from Jewish into no-Jewish English are vocabulary items, including productive morphemes like -nik and -shm- as in beatnik, fancy-shmancy. Intonation. khutspe.

Gold, Robert. 1960. A Jazz Lexicon. New York: Knopf.

Goldberg, Jeffrey (2016), ‘The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world.’ The Atlantic.

Friday, august 30, 2013, the day the feckless Barack Obama brought to a premature end America’s reign as the world’s sole indispensable superpower—or, alternatively, the day the sagacious Barack Obama peered into the Middle Eastern abyss and stepped back from the consuming void—began with a thundering speech given on Obama’s behalf by his secretary of state, John Kerry, in Washington, D.C. The subject of Kerry’s uncharacteristically Churchillian remarks, delivered in the Treaty Room at the State Department, was the gassing of civilians by the president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad.

Obama, in whose Cabinet Kerry serves faithfully, but with some exasperation, is himself given to vaulting oratory, but not usually of the martial sort associated with Churchill. Obama believes that the Manichaeanism, and eloquently rendered bellicosity, commonly associated with Churchill were justified by Hitler’s rise, and were at times defensible in the struggle against the Soviet Union. But he also thinks rhetoric should be weaponized sparingly, if at all, in today’s more ambiguous and complicated international arena. The president believes that Churchillian rhetoric and, more to the point, Churchillian habits of thought, helped bring his predecessor, George W. Bush, to ruinous war in Iraq. Obama entered the White House bent on getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan; he was not seeking new dragons to slay. And he was particularly mindful of promising victory in conflicts he believed to be unwinnable. “If you were to say, for instance, that we’re going to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and build a prosperous democracy instead, the president is aware that someone, seven years later, is going to hold you to that promise,” Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national-security adviser, and his foreign-policy amanuensis, told me not long ago.

But Kerry’s rousing remarks on that August day, which had been drafted in part by Rhodes, were threaded with righteous anger and bold promises, including the barely concealed threat of imminent attack. Kerry, like Obama himself, was horrified by the sins committed by the Syrian regime in its attempt to put down a two-year-old rebellion. In the Damascus suburb of Ghouta nine days earlier, Assad’s army had murdered more than 1,400 civilians with sarin gas. The strong sentiment inside the Obama administration was that Assad had earned dire punishment. In Situation Room meetings that followed the attack on Ghouta, only the White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough, cautioned explicitly about the perils of intervention. John Kerry argued vociferously for action.

“As previous storms in history have gathered, when unspeakable crimes were within our power to stop them, we have been warned against the temptations of looking the other way,” Kerry said in his speech. “History is full of leaders who have warned against inaction, indifference, and especially against silence when it mattered most.”

Kerry counted President Obama among those leaders. A year earlier, when the administration suspected that the Assad regime was contemplating the use of chemical weapons, Obama had declared: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime … that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”

Despite this threat, Obama seemed to many critics to be coldly detached from the suffering of innocent Syrians. Late in the summer of 2011, he had called for Assad’s departure. “For the sake of the Syrian people,” Obama said, “the time has come for President Assad to step aside.” But Obama initially did little to bring about Assad’s end.

He resisted demands to act in part because he assumed, based on the analysis of U.S. intelligence, that Assad would fall without his help. “He thought Assad would go the way Mubarak went,” Dennis Ross, a former Middle East adviser to Obama, told me, referring to the quick departure of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, a moment that represented the acme of the Arab Spring. But as Assad clung to power, Obama’s resistance to direct intervention only grew. After several months of deliberation, he authorized the CIA to train and fund Syrian rebels, but he also shared the outlook of his former defense secretary, Robert Gates, who had routinely asked in meetings, “Shouldn’t we finish up the two wars we have before we look for another?”

The current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, who is the most dispositionally interventionist among Obama’s senior advisers, had argued early for arming Syria’s rebels. Power, who during this period served on the National Security Council staff, is the author of a celebrated book excoriating a succession of U.S. presidents for their failures to prevent genocide. The book, A Problem From Hell, published in 2002, drew Obama to Power while he was in the U.S. Senate, though the two were not an obvious ideological match. Power is a partisan of the doctrine known as “responsibility to protect,” which holds that sovereignty should not be considered inviolate when a country is slaughtering its own citizens. She lobbied him to endorse this doctrine in the speech he delivered when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, but he declined. Obama generally does not believe a president should place American soldiers at great risk in order to prevent humanitarian disasters, unless those disasters pose a direct security threat to the United States.

Power sometimes argued with Obama in front of other National Security Council officials, to the point where he could no longer conceal his frustration. “Samantha, enough, I’ve already read your book,” he once snapped.

Obama, unlike liberal interventionists, is an admirer of the foreign-policy realism of President George H. W. Bush and, in particular, of Bush’s national-security adviser, Brent Scowcroft (“I love that guy,” Obama once told me). Bush and Scowcroft removed Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991, and they deftly managed the disintegration of the Soviet Union; Scowcroft also, on Bush’s behalf, toasted the leaders of China shortly after the slaughter in Tiananmen Square. As Obama was writing his campaign manifesto, The Audacity of Hope, in 2006, Susan Rice, then an informal adviser, felt it necessary to remind him to include at least one line of praise for the foreign policy of President Bill Clinton, to partially balance the praise he showered on Bush and Scowcroft.

At the outset of the Syrian uprising, in early 2011, Power argued that the rebels, drawn from the ranks of ordinary citizens, deserved America’s enthusiastic support. Others noted that the rebels were farmers and doctors and carpenters, comparing these revolutionaries to the men who won America’s war for independence.

Obama flipped this plea on its head. “When you have a professional army,” he once told me, “that is well armed and sponsored by two large states”—Iran and Russia—“who have huge stakes in this, and they are fighting against a farmer, a carpenter, an engineer who started out as protesters and suddenly now see themselves in the midst of a civil conflict …” He paused. “The notion that we could have—in a clean way that didn’t commit U.S. military forces—changed the equation on the ground there was never true.” The message Obama telegraphed in speeches and interviews was clear: He would not end up like the second President Bush—a president who became tragically overextended in the Middle East, whose decisions filled the wards of Walter Reed with grievously wounded soldiers, who was helpless to stop the obliteration of his reputation, even when he recalibrated his policies in his second term. Obama would say privately that the first task of an American president in the post-Bush international arena was “Don’t do stupid shit.”

Obama’s reticence frustrated Power and others on his national-security team who had a preference for action. Hillary Clinton, when she was Obama’s secretary of state, argued for an early and assertive response to Assad’s violence. In 2014, after she left office, Clinton told me that “the failure to help build up a credible fighting force of the people who were the originators of the protests against Assad … left a big vacuum, which the jihadists have now filled.” When The Atlantic published this statement, and also published Clinton’s assessment that “great nations need organizing principles, and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle,” Obama became “rip-shit angry,” according to one of his senior advisers. The president did not understand how “Don’t do stupid shit” could be considered a controversial slogan. Ben Rhodes recalls that “the questions we were asking in the White House were ‘Who exactly is in the stupid-shit caucus? Who is pro–stupid shit?’ ” The Iraq invasion, Obama believed, should have taught Democratic interventionists like Clinton, who had voted for its authorization, the dangers of doing stupid shit. (Clinton quickly apologized to Obama for her comments, and a Clinton spokesman announced that the two would “hug it out” on Martha’s Vineyard when they crossed paths there later.)

CF. Video: Obama’s “Red Line” That Wasn’t

Syria, for Obama, represented a slope potentially as slippery as Iraq. In his first term, he came to believe that only a handful of threats in the Middle East conceivably warranted direct U.S. military intervention. These included the threat posed by al‑Qaeda; threats to the continued existence of Israel (“It would be a moral failing for me as president of the United States” not to defend Israel, he once told me); and, not unrelated to Israel’s security, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. The danger to the United States posed by the Assad regime did not rise to the level of these challenges.

Given Obama’s reticence about intervention, the bright-red line he drew for Assad in the summer of 2012 was striking. Even his own advisers were surprised. “I didn’t know it was coming,” his secretary of defense at the time, Leon Panetta, told me. I was told that Vice President Joe Biden repeatedly warned Obama against drawing a red line on chemical weapons, fearing that it would one day have to be enforced.

Kerry, in his remarks on August 30, 2013, suggested that Assad should be punished in part because the “credibility and the future interests of the United States of America and our allies” were at stake. “It is directly related to our credibility and whether countries still believe the United States when it says something. They are watching to see if Syria can get away with it, because then maybe they too can put the world at greater risk.”

Ninety minutes later, at the White House, Obama reinforced Kerry’s message in a public statement: “It’s important for us to recognize that when over 1,000 people are killed, including hundreds of innocent children, through the use of a weapon that 98 or 99 percent of humanity says should not be used even in war, and there is no action, then we’re sending a signal that that international norm doesn’t mean much. And that is a danger to our national security.”

It appeared as though Obama had drawn the conclusion that damage to American credibility in one region of the world would bleed into others, and that U.S. deterrent credibility was indeed at stake in Syria. Assad, it seemed, had succeeded in pushing the president to a place he never thought he would have to go. Obama generally believes that the Washington foreign-policy establishment, which he secretly disdains, makes a fetish of “credibility”—particularly the sort of credibility purchased with force. The preservation of credibility, he says, led to Vietnam. Within the White House, Obama would argue that “dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force.”

American national-security credibility, as it is conventionally understood in the Pentagon, the State Department, and the cluster of think tanks headquartered within walking distance of the White House, is an intangible yet potent force—one that, when properly nurtured, keeps America’s friends feeling secure and keeps the international order stable.

In White House meetings that crucial week in August, Biden, who ordinarily shared Obama’s worries about American overreach, argued passionately that “big nations don’t bluff.” America’s closest allies in Europe and across the Middle East believed Obama was threatening military action, and his own advisers did as well. At a joint press conference with Obama at the White House the previous May, David Cameron, the British prime minister, had said, “Syria’s history is being written in the blood of her people, and it is happening on our watch.” Cameron’s statement, one of his advisers told me, was meant to encourage Obama toward more-decisive action. “The prime minister was certainly under the impression that the president would enforce the red line,” the adviser told me. The Saudi ambassador in Washington at the time, Adel al-Jubeir, told friends, and his superiors in Riyadh, that the president was finally ready to strike. Obama “figured out how important this is,” Jubeir, who is now the Saudi foreign minister, told one interlocutor. “He will definitely strike.”

Obama had already ordered the Pentagon to develop target lists. Five Arleigh Burke–class destroyers were in the Mediterranean, ready to fire cruise missiles at regime targets. French President François Hollande, the most enthusiastically pro-intervention among Europe’s leaders, was preparing to strike as well. All week, White House officials had publicly built the case that Assad had committed a crime against humanity. Kerry’s speech would mark the culmination of this campaign.

But the president had grown queasy. In the days after the gassing of Ghouta, Obama would later tell me, he found himself recoiling from the idea of an attack unsanctioned by international law or by Congress. The American people seemed unenthusiastic about a Syria intervention; so too did one of the few foreign leaders Obama respects, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. She told him that her country would not participate in a Syria campaign. And in a stunning development, on Thursday, August 29, the British Parliament denied David Cameron its blessing for an attack. John Kerry later told me that when he heard that, “internally, I went, Oops.”

Obama was also unsettled by a surprise visit early in the week from James Clapper, his director of national intelligence, who interrupted the President’s Daily Brief, the threat report Obama receives each morning from Clapper’s analysts, to make clear that the intelligence on Syria’s use of sarin gas, while robust, was not a “slam dunk.” He chose the term carefully. Clapper, the chief of an intelligence community traumatized by its failures in the run-up to the Iraq War, was not going to overpromise, in the manner of the onetime CIA director George Tenet, who famously guaranteed George W. Bush a “slam dunk” in Iraq.

While the Pentagon and the White House’s national-security apparatuses were still moving toward war (John Kerry told me he was expecting a strike the day after his speech), the president had come to believe that he was walking into a trap—one laid both by allies and by adversaries, and by conventional expectations of what an American president is supposed to do.

Many of his advisers did not grasp the depth of the president’s misgivings; his Cabinet and his allies were certainly unaware of them. But his doubts were growing. Late on Friday afternoon, Obama determined that he was simply not prepared to authorize a strike. He asked McDonough, his chief of staff, to take a walk with him on the South Lawn of the White House. Obama did not choose McDonough randomly: He is the Obama aide most averse to U.S. military intervention, and someone who, in the words of one of his colleagues, “thinks in terms of traps.” Obama, ordinarily a preternaturally confident man, was looking for validation, and trying to devise ways to explain his change of heart, both to his own aides and to the public. He and McDonough stayed outside for an hour. Obama told him he was worried that Assad would place civilians as “human shields” around obvious targets. He also pointed out an underlying flaw in the proposed strike: U.S. missiles would not be fired at chemical-weapons depots, for fear of sending plumes of poison into the air. A strike would target military units that had delivered these weapons, but not the weapons themselves.

Obama also shared with McDonough a long-standing resentment: He was tired of watching Washington unthinkingly drift toward war in Muslim countries. Four years earlier, the president believed, the Pentagon had “jammed” him on a troop surge for Afghanistan. Now, on Syria, he was beginning to feel jammed again.

When the two men came back to the Oval Office, the president told his national-security aides that he planned to stand down. There would be no attack the next day; he wanted to refer the matter to Congress for a vote. Aides in the room were shocked. Susan Rice, now Obama’s national-security adviser, argued that the damage to America’s credibility would be serious and lasting. Others had difficulty fathoming how the president could reverse himself the day before a planned strike. Obama, however, was completely calm. “If you’ve been around him, you know when he’s ambivalent about something, when it’s a 51–49 decision,” Ben Rhodes told me. “But he was completely at ease.”

Not long ago, I asked Obama to describe his thinking on that day. He listed the practical worries that had preoccupied him. “We had UN inspectors on the ground who were completing their work, and we could not risk taking a shot while they were there. A second major factor was the failure of Cameron to obtain the consent of his parliament.”

The third, and most important, factor, he told me, was “our assessment that while we could inflict some damage on Assad, we could not, through a missile strike, eliminate the chemical weapons themselves, and what I would then face was the prospect of Assad having survived the strike and claiming he had successfully defied the United States, that the United States had acted unlawfully in the absence of a UN mandate, and that that would have potentially strengthened his hand rather than weakened it.”

The fourth factor, he said, was of deeper philosophical importance. “This falls in the category of something that I had been brooding on for some time,” he said. “I had come into office with the strong belief that the scope of executive power in national-security issues is very broad, but not limitless.”

Obama knew his decision not to bomb Syria would likely upset America’s allies. It did. The prime minister of France, Manuel Valls, told me that his government was already worried about the consequences of earlier inaction in Syria when word came of the stand-down. “By not intervening early, we have created a monster,” Valls told me. “We were absolutely certain that the U.S. administration would say yes. Working with the Americans, we had already seen the targets. It was a great surprise. If we had bombed as was planned, I think things would be different today.” The crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, who was already upset with Obama for “abandoning” Hosni Mubarak, the former president of Egypt, fumed to American visitors that the U.S. was led by an “untrustworthy” president. The king of Jordan, Abdullah II—already dismayed by what he saw as Obama’s illogical desire to distance the U.S. from its traditional Sunni Arab allies and create a new alliance with Iran, Assad’s Shia sponsor—complained privately, “I think I believe in American power more than Obama does.” The Saudis, too, were infuriated. They had never trusted Obama—he had, long before he became president, referred to them as a “so-called ally” of the U.S. “Iran is the new great power of the Middle East, and the U.S. is the old,” Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador in Washington, told his superiors in Riyadh.

Obama’s decision caused tremors across Washington as well. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, the two leading Republican hawks in the Senate, had met with Obama in the White House earlier in the week and had been promised an attack. They were angered by the about-face. Damage was done even inside the administration. Neither Chuck Hagel, then the secretary of defense, nor John Kerry was in the Oval Office when the president informed his team of his thinking. Kerry would not learn about the change until later that evening. “I just got fucked over,” he told a friend shortly after talking to the president that night. (When I asked Kerry recently about that tumultuous night, he said, “I didn’t stop to analyze it. I figured the president had a reason to make a decision and, honestly, I understood his notion.”)

The next few days were chaotic. The president asked Congress to authorize the use of force—the irrepressible Kerry served as chief lobbyist—and it quickly became apparent in the White House that Congress had little interest in a strike. When I spoke with Biden recently about the red-line decision, he made special note of this fact. “It matters to have Congress with you, in terms of your ability to sustain what you set out to do,” he said. Obama “didn’t go to Congress to get himself off the hook. He had his doubts at that point, but he knew that if he was going to do anything, he better damn well have the public with him, or it would be a very short ride.” Congress’s clear ambivalence convinced Biden that Obama was correct to fear the slippery slope. “What happens when we get a plane shot down? Do we not go in and rescue?,” Biden asked. “You need the support of the American people.”

Amid the confusion, a deus ex machina appeared in the form of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. At the G20 summit in St. Petersburg, which was held the week after the Syria reversal, Obama pulled Putin aside, he recalled to me, and told the Russian president “that if he forced Assad to get rid of the chemical weapons, that that would eliminate the need for us taking a military strike.” Within weeks, Kerry, working with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, would engineer the removal of most of Syria’s chemical-weapons arsenal—a program whose existence Assad until then had refused to even acknowledge.

THE MOMENT OBAMA DECIDED NOT TO ENFORCE HIS RED LINE AND BOMB SYRIA, HE BROKE WITH WHAT HE CALLS, DERISIVELY, “THE WASHINGTON PLAYBOOK.” THIS WAS HIS LIBERATION DAY.
The arrangement won the president praise from, of all people, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, with whom he has had a consistently contentious relationship. The removal of Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpiles represented “the one ray of light in a very dark region,” Netanyahu told me not long after the deal was announced.

John Kerry today expresses no patience for those who argue, as he himself once did, that Obama should have bombed Assad-regime sites in order to buttress America’s deterrent capability. “You’d still have the weapons there, and you’d probably be fighting isil” for control of the weapons, he said, referring to the Islamic State, the terror group also known as isis. “It just doesn’t make sense. But I can’t deny to you that this notion about the red line being crossed and [Obama’s] not doing anything gained a life of its own.”

Obama understands that the decision he made to step back from air strikes, and to allow the violation of a red line he himself had drawn to go unpunished, will be interrogated mercilessly by historians. But today that decision is a source of deep satisfaction for him.

“I’m very proud of this moment,” he told me. “The overwhelming weight of conventional wisdom and the machinery of our national-security apparatus had gone fairly far. The perception was that my credibility was at stake, that America’s credibility was at stake. And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, I knew, would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to pull back from the immediate pressures and think through in my own mind what was in America’s interest, not only with respect to Syria but also with respect to our democracy, was as tough a decision as I’ve made—and I believe ultimately it was the right decision to make.”

This was the moment the president believes he finally broke with what he calls, derisively, the “Washington playbook.”

“Where am I controversial? When it comes to the use of military power,” he said. “That is the source of the controversy. There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It’s a playbook that comes out of the foreign-policy establishment. And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses. Where America is directly threatened, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions. In the midst of an international challenge like Syria, you get judged harshly if you don’t follow the playbook, even if there are good reasons why it does not apply.”

I have come to believe that, in Obama’s mind, August 30, 2013, was his liberation day, the day he defied not only the foreign-policy establishment and its cruise-missile playbook, but also the demands of America’s frustrating, high-maintenance allies in the Middle East—countries, he complains privately to friends and advisers, that seek to exploit American “muscle” for their own narrow and sectarian ends. By 2013, Obama’s resentments were well developed. He resented military leaders who believed they could fix any problem if the commander in chief would simply give them what they wanted, and he resented the foreign-policy think-tank complex. A widely held sentiment inside the White House is that many of the most prominent foreign-policy think tanks in Washington are doing the bidding of their Arab and pro-Israel funders. I’ve heard one administration official refer to Massachusetts Avenue, the home of many of these think tanks, as “Arab-occupied territory.”

Obama talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin prior to the opening session of the G20 in Antalya in November of 2015. (Cem Oksuz / Reuters)

For some foreign-policy experts, even within his own administration, Obama’s about-face on enforcing the red line was a dispiriting moment in which he displayed irresolution and naïveté, and did lasting damage to America’s standing in the world. “Once the commander in chief draws that red line,” Leon Panetta, who served as CIA director and then as secretary of defense in Obama’s first term, told me recently, “then I think the credibility of the commander in chief and this nation is at stake if he doesn’t enforce it.” Right after Obama’s reversal, Hillary Clinton said privately, “If you say you’re going to strike, you have to strike. There’s no choice.”

“Assad is effectively being rewarded for the use of chemical weapons, rather than ‘punished’ as originally planned.” Shadi Hamid, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, wrote for The Atlantic at the time. “He has managed to remove the threat of U.S. military action while giving very little up in return.”

Even commentators who have been broadly sympathetic to Obama’s policies saw this episode as calamitous. Gideon Rose, the editor of Foreign Affairs, wrote recently that Obama’s handling of this crisis—“first casually announcing a major commitment, then dithering about living up to it, then frantically tossing the ball to Congress for a decision—was a case study in embarrassingly amateurish improvisation.”

Obama’s defenders, however, argue that he did no damage to U.S. credibility, citing Assad’s subsequent agreement to have his chemical weapons removed. “The threat of force was credible enough for them to give up their chemical weapons,” Tim Kaine, a Democratic senator from Virginia, told me. “We threatened military action and they responded. That’s deterrent credibility.”

History may record August 30, 2013, as the day Obama prevented the U.S. from entering yet another disastrous Muslim civil war, and the day he removed the threat of a chemical attack on Israel, Turkey, or Jordan. Or it could be remembered as the day he let the Middle East slip from America’s grasp, into the hands of Russia, Iran, and isis.

I first spoke with obama about foreign policy when he was a U.S. senator, in 2006. At the time, I was familiar mainly with the text of a speech he had delivered four years earlier, at a Chicago antiwar rally. It was an unusual speech for an antiwar rally in that it was not antiwar; Obama, who was then an Illinois state senator, argued only against one specific and, at the time, still theoretical, war. “I suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein,” he said. “He is a brutal man. A ruthless man … But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States or to his neighbors.” He added, “I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of al-Qaeda.”

This speech had made me curious about its author. I wanted to learn how an Illinois state senator, a part-time law professor who spent his days traveling between Chicago and Springfield, had come to a more prescient understanding of the coming quagmire than the most experienced foreign-policy thinkers of his party, including such figures as Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and John Kerry, not to mention, of course, most Republicans and many foreign-policy analysts and writers, including me.

Since that first meeting in 2006, I’ve interviewed Obama periodically, mainly on matters related to the Middle East. But over the past few months, I’ve spent several hours talking with him about the broadest themes of his “long game” foreign policy, including the themes he is most eager to discuss—namely, the ones that have nothing to do with the Middle East.

“isis is not an existential threat to the United States,” he told me in one of these conversations. “Climate change is a potential existential threat to the entire world if we don’t do something about it.” Obama explained that climate change worries him in particular because “it is a political problem perfectly designed to repel government intervention. It involves every single country, and it is a comparatively slow-moving emergency, so there is always something seemingly more urgent on the agenda.”

At the moment, of course, the most urgent of the “seemingly more urgent” issues is Syria. But at any given moment, Obama’s entire presidency could be upended by North Korean aggression, or an assault by Russia on a member of nato, or an isis-planned attack on U.S. soil. Few presidents have faced such diverse tests on the international stage as Obama has, and the challenge for him, as for all presidents, has been to distinguish the merely urgent from the truly important, and to focus on the important.

My goal in our recent conversations was to see the world through Obama’s eyes, and to understand what he believes America’s role in the world should be. This article is informed by our recent series of conversations, which took place in the Oval Office; over lunch in his dining room; aboard Air Force One; and in Kuala Lumpur during his most recent visit to Asia, in November. It is also informed by my previous interviews with him and by his speeches and prolific public ruminations, as well as by conversations with his top foreign-policy and national-security advisers, foreign leaders and their ambassadors in Washington, friends of the president and others who have spoken with him about his policies and decisions, and his adversaries and critics.

Over the course of our conversations, I came to see Obama as a president who has grown steadily more fatalistic about the constraints on America’s ability to direct global events, even as he has, late in his presidency, accumulated a set of potentially historic foreign-policy achievements—controversial, provisional achievements, to be sure, but achievements nonetheless: the opening to Cuba, the Paris climate-change accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and, of course, the Iran nuclear deal. These he accomplished despite his growing sense that larger forces—the riptide of tribal feeling in a world that should have already shed its atavism; the resilience of small men who rule large countries in ways contrary to their own best interests; the persistence of fear as a governing human emotion—frequently conspire against the best of America’s intentions. But he also has come to learn, he told me, that very little is accomplished in international affairs without U.S. leadership.

Obama talked me through this apparent contradiction. “I want a president who has the sense that you can’t fix everything,” he said. But on the other hand, “if we don’t set the agenda, it doesn’t happen.” He explained what he meant. “The fact is, there is not a summit I’ve attended since I’ve been president where we are not setting the agenda, where we are not responsible for the key results,” he said. “That’s true whether you’re talking about nuclear security, whether you’re talking about saving the world financial system, whether you’re talking about climate.”

One day, over lunch in the Oval Office dining room, I asked the president how he thought his foreign policy might be understood by historians. He started by describing for me a four-box grid representing the main schools of American foreign-policy thought. One box he called isolationism, which he dismissed out of hand. “The world is ever-shrinking,” he said. “Withdrawal is untenable.” The other boxes he labeled realism, liberal interventionism, and internationalism. “I suppose you could call me a realist in believing we can’t, at any given moment, relieve all the world’s misery,” he said. “We have to choose where we can make a real impact.” He also noted that he was quite obviously an internationalist, devoted as he is to strengthening multilateral organizations and international norms.

I told him my impression was that the various traumas of the past seven years have, if anything, intensified his commitment to realist-driven restraint. Had nearly two full terms in the White House soured him on interventionism?

“For all of our warts, the United States has clearly been a force for good in the world,” he said. “If you compare us to previous superpowers, we act less on the basis of naked self-interest, and have been interested in establishing norms that benefit everyone. If it is possible to do good at a bearable cost, to save lives, we will do it.”

If a crisis, or a humanitarian catastrophe, does not meet his stringent standard for what constitutes a direct national-security threat, Obama said, he doesn’t believe that he should be forced into silence. He is not so much the realist, he suggested, that he won’t pass judgment on other leaders. Though he has so far ruled out the use of direct American power to depose Assad, he was not wrong, he argued, to call on Assad to go. “Oftentimes when you get critics of our Syria policy, one of the things that they’ll point out is ‘You called for Assad to go, but you didn’t force him to go. You did not invade.’ And the notion is that if you weren’t going to overthrow the regime, you shouldn’t have said anything. That’s a weird argument to me, the notion that if we use our moral authority to say ‘This is a brutal regime, and this is not how a leader should treat his people,’ once you do that, you are obliged to invade the country and install a government you prefer.”

“I am very much the internationalist,” Obama said in a later conversation. “And I am also an idealist insofar as I believe that we should be promoting values, like democracy and human rights and norms and values, because not only do they serve our interests the more people adopt values that we share—in the same way that, economically, if people adopt rule of law and property rights and so forth, that is to our advantage—but because it makes the world a better place. And I’m willing to say that in a very corny way, and in a way that probably Brent Scowcroft would not say.

“Having said that,” he continued, “I also believe that the world is a tough, complicated, messy, mean place, and full of hardship and tragedy. And in order to advance both our security interests and those ideals and values that we care about, we’ve got to be hardheaded at the same time as we’re bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and recognize that there are going to be times where the best that we can do is to shine a spotlight on something that’s terrible, but not believe that we can automatically solve it. There are going to be times where our security interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. There are going to be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed, but there are going to be times where we can’t.”

If Obama ever questioned whether America really is the world’s one indispensable nation, he no longer does so. But he is the rare president who seems at times to resent indispensability, rather than embrace it. “Free riders aggravate me,” he told me. Recently, Obama warned that Great Britain would no longer be able to claim a “special relationship” with the United States if it did not commit to spending at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense. “You have to pay your fair share,” Obama told David Cameron, who subsequently met the 2 percent threshold.

Part of his mission as president, Obama explained, is to spur other countries to take action for themselves, rather than wait for the U.S. to lead. The defense of the liberal international order against jihadist terror, Russian adventurism, and Chinese bullying depends in part, he believes, on the willingness of other nations to share the burden with the U.S. This is why the controversy surrounding the assertion—made by an anonymous administration official to The New Yorker during the Libya crisis of 2011—that his policy consisted of “leading from behind” perturbed him. “We don’t have to always be the ones who are up front,” he told me. “Sometimes we’re going to get what we want precisely because we are sharing in the agenda. The irony is that it was precisely in order to prevent the Europeans and the Arab states from holding our coats while we did all the fighting that we, by design, insisted” that they lead during the mission to remove Muammar Qaddafi from power in Libya. “It was part of the anti–free rider campaign.”

The president also seems to believe that sharing leadership with other countries is a way to check America’s more unruly impulses. “One of the reasons I am so focused on taking action multilaterally where our direct interests are not at stake is that multilateralism regulates hubris,” he explained. He consistently invokes what he understands to be America’s past failures overseas as a means of checking American self-righteousness. “We have history,” he said. “We have history in Iran, we have history in Indonesia and Central America. So we have to be mindful of our history when we start talking about intervening, and understand the source of other people’s suspicions.”

In his efforts to off-load some of America’s foreign-policy responsibilities to its allies, Obama appears to be a classic retrenchment president in the manner of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Retrenchment, in this context, is defined as “pulling back, spending less, cutting risk, and shifting burdens to allies,” Stephen Sestanovich, an expert on presidential foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained to me. “If John McCain had been elected in 2008, you would still have seen some degree of retrenchment,” Sestanovich said. “It’s what the country wanted. If you come into office in the middle of a war that is not going well, you’re convinced that the American people have hired you to do less.” One difference between Eisenhower and Nixon, on the one hand, and Obama, on the other, Sestanovich said, is that Obama “appears to have had a personal, ideological commitment to the idea that foreign policy had consumed too much of the nation’s attention and resources.”

I asked Obama about retrenchment. “Almost every great world power has succumbed” to overextension, he said. “What I think is not smart is the idea that every time there is a problem, we send in our military to impose order. We just can’t do that.”

But once he decides that a particular challenge represents a direct national-security threat, he has shown a willingness to act unilaterally. This is one of the larger ironies of the Obama presidency: He has relentlessly questioned the efficacy of force, but he has also become the most successful terrorist-hunter in the history of the presidency, one who will hand to his successor a set of tools an accomplished assassin would envy. “He applies different standards to direct threats to the U.S.,” Ben Rhodes says. “For instance, despite his misgivings about Syria, he has not had a second thought about drones.” Some critics argue he should have had a few second thoughts about what they see as the overuse of drones. But John Brennan, Obama’s CIA director, told me recently that he and the president “have similar views. One of them is that sometimes you have to take a life to save even more lives. We have a similar view of just-war theory. The president requires near-certainty of no collateral damage. But if he believes it is necessary to act, he doesn’t hesitate.”

Those who speak with Obama about jihadist thought say that he possesses a no-illusions understanding of the forces that drive apocalyptic violence among radical Muslims, but he has been careful about articulating that publicly, out of concern that he will exacerbate anti-Muslim xenophobia. He has a tragic realist’s understanding of sin, cowardice, and corruption, and a Hobbesian appreciation of how fear shapes human behavior. And yet he consistently, and with apparent sincerity, professes optimism that the world is bending toward justice. He is, in a way, a Hobbesian optimist.

The contradictions do not end there. Though he has a reputation for prudence, he has also been eager to question some of the long-standing assumptions undergirding traditional U.S. foreign-policy thinking. To a remarkable degree, he is willing to question why America’s enemies are its enemies, or why some of its friends are its friends. He overthrew half a century of bipartisan consensus in order to reestablish ties with Cuba. He questioned why the U.S. should avoid sending its forces into Pakistan to kill al-Qaeda leaders, and he privately questions why Pakistan, which he believes is a disastrously dysfunctional country, should be considered an ally of the U.S. at all. According to Leon Panetta, he has questioned why the U.S. should maintain Israel’s so-called qualitative military edge, which grants it access to more sophisticated weapons systems than America’s Arab allies receive; but he has also questioned, often harshly, the role that America’s Sunni Arab allies play in fomenting anti-American terrorism. He is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally. And of course he decided early on, in the face of great criticism, that he wanted to reach out to America’s most ardent Middle Eastern foe, Iran. The nuclear deal he struck with Iran proves, if nothing else, that Obama is not risk-averse. He has bet global security and his own legacy that one of the world’s leading state sponsors of terrorism will adhere to an agreement to curtail its nuclear program.

“DROPPING BOMBS ON SOMEONE TO PROVE THAT YOU’RE WILLING TO DROP BOMBS ON SOMEONE IS JUST ABOUT THE WORST REASON TO USE FORCE.”
It is assumed, at least among his critics, that Obama sought the Iran deal because he has a vision of a historic American-Persian rapprochement. But his desire for the nuclear agreement was born of pessimism as much as it was of optimism. “The Iran deal was never primarily about trying to open a new era of relations between the U.S. and Iran,” Susan Rice told me. “It was far more pragmatic and minimalist. The aim was very simply to make a dangerous country substantially less dangerous. No one had any expectation that Iran would be a more benign actor.”

I once mentioned to obama a scene from The Godfather: Part III, in which Michael Corleone complains angrily about his failure to escape the grasp of organized crime. I told Obama that the Middle East is to his presidency what the Mob is to Corleone, and I started to quote the Al Pacino line: “Just when I thought I was out—”

“It pulls you back in,” Obama said, completing the thought.

The story of Obama’s encounter with the Middle East follows an arc of disenchantment. In his first extended spree of fame, as a presidential candidate in 2008, Obama often spoke with hope about the region. In Berlin that summer, in a speech to 200,000 adoring Germans, he said, “This is the moment we must help answer the call for a new dawn in the Middle East.”

The next year, as president, he gave a speech in Cairo meant to reset U.S. relations with the world’s Muslims. He spoke about Muslims in his own family, and his childhood years in Indonesia, and confessed America’s sins even as he criticized those in the Muslim world who demonized the U.S. What drew the most attention, though, was his promise to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was then thought to be the central animating concern of Arab Muslims. His sympathy for the Palestinians moved the audience, but complicated his relations with Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister—especially because Obama had also decided to bypass Jerusalem on his first presidential visit to the Middle East.

When I asked Obama recently what he had hoped to accomplish with his Cairo reset speech, he said that he had been trying—unsuccessfully, he acknowledged—to persuade Muslims to more closely examine the roots of their unhappiness.

“My argument was this: Let’s all stop pretending that the cause of the Middle East’s problems is Israel,” he told me. “We want to work to help achieve statehood and dignity for the Palestinians, but I was hoping that my speech could trigger a discussion, could create space for Muslims to address the real problems they are confronting—problems of governance, and the fact that some currents of Islam have not gone through a reformation that would help people adapt their religious doctrines to modernity. My thought was, I would communicate that the U.S. is not standing in the way of this progress, that we would help, in whatever way possible, to advance the goals of a practical, successful Arab agenda that provided a better life for ordinary people.”

(photo) British Prime Minister David Cameron, flanked by U.K. officials, attends dinner at the White House in January 2015. (Pete Souza / White House)
Through the first flush of the Arab Spring, in 2011, Obama continued to speak optimistically about the Middle East’s future, coming as close as he ever would to embracing the so-called freedom agenda of George W. Bush, which was characterized in part by the belief that democratic values could be implanted in the Middle East. He equated protesters in Tunisia and Tahrir Square with Rosa Parks and the “patriots of Boston.”

“After decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be,” he said in a speech at the time. “The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders … Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest.”

But over the next three years, as the Arab Spring gave up its early promise, and brutality and dysfunction overwhelmed the Middle East, the president grew disillusioned. Some of his deepest disappointments concern Middle Eastern leaders themselves. Benjamin Netanyahu is in his own category: Obama has long believed that Netanyahu could bring about a two-state solution that would protect Israel’s status as a Jewish-majority democracy, but is too fearful and politically paralyzed to do so. Obama has also not had much patience for Netanyahu and other Middle Eastern leaders who question his understanding of the region. In one of Netanyahu’s meetings with the president, the Israeli prime minister launched into something of a lecture about the dangers of the brutal region in which he lives, and Obama felt that Netanyahu was behaving in a condescending fashion, and was also avoiding the subject at hand: peace negotiations. Finally, the president interrupted the prime minister: “Bibi, you have to understand something,” he said. “I’m the African American son of a single mother, and I live here, in this house. I live in the White House. I managed to get elected president of the United States. You think I don’t understand what you’re talking about, but I do.” Other leaders also frustrate him immensely. Early on, Obama saw Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, as the sort of moderate Muslim leader who would bridge the divide between East and West—but Obama now considers him a failure and an authoritarian, one who refuses to use his enormous army to bring stability to Syria. And on the sidelines of a nato summit in Wales in 2014, Obama pulled aside King Abdullah II of Jordan. Obama said he had heard that Abdullah had complained to friends in the U.S. Congress about his leadership, and told the king that if he had complaints, he should raise them directly. The king denied that he had spoken ill of him.

In recent days, the president has taken to joking privately, “All I need in the Middle East is a few smart autocrats.” Obama has always had a fondness for pragmatic, emotionally contained technocrats, telling aides, “If only everyone could be like the Scandinavians, this would all be easy.”

The unraveling of the Arab Spring darkened the president’s view of what the U.S. could achieve in the Middle East, and made him realize how much the chaos there was distracting from other priorities. “The president recognized during the course of the Arab Spring that the Middle East was consuming us,” John Brennan, who served in Obama’s first term as his chief counterterrorism adviser, told me recently.

But what sealed Obama’s fatalistic view was the failure of his administration’s intervention in Libya, in 2011. That intervention was meant to prevent the country’s then-dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, from slaughtering the people of Benghazi, as he was threatening to do. Obama did not want to join the fight; he was counseled by Joe Biden and his first-term secretary of defense Robert Gates, among others, to steer clear. But a strong faction within the national-security team—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice, who was then the ambassador to the United Nations, along with Samantha Power, Ben Rhodes, and Antony Blinken, who was then Biden’s national-security adviser—lobbied hard to protect Benghazi, and prevailed. (Biden, who is acerbic about Clinton’s foreign-policy judgment, has said privately, “Hillary just wants to be Golda Meir.”) American bombs fell, the people of Benghazi were spared from what may or may not have been a massacre, and Qaddafi was captured and executed.

But Obama says today of the intervention, “It didn’t work.” The U.S., he believes, planned the Libya operation carefully—and yet the country is still a disaster.

Why, given what seems to be the president’s natural reticence toward getting militarily ensnarled where American national security is not directly at stake, did he accept the recommendation of his more activist advisers to intervene?

“The social order in Libya has broken down,” Obama said, explaining his thinking at the time. “You have massive protests against Qaddafi. You’ve got tribal divisions inside of Libya. Benghazi is a focal point for the opposition regime. And Qaddafi is marching his army toward Benghazi, and he has said, ‘We will kill them like rats.’

“Now, option one would be to do nothing, and there were some in my administration who said, as tragic as the Libyan situation may be, it’s not our problem. The way I looked at it was that it would be our problem if, in fact, complete chaos and civil war broke out in Libya. But this is not so at the core of U.S. interests that it makes sense for us to unilaterally strike against the Qaddafi regime. At that point, you’ve got Europe and a number of Gulf countries who despise Qaddafi, or are concerned on a humanitarian basis, who are calling for action. But what has been a habit over the last several decades in these circumstances is people pushing us to act but then showing an unwillingness to put any skin in the game.”

“Free riders?,” I interjected.

“Free riders,” he said, and continued. “So what I said at that point was, we should act as part of an international coalition. But because this is not at the core of our interests, we need to get a UN mandate; we need Europeans and Gulf countries to be actively involved in the coalition; we will apply the military capabilities that are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight. And we worked with our defense teams to ensure that we could execute a strategy without putting boots on the ground and without a long-term military commitment in Libya.

“So we actually executed this plan as well as I could have expected: We got a UN mandate, we built a coalition, it cost us $1 billion—which, when it comes to military operations, is very cheap. We averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what almost surely would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict. And despite all that, Libya is a mess.”

Mess is the president’s diplomatic term; privately, he calls Libya a “shit show,” in part because it’s subsequently become an isis haven—one that he has already targeted with air strikes. It became a shit show, Obama believes, for reasons that had less to do with American incompetence than with the passivity of America’s allies and with the obdurate power of tribalism.

“When I go back and I ask myself what went wrong,” Obama said, “there’s room for criticism, because I had more faith in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up,” he said. He noted that Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, lost his job the following year. And he said that British Prime Minister David Cameron soon stopped paying attention, becoming “distracted by a range of other things.” Of France, he said, “Sarkozy wanted to trumpet the flights he was taking in the air campaign, despite the fact that we had wiped out all the air defenses and essentially set up the entire infrastructure” for the intervention. This sort of bragging was fine, Obama said, because it allowed the U.S. to “purchase France’s involvement in a way that made it less expensive for us and less risky for us.” In other words, giving France extra credit in exchange for less risk and cost to the United States was a useful trade-off—except that “from the perspective of a lot of the folks in the foreign-policy establishment, well, that was terrible. If we’re going to do something, obviously we’ve got to be up front, and nobody else is sharing in the spotlight.”

Obama also blamed internal Libyan dynamics. “The degree of tribal division in Libya was greater than our analysts had expected. And our ability to have any kind of structure there that we could interact with and start training and start providing resources broke down very quickly.”

Libya proved to him that the Middle East was best avoided. “There is no way we should commit to governing the Middle East and North Africa,” he recently told a former colleague from the Senate. “That would be a basic, fundamental mistake.”

President obama did not come into office preoccupied by the Middle East. He is the first child of the Pacific to become president—born in Hawaii, raised there and, for four years, in Indonesia—and he is fixated on turning America’s attention to Asia. For Obama, Asia represents the future. Africa and Latin America, in his view, deserve far more U.S. attention than they receive. Europe, about which he is unromantic, is a source of global stability that requires, to his occasional annoyance, American hand-holding. And the Middle East is a region to be avoided—one that, thanks to America’s energy revolution, will soon be of negligible relevance to the U.S. economy.

It is not oil but another of the Middle East’s exports, terrorism, that shapes Obama’s understanding of his responsibilities there. Early in 2014, Obama’s intelligence advisers told him that isis was of marginal importance. According to administration officials, General Lloyd Austin, then the commander of Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, told the White House that the Islamic State was “a flash in the pan.” This analysis led Obama, in an interview with The New Yorker, to describe the constellation of jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria as terrorism’s “jayvee team.” (A spokesman for Austin told me, “At no time has General Austin ever considered isil a ‘flash in the pan’ phenomenon.”)

MESS IS THE PRESIDENT’S DIPLOMATIC TERM FOR WHAT U.S. INTERVENTION LEFT BEHIND IN LIBYA; PRIVATELY, HE CALLS IT A “SHIT SHOW.”
But by late spring of 2014, after isis took the northern-Iraq city of Mosul, he came to believe that U.S. intelligence had failed to appreciate the severity of the threat and the inadequacies of the Iraqi army, and his view shifted. After isis beheaded three American civilians in Syria, it became obvious to Obama that defeating the group was of more immediate urgency to the U.S. than overthrowing Bashar al-Assad.

Advisers recall that Obama would cite a pivotal moment in The Dark Knight, the 2008 Batman movie, to help explain not only how he understood the role of isis, but how he understood the larger ecosystem in which it grew. “There’s a scene in the beginning in which the gang leaders of Gotham are meeting,” the president would say. “These are men who had the city divided up. They were thugs, but there was a kind of order. Everyone had his turf. And then the Joker comes in and lights the whole city on fire. isil is the Joker. It has the capacity to set the whole region on fire. That’s why we have to fight it.”

The rise of the Islamic State deepened Obama’s conviction that the Middle East could not be fixed—not on his watch, and not for a generation to come.

On a rainy wednesday in mid-November, President Obama appeared on a stage at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) summit in Manila with Jack Ma, the founder of the Chinese e-commerce company Alibaba, and a 31-year-old Filipina inventor named Aisa Mijeno. The ballroom was crowded with Asian CEOs, American business leaders, and government officials from across the region. Obama, who was greeted warmly, first delivered informal remarks from behind a podium, mainly about the threat of climate change.

Obama made no mention of the subject preoccupying much of the rest of the world—the isis attacks in Paris five days earlier, which had killed 130 people. Obama had arrived in Manila the day before from a G20 summit held in Antalya, Turkey. The Paris attacks had been a main topic of conversation in Antalya, where Obama held a particularly contentious press conference on the subject.

The traveling White House press corps was unrelenting: “Isn’t it time for your strategy to change?” one reporter asked. This was followed by “Could I ask you to address your critics who say that your reluctance to enter another Middle East war, and your preference of diplomacy over using the military, makes the United States weaker and emboldens our enemies?” And then came this imperishable question, from a CNN reporter: “If you’ll forgive the language—why can’t we take out these bastards?” Which was followed by “Do you think you really understand this enemy well enough to defeat them and to protect the homeland?”

As the questions unspooled, Obama became progressively more irritated. He described his isis strategy at length, but the only time he exhibited an emotion other than disdain was when he addressed an emerging controversy about America’s refugee policy. Republican governors and presidential candidates had suddenly taken to demanding that the United States block Syrian refugees from coming to America. Ted Cruz had proposed accepting only Christian Syrians. Chris Christie had said that all refugees, including “orphans under 5,” should be banned from entry until proper vetting procedures had been put in place.

This rhetoric appeared to frustrate Obama immensely. “When I hear folks say that, well, maybe we should just admit the Christians but not the Muslims; when I hear political leaders suggesting that there would be a religious test for which person who’s fleeing from a war-torn country is admitted,” Obama told the assembled reporters, “that’s not American. That’s not who we are. We don’t have religious tests to our compassion.”

“AREN’T THE SAUDIS YOUR FRIENDS?” THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED. OBAMA SMILED. “IT’S COMPLICATED.”
Air Force One departed Antalya and arrived 10 hours later in Manila. That’s when the president’s advisers came to understand, in the words of one official, that “everyone back home had lost their minds.” Susan Rice, trying to comprehend the rising anxiety, searched her hotel television in vain for CNN, finding only the BBC and Fox News. She toggled between the two, looking for the mean, she told people on the trip.

Later, the president would say that he had failed to fully appreciate the fear many Americans were experiencing about the possibility of a Paris-style attack in the U.S. Great distance, a frantic schedule, and the jet-lag haze that envelops a globe-spanning presidential trip were working against him. But he has never believed that terrorism poses a threat to America commensurate with the fear it generates. Even during the period in 2014 when isis was executing its American captives in Syria, his emotions were in check. Valerie Jarrett, Obama’s closest adviser, told him people were worried that the group would soon take its beheading campaign to the U.S. “They’re not coming here to chop our heads off,” he reassured her. Obama frequently reminds his staff that terrorism takes far fewer lives in America than handguns, car accidents, and falls in bathtubs do. Several years ago, he expressed to me his admiration for Israelis’ “resilience” in the face of constant terrorism, and it is clear that he would like to see resilience replace panic in American society. Nevertheless, his advisers are fighting a constant rearguard action to keep Obama from placing terrorism in what he considers its “proper” perspective, out of concern that he will seem insensitive to the fears of the American people.

Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry look on during a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the World Climate Change Conference 2015 in Paris in December. (Kevin Lamarque / Reuters)
The frustration among Obama’s advisers spills over into the Pentagon and the State Department. John Kerry, for one, seems more alarmed about isis than the president does. Recently, when I asked the secretary of state a general question—is the Middle East still important to the U.S.?—he answered by talking exclusively about isis. “This is a threat to everybody in the world,” he said, a group “overtly committed to destroying people in the West and in the Middle East. Imagine what would happen if we don’t stand and fight them, if we don’t lead a coalition—as we are doing, by the way. If we didn’t do that, you could have allies and friends of ours fall. You could have a massive migration into Europe that destroys Europe, leads to the pure destruction of Europe, ends the European project, and everyone runs for cover and you’ve got the 1930s all over again, with nationalism and fascism and other things breaking out. Of course we have an interest in this, a huge interest in this.”

When I noted to Kerry that the president’s rhetoric doesn’t match his, he said, “President Obama sees all of this, but he doesn’t gin it up into this kind of—he thinks we are on track. He has escalated his efforts. But he’s not trying to create hysteria … I think the president is always inclined to try to keep things on an appropriate equilibrium. I respect that.”

Obama modulates his discussion of terrorism for several reasons: He is, by nature, Spockian. And he believes that a misplaced word, or a frightened look, or an ill-considered hyperbolic claim, could tip the country into panic. The sort of panic he worries about most is the type that would manifest itself in anti-Muslim xenophobia or in a challenge to American openness and to the constitutional order.

The president also gets frustrated that terrorism keeps swamping his larger agenda, particularly as it relates to rebalancing America’s global priorities. For years, the “pivot to Asia” has been a paramount priority of his. America’s economic future lies in Asia, he believes, and the challenge posed by China’s rise requires constant attention. From his earliest days in office, Obama has been focused on rebuilding the sometimes-threadbare ties between the U.S. and its Asian treaty partners, and he is perpetually on the hunt for opportunities to draw other Asian nations into the U.S. orbit. His dramatic opening to Burma was one such opportunity; Vietnam and the entire constellation of Southeast Asian countries fearful of Chinese domination presented others.

In Manila, at apec, Obama was determined to keep the conversation focused on this agenda, and not on what he viewed as the containable challenge presented by isis. Obama’s secretary of defense, Ashton Carter, told me not long ago that Obama has maintained his focus on Asia even as Syria and other Middle Eastern conflicts continue to flare. Obama believes, Carter said, that Asia “is the part of the world of greatest consequence to the American future, and that no president can take his eye off of this.” He added, “He consistently asks, even in the midst of everything else that’s going on, ‘Where are we in the Asia-Pacific rebalance? Where are we in terms of resources?’ He’s been extremely consistent about that, even in times of Middle East tension.”

After Obama finished his presentation on climate change, he joined Ma and Mijeno, who had seated themselves on nearby armchairs, where Obama was preparing to interview them in the manner of a daytime talk-show host—an approach that seemed to induce a momentary bout of status-inversion vertigo in an audience not accustomed to such behavior in their own leaders. Obama began by asking Ma a question about climate change. Ma, unsurprisingly, agreed with Obama that it was a very important issue. Then Obama turned to Mijeno. A laboratory operating in the hidden recesses of the West Wing could not have fashioned a person more expertly designed to appeal to Obama’s wonkish enthusiasms than Mijeno, a young engineer who, with her brother, had invented a lamp that is somehow powered by salt water.

“Just to be clear, Aisa, so with some salt water, the device that you’ve set up can provide—am I right?—about eight hours of lighting?,” Obama asked.

“Eight hours of lighting,” she responded.

Obama: “And the lamp is $20—”

Mijeno: “Around $20.”

“I think Aisa is a perfect example of what we’re seeing in a lot of countries—young entrepreneurs coming up with leapfrog technologies, in the same ways that in large portions of Asia and Africa, the old landline phones never got set up,” Obama said, because those areas jumped straight to mobile phones. Obama encouraged Jack Ma to fund her work. “She’s won, by the way, a lot of prizes and gotten a lot of attention, so this is not like one of those infomercials where you order it, and you can’t make the thing work,” he said, to laughter.

The next day, aboard Air Force One en route to Kuala Lumpur, I mentioned to Obama that he seemed genuinely happy to be onstage with Ma and Mijeno, and then I pivoted away from Asia, asking him if anything about the Middle East makes him happy.

“Right now, I don’t think that anybody can be feeling good about the situation in the Middle East,” he said. “You have countries that are failing to provide prosperity and opportunity for their people. You’ve got a violent, extremist ideology, or ideologies, that are turbocharged through social media. You’ve got countries that have very few civic traditions, so that as autocratic regimes start fraying, the only organizing principles are sectarian.”

He went on, “Contrast that with Southeast Asia, which still has huge problems—enormous poverty, corruption—but is filled with striving, ambitious, energetic people who are every single day scratching and clawing to build businesses and get education and find jobs and build infrastructure. The contrast is pretty stark.”

In Asia, as well as in Latin America and Africa, Obama says, he sees young people yearning for self-improvement, modernity, education, and material wealth.

“They are not thinking about how to kill Americans,” he says. “What they’re thinking about is How do I get a better education? How do I create something of value?”

He then made an observation that I came to realize was representative of his bleakest, most visceral understanding of the Middle East today—not the sort of understanding that a White House still oriented around themes of hope and change might choose to advertise. “If we’re not talking to them,” he said, referring to young Asians and Africans and Latin Americans, “because the only thing we’re doing is figuring out how to destroy or cordon off or control the malicious, nihilistic, violent parts of humanity, then we’re missing the boat.”

Obama’s critics argue that he is ineffective in cordoning off the violent nihilists of radical Islam because he doesn’t understand the threat. He does resist refracting radical Islam through the “clash of civilizations” prism popularized by the late political scientist Samuel Huntington. But this is because, he and his advisers argue, he does not want to enlarge the ranks of the enemy. “The goal is not to force a Huntington template onto this conflict,” said John Brennan, the CIA director.

Both François Hollande and David Cameron have spoken about the threat of radical Islam in more Huntingtonesque terms, and I’ve heard that both men wish Obama would use more-direct language in discussing the threat. When I mentioned this to Obama he said, “Hollande and Cameron have used phrases, like radical Islam, that we have not used on a regular basis as our way of targeting terrorism. But I’ve never had a conversation when they said, ‘Man, how come you’re not using this phrase the way you hear Republicans say it?’ ” Obama says he has demanded that Muslim leaders do more to eliminate the threat of violent fundamentalism. “It is very clear what I mean,” he told me, “which is that there is a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam by a faction—a tiny faction—within the Muslim community that is our enemy, and that has to be defeated.”

He then offered a critique that sounded more in line with the rhetoric of Cameron and Hollande. “There is also the need for Islam as a whole to challenge that interpretation of Islam, to isolate it, and to undergo a vigorous discussion within their community about how Islam works as part of a peaceful, modern society,” he said. But he added, “I do not persuade peaceful, tolerant Muslims to engage in that debate if I’m not sensitive to their concern that they are being tagged with a broad brush.”

In private encounters with other world leaders, Obama has argued that there will be no comprehensive solution to Islamist terrorism until Islam reconciles itself to modernity and undergoes some of the reforms that have changed Christianity.

Though he has argued, controversially, that the Middle East’s conflicts “date back millennia,” he also believes that the intensified Muslim fury of recent years was encouraged by countries considered friends of the U.S. In a meeting during apec with Malcolm Turnbull, the new prime minister of Australia, Obama described how he has watched Indonesia gradually move from a relaxed, syncretistic Islam to a more fundamentalist, unforgiving interpretation; large numbers of Indonesian women, he observed, have now adopted the hijab, the Muslim head covering.

Why, Turnbull asked, was this happening?

Because, Obama answered, the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs have funneled money, and large numbers of imams and teachers, into the country. In the 1990s, the Saudis heavily funded Wahhabist madrassas, seminaries that teach the fundamentalist version of Islam favored by the Saudi ruling family, Obama told Turnbull. Today, Islam in Indonesia is much more Arab in orientation than it was when he lived there, he said.

“Aren’t the Saudis your friends?,” Turnbull asked.

Obama smiled. “It’s complicated,” he said.

Obama’s patience with Saudi Arabia has always been limited. In his first foreign-policy commentary of note, that 2002 speech at the antiwar rally in Chicago, he said, “You want a fight, President Bush? Let’s fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East—the Saudis and the Egyptians—stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality.” In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obama’s National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi—and Obama himself rails against Saudi Arabia’s state-sanctioned misogyny, arguing in private that “a country cannot function in the modern world when it is repressing half of its population.” In meetings with foreign leaders, Obama has said, “You can gauge the success of a society by how it treats its women.”

His frustration with the Saudis informs his analysis of Middle Eastern power politics. At one point I observed to him that he is less likely than previous presidents to axiomatically side with Saudi Arabia in its dispute with its archrival, Iran. He didn’t disagree.

“Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the United States, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a genuine threat to Israel and many of our allies, and engages in all kinds of destructive behavior,” the president said. “And my view has never been that we should throw our traditional allies”—the Saudis—“overboard in favor of Iran.”

But he went on to say that the Saudis need to “share” the Middle East with their Iranian foes. “The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians—which has helped to feed proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen—requires us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace,” he said. “An approach that said to our friends ‘You are right, Iran is the source of all problems, and we will support you in dealing with Iran’ would essentially mean that as these sectarian conflicts continue to rage and our Gulf partners, our traditional friends, do not have the ability to put out the flames on their own or decisively win on their own, and would mean that we have to start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. And that would be in the interest neither of the United States nor of the Middle East.”

One of the most destructive forces in the Middle East, Obama believes, is tribalism—a force no president can neutralize. Tribalism, made manifest in the reversion to sect, creed, clan, and village by the desperate citizens of failing states, is the source of much of the Muslim Middle East’s problems, and it is another source of his fatalism. Obama has deep respect for the destructive resilience of tribalism—part of his memoir, Dreams From My Father, concerns the way in which tribalism in post-colonial Kenya helped ruin his father’s life—which goes some distance in explaining why he is so fastidious about avoiding entanglements in tribal conflicts.

“It is literally in my DNA to be suspicious of tribalism,” he told me. “I understand the tribal impulse, and acknowledge the power of tribal division. I’ve been navigating tribal divisions my whole life. In the end, it’s the source of a lot of destructive acts.”

While flying to Kuala Lumpur with the president, I recalled a passing reference he had once made to me about the Hobbesian argument for strong government as an antidote to the unforgiving state of nature. When Obama looks at swathes of the Middle East, Hobbes’s “war of all against all” is what he sees. “I have a recognition that us serving as the Leviathan clamps down and tames some of these impulses,” Obama had said. So I tried to reopen this conversation with an unfortunately prolix question about, among other things, “the Hobbesian notion that people organize themselves into collectives to stave off their supreme fear, which is death.”

Ben Rhodes and Joshua Earnest, the White House spokesman, who were seated on a couch to the side of Obama’s desk on Air Force One, could barely suppress their amusement at my discursiveness. I paused and said, “I bet if I asked that in a press conference my colleagues would just throw me out of the room.”

“I would be really into it,” Obama said, “but everybody else would be rolling their eyes.”

Rhodes interjected: “Why can’t we get the bastards?” That question, the one put to the president by the CNN reporter at the press conference in Turkey, had become a topic of sardonic conversation during the trip.

I turned to the president: “Well, yeah, and also, why can’t we get the bastards?”

He took the first question.

“Look, I am not of the view that human beings are inherently evil,” he said. “I believe that there’s more good than bad in humanity. And if you look at the trajectory of history, I am optimistic.

“I believe that overall, humanity has become less violent, more tolerant, healthier, better fed, more empathetic, more able to manage difference. But it’s hugely uneven. And what has been clear throughout the 20th and 21st centuries is that the progress we make in social order and taming our baser impulses and steadying our fears can be reversed very quickly. Social order starts breaking down if people are under profound stress. Then the default position is tribe—us/them, a hostility toward the unfamiliar or the unknown.”

He continued, “Right now, across the globe, you’re seeing places that are undergoing severe stress because of globalization, because of the collision of cultures brought about by the Internet and social media, because of scarcities—some of which will be attributable to climate change over the next several decades—because of population growth. And in those places, the Middle East being Exhibit A, the default position for a lot of folks is to organize tightly in the tribe and to push back or strike out against those who are different.

“A group like isil is the distillation of every worst impulse along these lines. The notion that we are a small group that defines ourselves primarily by the degree to which we can kill others who are not like us, and attempting to impose a rigid orthodoxy that produces nothing, that celebrates nothing, that really is contrary to every bit of human progress—it indicates the degree to which that kind of mentality can still take root and gain adherents in the 21st century.”

So your appreciation for tribalism’s power makes you want to stay away?, I asked. “In other words, when people say ‘Why don’t you just go get the bastards?,’ you step back?”

“We have to determine the best tools to roll back those kinds of attitudes,” he said. “There are going to be times where either because it’s not a direct threat to us or because we just don’t have the tools in our toolkit to have a huge impact that, tragically, we have to refrain from jumping in with both feet.”

I asked Obama whether he would have sent the Marines to Rwanda in 1994 to stop the genocide as it was happening, had he been president at the time. “Given the speed with which the killing took place, and how long it takes to crank up the machinery of the U.S. government, I understand why we did not act fast enough,” he said. “Now, we should learn from that. I actually think that Rwanda is an interesting test case because it’s possible—not guaranteed, but it’s possible—that this was a situation where the quick application of force might have been enough.”

He related this to Syria: “Ironically, it’s probably easier to make an argument that a relatively small force inserted quickly with international support would have resulted in averting genocide [more successfully in Rwanda] than in Syria right now, where the degree to which the various groups are armed and hardened fighters and are supported by a whole host of external actors with a lot of resources requires a much larger commitment of forces.”

Obama-administration officials argue that he has a comprehensible approach to fighting terrorism: a drone air force, Special Forces raids, a clandestine CIA-aided army of 10,000 rebels battling in Syria. So why does Obama stumble when explaining to the American people that he, too, cares about terrorism? The Turkey press conference, I told him, “was a moment for you as a politician to say, ‘Yeah, I hate the bastards too, and by the way, I am taking out the bastards.’ ” The easy thing to do would have been to reassure Americans in visceral terms that he will kill the people who want to kill them. Does he fear a knee-jerk reaction in the direction of another Middle East invasion? Or is he just inalterably Spockian?

“Every president has strengths and weaknesses,” he answered. “And there is no doubt that there are times where I have not been attentive enough to feelings and emotions and politics in communicating what we’re doing and how we’re doing it.”

But for America to be successful in leading the world, he continued, “I believe that we have to avoid being simplistic. I think we have to build resilience and make sure that our political debates are grounded in reality. It’s not that I don’t appreciate the value of theater in political communications; it’s that the habits we—the media, politicians—have gotten into, and how we talk about these issues, are so detached so often from what we need to be doing that for me to satisfy the cable news hype-fest would lead to us making worse and worse decisions over time.”

As Air Force One began its descent toward Kuala Lumpur, the president mentioned the successful U.S.-led effort to stop the Ebola epidemic in West Africa as a positive example of steady, nonhysterical management of a terrifying crisis.

“During the couple of months in which everybody was sure Ebola was going to destroy the Earth and there was 24/7 coverage of Ebola, if I had fed the panic or in any way strayed from ‘Here are the facts, here’s what needs to be done, here’s how we’re handling it, the likelihood of you getting Ebola is very slim, and here’s what we need to do both domestically and overseas to stamp out this epidemic,’ ” then “maybe people would have said ‘Obama is taking this as seriously as he needs to be.’ ” But feeding the panic by overreacting could have shut down travel to and from three African countries that were already cripplingly poor, in ways that might have destroyed their economies—which would likely have meant, among other things, a recurrence of Ebola. He added, “It would have also meant that we might have wasted a huge amount of resources in our public-health systems that need to be devoted to flu vaccinations and other things that actually kill people” in large numbers in America.

The plane landed. The president, leaning back in his office chair with his jacket off and his tie askew, did not seem to notice. Outside, on the tarmac, I could see that what appeared to be a large portion of the Malaysian Armed Forces had assembled to welcome him. As he continued talking, I began to worry that the waiting soldiers and dignitaries would get hot. “I think we’re in Malaysia,” I said. “It seems to be outside this plane.”

He conceded that this was true, but seemed to be in no rush, so I pressed him about his public reaction to terrorism: If he showed more emotion, wouldn’t that calm people down rather than rile them up?

“I have friends who have kids in Paris right now,” he said. “And you and I and a whole bunch of people who are writing about what happened in Paris have strolled along the same streets where people were gunned down. And it’s right to feel fearful. And it’s important for us not to ever get complacent. There’s a difference between resilience and complacency.” He went on to describe another difference—between making considered decisions and making rash, emotional ones. “What it means, actually, is that you care so much that you want to get it right and you’re not going to indulge in either impetuous or, in some cases, manufactured responses that make good sound bites but don’t produce results. The stakes are too high to play those games.”

“ISIS IS NOT AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. CLIMATE CHANGE IS A POTENTIAL EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD IF WE DON’T DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT.”
With that, Obama stood up and said, “Okay, gotta go.” He headed out of his office and down the stairs, to the red carpet and the honor guard and the cluster of Malaysian officials waiting to greet him, and then to his armored limousine, flown to Kuala Lumpur ahead of him. (Early in his first term, still unaccustomed to the massive military operation it takes to move a president from one place to another, he noted ruefully to aides, “I have the world’s largest carbon footprint.”)

The president’s first stop was another event designed to highlight his turn to Asia, this one a town-hall meeting with students and entrepreneurs participating in the administration’s Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative. Obama entered the lecture hall at Taylor’s University to huge applause. He made some opening remarks, then charmed his audience in an extended Q&A session.

But those of us watching from the press section became distracted by news coming across our phones about a new jihadist attack, this one in Mali. Obama, busily mesmerizing adoring Asian entrepreneurs, had no idea. Only when he got into his limousine with Susan Rice did he get the news.

Later that evening, I visited the president in his suite at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in downtown Kuala Lumpur. The streets around the hotel had been sealed. Armored vehicles ringed the building; the lobby was filled with swat teams. I took the elevator to a floor crowded with Secret Service agents, who pointed me to a staircase; the elevator to Obama’s floor was disabled for security reasons. Up two flights, to a hallway with more agents. A moment’s wait, and then Obama opened the door. His two-story suite was outlandish: Tara-like drapes, overstuffed couches. It was enormous and lonely and claustrophobic all at once.

“It’s like the Hearst Castle,” I observed.

“Well, it’s a long way from the Hampton Inn in Des Moines,” Obama said.

ESPN was playing in the background.

When we sat down, I pointed out to the president a central challenge of his pivot to Asia. Earlier in the day, at the moment he was trying to inspire a group of gifted and eager hijab-wearing Indonesian entrepreneurs and Burmese innovators, attention was diverted by the latest Islamist terror attack.

A writer at heart, he had a suggestion: “It’s probably a pretty easy way to start the story,” he said, referring to this article.

Possibly, I said, but it’s kind of a cheap trick.

“It’s cheap, but it works,” Obama said. “We’re talking to these kids, and then there’s this attack going on.”

The split-screen quality of the day prompted a conversation about two recent meetings he’d held, one that generated major international controversy and headlines, and one that did not. The one that drew so much attention, I suggested, would ultimately be judged less consequential. This was the Gulf summit in May of 2015 at Camp David, meant to mollify a crowd of visiting sheikhs and princes who feared the impending Iran deal. The other meeting took place two months later, in the Oval Office, between Obama and the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong. This meeting took place only because John Kerry had pushed the White House to violate protocol, since the general secretary was not a head of state. But the goals trumped decorum: Obama wanted to lobby the Vietnamese on the Trans-Pacific Partnership—his negotiators soon extracted a promise from the Vietnamese that they would legalize independent labor unions—and he wanted to deepen cooperation on strategic issues. Administration officials have repeatedly hinted to me that Vietnam may one day soon host a permanent U.S. military presence, to check the ambitions of the country it now fears most, China. The U.S. Navy’s return to Cam Ranh Bay would count as one of the more improbable developments in recent American history. “We just moved the Vietnamese Communist Party to recognize labor rights in a way that we could never do by bullying them or scaring them,” Obama told me, calling this a key victory in his campaign to replace stick-waving with diplomatic persuasion.

I noted that the 200 or so young Southeast Asians in the room earlier that day—including citizens of Communist-ruled countries—seemed to love America. “They do,” Obama said. “In Vietnam right now, America polls at 80 percent.”

The resurgent popularity of America throughout Southeast Asia means that “we can do really big, important stuff—which, by the way, then has ramifications across the board,” he said, “because when Malaysia joins the anti-isil campaign, that helps us leverage resources and credibility in our fight against terrorism. When we have strong relations with Indonesia, that helps us when we are going to Paris and trying to negotiate a climate treaty, where the temptation of a Russia or some of these other countries may be to skew the deal in a way that is unhelpful.”

Obama then cited America’s increased influence in Latin America—increased, he said, in part by his removal of a region-wide stumbling block when he reestablished ties with Cuba—as proof that his deliberate, nonthreatening, diplomacy-centered approach to foreign relations is working. The alba movement, a group of Latin American governments oriented around anti-Americanism, has significantly weakened during his time as president. “When I came into office, at the first Summit of the Americas that I attended, Hugo Chávez”—the late anti-American Venezuelan dictator—“was still the dominant figure in the conversation,” he said. “We made a very strategic decision early on, which was, rather than blow him up as this 10-foot giant adversary, to right-size the problem and say, ‘We don’t like what’s going on in Venezuela, but it’s not a threat to the United States.’ ”

Obama said that to achieve this rebalancing, the U.S. had to absorb the diatribes and insults of superannuated Castro manqués. “When I saw Chávez, I shook his hand and he handed me a Marxist critique of the U.S.–Latin America relationship,” Obama recalled. “And I had to sit there and listen to Ortega”—Daniel Ortega, the radical leftist president of Nicaragua—“make an hour-long rant against the United States. But us being there, not taking all that stuff seriously—because it really wasn’t a threat to us”—helped neutralize the region’s anti-Americanism.

The president’s unwillingness to counter the baiting by American adversaries can feel emotionally unsatisfying, I said, and I told him that every so often, I’d like to see him give Vladimir Putin the finger. It’s atavistic, I said, understanding my audience.

“It is,” the president responded coolly. “This is what they’re looking for.”

He described a relationship with Putin that doesn’t quite conform to common perceptions. I had been under the impression that Obama viewed Putin as nasty, brutish, and short. But, Obama told me, Putin is not particularly nasty.

“The truth is, actually, Putin, in all of our meetings, is scrupulously polite, very frank. Our meetings are very businesslike. He never keeps me waiting two hours like he does a bunch of these other folks.” Obama said that Putin believes his relationship with the U.S. is more important than Americans tend to think. “He’s constantly interested in being seen as our peer and as working with us, because he’s not completely stupid. He understands that Russia’s overall position in the world is significantly diminished. And the fact that he invades Crimea or is trying to prop up Assad doesn’t suddenly make him a player. You don’t see him in any of these meetings out here helping to shape the agenda. For that matter, there’s not a G20 meeting where the Russians set the agenda around any of the issues that are important.”

Russia’s invasion of crimea in early 2014, and its decision to use force to buttress the rule of its client Bashar al-Assad, have been cited by Obama’s critics as proof that the post-red-line world no longer fears America.

So when I talked with the president in the Oval Office in late January, I again raised this question of deterrent credibility. “The argument is made,” I said, “that Vladimir Putin watched you in Syria and thought, He’s too logical, he’s too rational, he’s too into retrenchment. I’m going to push him a little bit further in Ukraine.”

Obama didn’t much like my line of inquiry. “Look, this theory is so easily disposed of that I’m always puzzled by how people make the argument. I don’t think anybody thought that George W. Bush was overly rational or cautious in his use of military force. And as I recall, because apparently nobody in this town does, Putin went into Georgia on Bush’s watch, right smack dab in the middle of us having over 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq.” Obama was referring to Putin’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, a former Soviet republic, which was undertaken for many of the same reasons Putin later invaded Ukraine—to keep an ex–Soviet republic in Russia’s sphere of influence.

“Putin acted in Ukraine in response to a client state that was about to slip out of his grasp. And he improvised in a way to hang on to his control there,” he said. “He’s done the exact same thing in Syria, at enormous cost to the well-being of his own country. And the notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now, in Syria or in Ukraine, than they were before they invaded Ukraine or before he had to deploy military forces to Syria is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in foreign affairs or in the world generally. Real power means you can get what you want without having to exert violence. Russia was much more powerful when Ukraine looked like an independent country but was a kleptocracy that he could pull the strings on.”

Obama’s theory here is simple: Ukraine is a core Russian interest but not an American one, so Russia will always be able to maintain escalatory dominance there.

“The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-nato country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do,” he said.

I asked Obama whether his position on Ukraine was realistic or fatalistic.

“It’s realistic,” he said. “But this is an example of where we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for. And at the end of the day, there’s always going to be some ambiguity.” He then offered up a critique he had heard directed against him, in order to knock it down. “I think that the best argument you can make on the side of those who are critics of my foreign policy is that the president doesn’t exploit ambiguity enough. He doesn’t maybe react in ways that might cause people to think, Wow, this guy might be a little crazy.”

“The ‘crazy Nixon’ approach,” I said: Confuse and frighten your enemies by making them think you’re capable of committing irrational acts.

“But let’s examine the Nixon theory,” he said. “So we dropped more ordnance on Cambodia and Laos than on Europe in World War II, and yet, ultimately, Nixon withdrew, Kissinger went to Paris, and all we left behind was chaos, slaughter, and authoritarian governments that finally, over time, have emerged from that hell. When I go to visit those countries, I’m going to be trying to figure out how we can, today, help them remove bombs that are still blowing off the legs of little kids. In what way did that strategy promote our interests?”

But what if Putin were threatening to move against, say, Moldova—another vulnerable post-Soviet state? Wouldn’t it be helpful for Putin to believe that Obama might get angry and irrational about that?

“There is no evidence in modern American foreign policy that that’s how people respond. People respond based on what their imperatives are, and if it’s really important to somebody, and it’s not that important to us, they know that, and we know that,” he said. “There are ways to deter, but it requires you to be very clear ahead of time about what is worth going to war for and what is not. Now, if there is somebody in this town that would claim that we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, they should speak up and be very clear about it. The idea that talking tough or engaging in some military action that is tangential to that particular area is somehow going to influence the decision making of Russia or China is contrary to all the evidence we have seen over the last 50 years.”

Obama went on to say that the belief in the possibilities of projected toughness is rooted in “mythologies” about Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy.

“If you think about, let’s say, the Iran hostage crisis, there is a narrative that has been promoted today by some of the Republican candidates that the day Reagan was elected, because he looked tough, the Iranians decided, ‘We better turn over these hostages,’ ” he said. “In fact what had happened was that there was a long negotiation with the Iranians and because they so disliked Carter—even though the negotiations had been completed—they held those hostages until the day Reagan got elected. Reagan’s posture, his rhetoric, etc., had nothing to do with their release. When you think of the military actions that Reagan took, you have Grenada—which is hard to argue helped our ability to shape world events, although it was good politics for him back home. You have the Iran-Contra affair, in which we supported right-wing paramilitaries and did nothing to enhance our image in Central America, and it wasn’t successful at all.” He reminded me that Reagan’s great foe, Daniel Ortega, is today the unrepentant president of Nicaragua.

Obama also cited Reagan’s decision to almost immediately pull U.S. forces from Lebanon after 241 servicemen were killed in a Hezbollah attack in 1983. “Apparently all these things really helped us gain credibility with the Russians and the Chinese,” because “that’s the narrative that is told,” he said sarcastically. “Now, I actually think that Ronald Reagan had a great success in foreign policy, which was to recognize the opportunity that Gorbachev presented and to engage in extensive diplomacy—which was roundly criticized by some of the same people who now use Ronald Reagan to promote the notion that we should go around bombing people.”

In a conversation at the end of January, I asked the president to describe for me the threats he worries about most as he prepares, in the coming months, to hand off power to his successor.

“As I survey the next 20 years, climate change worries me profoundly because of the effects that it has on all the other problems that we face,” he said. “If you start seeing more severe drought; more significant famine; more displacement from the Indian subcontinent and coastal regions in Africa and Asia; the continuing problems of scarcity, refugees, poverty, disease—this makes every other problem we’ve got worse. That’s above and beyond just the existential issues of a planet that starts getting into a bad feedback loop.”

Terrorism, he said, is also a long-term problem “when combined with the problem of failed states.”

What country does he consider the greatest challenge to America in the coming decades? “In terms of traditional great-state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States and China is going to be the most critical,” he said. “If we get that right and China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have a partner that is growing in capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international order. If China fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organizing principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a country its size in maintaining the international order; if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres of influence—then not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are going to come.”

Many people, I noted, want the president to be more forceful in confronting China, especially in the South China Sea. Hillary Clinton, for one, has been heard to say in private settings, “I don’t want my grandchildren to live in a world dominated by the Chinese.”

“I’ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China,” Obama said. “I think we have to be firm where China’s actions are undermining international interests, and if you look at how we’ve operated in the South China Sea, we have been able to mobilize most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised China, frankly, and have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances.”

A weak, flailing Russia constitutes a threat as well, though not quite a top-tier threat. “Unlike China, they have demographic problems, economic structural problems, that would require not only vision but a generation to overcome,” Obama said. “The path that Putin is taking is not going to help them overcome those challenges. But in that environment, the temptation to project military force to show greatness is strong, and that’s what Putin’s inclination is. So I don’t underestimate the dangers there.”
Obama returned to a point he had made repeatedly to me, one that he hopes the country, and the next president, absorbs: “You know, the notion that diplomacy and technocrats and bureaucrats somehow are helping to keep America safe and secure, most people think, Eh, that’s nonsense. But it’s true. And by the way, it’s the element of American power that the rest of the world appreciates unambiguously. When we deploy troops, there’s always a sense on the part of other countries that, even where necessary, sovereignty is being violated.”

Over the past year, John Kerry has visited the White House regularly to ask Obama to violate Syria’s sovereignty. On several occasions, Kerry has asked Obama to launch missiles at specific regime targets, under cover of night, to “send a message” to the regime. The goal, Kerry has said, is not to overthrow Assad but to encourage him, and Iran and Russia, to negotiate peace. When the Assad alliance has had the upper hand on the battlefield, as it has these past several months, it has shown no inclination to take seriously Kerry’s entreaties to negotiate in good faith. A few cruise missiles, Kerry has argued, might concentrate the attention of Assad and his backers. “Kerry’s looking like a chump with the Russians, because he has no leverage,” a senior administration official told me.

The U.S. wouldn’t have to claim credit for the attacks, Kerry has told Obama—but Assad would surely know the missiles’ return address.

Obama has steadfastly resisted Kerry’s requests, and seems to have grown impatient with his lobbying. Recently, when Kerry handed Obama a written outline of new steps to bring more pressure to bear on Assad, Obama said, “Oh, another proposal?” Administration officials have told me that Vice President Biden, too, has become frustrated with Kerry’s demands for action. He has said privately to the secretary of state, “John, remember Vietnam? Remember how that started?” At a National Security Council meeting held at the Pentagon in December, Obama announced that no one except the secretary of defense should bring him proposals for military action. Pentagon officials understood Obama’s announcement to be a brushback pitch directed at Kerry.

OBAMA HAS BET THAT THE PRICE OF DIRECT U.S. ACTION IN SYRIA WOULD BE HIGHER THAN THE PRICE OF INACTION.
One day in January, in Kerry’s office at the State Department, I expressed the obvious: He has more of a bias toward action than the president does.

“I do, probably,” Kerry acknowledged. “Look, the final say on these things is in his hands … I’d say that I think we’ve had a very symbiotic, synergistic, whatever you call it, relationship, which works very effectively. Because I’ll come in with the bias toward ‘Let’s try to do this, let’s try to do that, let’s get this done.’ ”

Obama’s caution on Syria has vexed those in the administration who have seen opportunities, at different moments over the past four years, to tilt the battlefield against Assad. Some thought that Putin’s decision to fight on behalf of Assad would prompt Obama to intensify American efforts to help anti-regime rebels. But Obama, at least as of this writing, would not be moved, in part because he believed that it was not his business to stop Russia from making what he thought was a terrible mistake. “They are overextended. They’re bleeding,” he told me. “And their economy has contracted for three years in a row, drastically.”

In recent National Security Council meetings, Obama’s strategy was occasionally referred to as the “Tom Sawyer approach.” Obama’s view was that if Putin wanted to expend his regime’s resources by painting the fence in Syria, the U.S. should let him. By late winter, though, when it appeared that Russia was making advances in its campaign to solidify Assad’s rule, the White House began discussing ways to deepen support for the rebels, though the president’s ambivalence about more-extensive engagement remained. In conversations I had with National Security Council officials over the past couple of months, I sensed a foreboding that an event—another San Bernardino–style attack, for instance—would compel the United States to take new and direct action in Syria. For Obama, this would be a nightmare.

If there had been no Iraq, no Afghanistan, and no Libya, Obama told me, he might be more apt to take risks in Syria. “A president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the strains that it’s placed on our military—any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”

Are you too cautious?, I asked.

“No,” he said. “Do I think that had we not invaded Iraq and were we not still involved in sending billions of dollars and a number of military trainers and advisers into Afghanistan, would I potentially have thought about taking on some additional risk to help try to shape the Syria situation? I don’t know.”

What has struck me is that, even as his secretary of state warns about a dire, Syria-fueled European apocalypse, Obama has not recategorized the country’s civil war as a top-tier security threat.

Obama’s hesitation to join the battle for Syria is held out as proof by his critics that he is too naive; his decision in 2013 not to fire missiles is proof, they argue, that he is a bluffer.

This critique frustrates the president. “Nobody remembers bin Laden anymore,” he says. “Nobody talks about me ordering 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan.” The red-line crisis, he said, “is the point of the inverted pyramid upon which all other theories rest.”

One afternoon in late January, as I was leaving the Oval Office, I mentioned to Obama a moment from an interview in 2012 when he told me that he would not allow Iran to gain possession of a nuclear weapon. “You said, ‘I’m the president of the United States, I don’t bluff.’ ”

He said, “I don’t.”

Shortly after that interview four years ago, Ehud Barak, who was then the defense minister of Israel, asked me whether I thought Obama’s no-bluff promise was itself a bluff. I answered that I found it difficult to imagine that the leader of the United States would bluff about something so consequential. But Barak’s question had stayed with me. So as I stood in the doorway with the president, I asked: “Was it a bluff?” I told him that few people now believe he actually would have attacked Iran to keep it from getting a nuclear weapon.

“That’s interesting,” he said, noncommittally.

I started to talk: “Do you—”

He interrupted. “I actually would have,” he said, meaning that he would have struck Iran’s nuclear facilities. “If I saw them break out.”

He added, “Now, the argument that can’t be resolved, because it’s entirely situational, was what constitutes them getting” the bomb. “This was the argument I was having with Bibi Netanyahu.” Netanyahu wanted Obama to prevent Iran from being capable of building a bomb, not merely from possessing a bomb.

“You were right to believe it,” the president said. And then he made his key point. “This was in the category of an American interest.”

I was reminded then of something Derek Chollet, a former National Security Council official, told me: “Obama is a gambler, not a bluffer.”

The president has placed some huge bets. Last May, as he was trying to move the Iran nuclear deal through Congress, I told him that the agreement was making me nervous. His response was telling. “Look, 20 years from now, I’m still going to be around, God willing. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, it’s my name on this,” he said. “I think it’s fair to say that in addition to our profound national-security interests, I have a personal interest in locking this down.”

In the matter of the Syrian regime and its Iranian and Russian sponsors, Obama has bet, and seems prepared to continue betting, that the price of direct U.S. action would be higher than the price of inaction. And he is sanguine enough to live with the perilous ambiguities of his decisions. Though in his Nobel Peace Prize speech in 2009, Obama said, “Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later,” today the opinions of humanitarian interventionists do not seem to move him, at least not publicly. He undoubtedly knows that a next-generation Samantha Power will write critically of his unwillingness to do more to prevent the continuing slaughter in Syria. (For that matter, Samantha Power will also be the subject of criticism from the next Samantha Power.) As he comes to the end of his presidency, Obama believes he has done his country a large favor by keeping it out of the maelstrom—and he believes, I suspect, that historians will one day judge him wise for having done so.

Inside the West Wing, officials say that Obama, as a president who inherited a financial crisis and two active wars from his predecessor, is keen to leave “a clean barn” to whoever succeeds him. This is why the fight against isis, a group he considers to be a direct, though not existential, threat to the U.S., is his most urgent priority for the remainder of his presidency; killing the so-called caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is one of the top goals of the American national-security apparatus in Obama’s last year.

Of course, isis was midwifed into existence, in part, by the Assad regime. Yet by Obama’s stringent standards, Assad’s continued rule for the moment still doesn’t rise to the level of direct challenge to America’s national security.

This is what is so controversial about the president’s approach, and what will be controversial for years to come—the standard he has used to define what, exactly, constitutes a direct threat.

Obama has come to a number of dovetailing conclusions about the world, and about America’s role in it. The first is that the Middle East is no longer terribly important to American interests. The second is that even if the Middle East were surpassingly important, there would still be little an American president could do to make it a better place. The third is that the innate American desire to fix the sorts of problems that manifest themselves most drastically in the Middle East inevitably leads to warfare, to the deaths of U.S. soldiers, and to the eventual hemorrhaging of U.S. credibility and power. The fourth is that the world cannot afford to see the diminishment of U.S. power. Just as the leaders of several American allies have found Obama’s leadership inadequate to the tasks before him, he himself has found world leadership wanting: global partners who often lack the vision and the will to spend political capital in pursuit of broad, progressive goals, and adversaries who are not, in his mind, as rational as he is. Obama believes that history has sides, and that America’s adversaries—and some of its putative allies—have situated themselves on the wrong one, a place where tribalism, fundamentalism, sectarianism, and militarism still flourish. What they don’t understand is that history is bending in his direction.

“The central argument is that by keeping America from immersing itself in the crises of the Middle East, the foreign-policy establishment believes that the president is precipitating our decline,” Ben Rhodes told me. “But the president himself takes the opposite view, which is that overextension in the Middle East will ultimately harm our economy, harm our ability to look for other opportunities and to deal with other challenges, and, most important, endanger the lives of American service members for reasons that are not in the direct American national-security interest.”

If you are a supporter of the president, his strategy makes eminent sense: Double down in those parts of the world where success is plausible, and limit America’s exposure to the rest. His critics believe, however, that problems like those presented by the Middle East don’t solve themselves—that, without American intervention, they metastasize.

At the moment, Syria, where history appears to be bending toward greater chaos, poses the most direct challenge to the president’s worldview.

George W. Bush was also a gambler, not a bluffer. He will be remembered harshly for the things he did in the Middle East. Barack Obama is gambling that he will be judged well for the things he didn’t do.

Goodman, D., D.J. O’Hearn, and C. Wallace-Crabbe, eds. 1991. Multicultural Australia. Melbourne: Scribe.

Görlach, Manfred. 1997. Language and Nation: the concept of linguistic identity in the history of English. English World-Wide (18):1-34.

Gorter, Durk , Marten, Heiko F., and Van Mense, Luk (eds.) (2012), Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape Edited by (Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities, London: Palgrave Macmillan).

List of Contributors
Overview Map of Cases Discussed in this Book
Studying Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape; H.F.Marten, L.Van Mensel & D.Gorter
PART I: LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES AND LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE
‘Latgalian is not a Language’: Linguistic Landscapes in Eastern Latvia and how they Reflect Centralist Attitudes; H.F.Marten
Transgression as the Norm: Russian in Linguistic Landscape of Kyiv, Ukraine; A.Pavlenko
Minority Semiotic Landscapes: An Ideological Minefield?; M.Hornsby & D.Vigers
Language Ideological Debates in the Linguistic Landscape of an Irish Tourist Town; M.Moriarty
Linguistic Landscape as a Tool for Interpreting Language Vitality: Arabic as a ‘Minority’ Language in Israel; E.Shohamy & M.A.Ghazaleh-Mahajneh
PART II: LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE POLICY
Policies vs. Non-policies: Analysing Regional Languages and the National Standard in the Linguistic Landscape of French and Italian Mediterranean Cities; R.Blackwood & S.Tufi
Two-way Traffic: How Linguistic Landscapes Reflect and Influence the Politics of Language; G.Puzey
The Revitalization of Basque and the Linguistic Landscape of Donostia-San Sebastián; D.Gorter, J.Aiestaran & J.Cenoz
All is Quiet on the Eastern Front? Language Contact along the French-German Language Border in Belgium; L.Van Mensel & J.Darquennes
PART III: THE DISTRIBUTIVE APPROACH TO LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE
The Linguistic Landscape of Three Streets in Barcelona: Patterns of Language Visibility in Public Space; E.Long & L.Comajoan
The Linguistic Landscapes of Chişinău and Vilnius: Linguistic Landscape and the Representation of Minority Languages in Two Post-Soviet Capitals; S.Muth
Multilingual Societies Versus Monolingual States: the Linguistic Landscapes in Italy and Brunei Darussalam; P.Coluzzi
Using Linguistic Landscape to Examine the Visibility of Sámi Languages in the North Calotte; H.Salo
PART IV: FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON LINGUISTIC LANDSCAPE
Discourse Coalitions For and Against Minority Languages on Signs: Linguistic Landscape as a Social Issue; E.Szabó-Gilinger, M.Sloboda, L.Šimičić & D.Vigers
The Linguistic Landscape of Educational Spaces: Language Revitalization and Schools in Southeastern Estonia; K.D.Brown
The Material Culture of Multilingualism; L.Aronin & M.Ó Laoire
Minority Languages through the Lens of the Linguistic Landscape; L.Van Mensel, H.F.Marten & D.Gorter

Goudsblom, J. 1980. Nihilism and Culture. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gour (Gur), Batya. 1994. Meurtre à l’Université: un crime littéraire. Translated by Jacqueline Carnaud et Jacqueline Lahana. Paris: Arthème Fayard.

33: De fait, seuls les intimes de ce séduisant quadragénaire, aux pommettes saillantes et au regard mélancolique,savaient qu’il était sujet au doute, à l’angoisse. Pour les autres -ses supérieurs, ses collègues-, Michael Ohayon était un homme solide, intelligent, cultivé, mais aussi un Don Juan invétéré, dont la réputation attirait les femmes par dizaines. Et c’était vrai que même les policiers les plus retors pâlissaient en entendant les enregistrement de certiains de ses interrogatoires, bien qu’il ne brutaliât jamais physiqueement un suspect. La fidélité que lui vouaient ses hommes et l’atmosphère détendue dans laquelle ils travaillaient tenaient, en grande partie, à la courtoisie et au respect qu’il leur témoignait, à sa simplicité et sa modestie. D’ailleurs son entourage était convaicu que c’était précisément ces qualités que lui avient valu de grimper si rapidement les échelons de la police.
Conquis, lui aussi, par le sourire timide et embarrasé qui illuminait le visage de son ami, Ouzi lui tapota l’épaule: “Je ne te force pas, mais c’est bien la première fois que je vois un Marocain jouer les mères juives!”
Les angoisses secrètes d’Ohayon, source intarrissable de plaisantereis pour ses proches, portaient principalement sur son fils unique.
Youval était encore tout petit qu’il appréhendait déjà le moment où celui-ci partirait en excursion avec l’école, apprendrait à monter à bicyclette, rêverait d’avoir une moto et serait appelé sous les drapeaux. Lorsque Nira était revenue de la maternité, pendant plusieurs nuits, il n’avait pu fermer l’oeil, de crainte que le bébé ne s’arrête de respirer. Youval avait à peine un an que tout le monde s’extasiait devant ce père marocain qui se comportait avec son rejeton comme un Polonais rescapé de l’Holocauste. “Nous avons échangé nos rôles, expliquait Nira d’un ton railleur à leurs amis. Moi encore, je comprends. Mais lui?

Gordon, Philip (2014), ‘Special assistant to the US. Message from President OBAMA.’ paper given at Israel Conference on Peace, David Intercontinental, 8 July 2014.

Pleased to see such a big turnout for such a big issue Peace talks have been suspended and killings of the past few weeks make it seem that we have the wrong agenda.
Peace talks in fact have resumed to ask what we could do better. Our inability means more insecurity, more grief, and the sight of grieving families reminds us that the cost of this conflict remains unbearably high.
US strongly condemns attacks against innocent Israeli civilians. We support Israel to take all mesures.

Conveys Obama’s condoleances. Killings and abudctions. The families reacted very decently on both sides. We applaud as you do these words and the fact these families reached across each other.

There has clearly been too much recriminations and racism on both side, we welcome Netanyou’s comments.

This is a moment for leaders to call for reason and calm.

I acknowledge that Israel faces threats on several front so Obama’s assurance of ever greater support and cooperation with Iisrael.

No one can question America’s unshakable committment to Israel security. It will not waver.

Top of that list is ensuring Iran doesn’t get the nuclear weapon.

Anything else than peaceful use of nuclear power will not be tolerated.

We are also working on reducing the ability or abrutal dictator to threaten its own people and its neighbours including Israel.

Syrian remains an immense danger at an enormous scale.

Supporters of Islamic state are a major concern to us and we are surveilling it. The president has made clear that partnerships with local iraqis taking the lead is of essence.

These are some of the regional challenges. how do they affect peace? Should palestinian issue be put to the side when there are so many challenges for Israel to meet.
The answer is no. Peace is just, necessary and possible. We’ve not hidden our disappointment of the failure of the recent talk but we are not playing the blaming game. The US didn’t invest so much effort relentlessly in vain but instead because all other alternatives are worse.

True safety can only come from mutual trust.

We know that the withdrawal from Gaza created fear but we are determined that this never happen again.

Israel security in a two state context. General Allen is the best person to address this concern.
The world is misinformed and misled. aPProach being discussed will ensure one of the most secure borders from conventional and unconventioal threats tECHNology cannot bring peace but can certainly contribute to enforcing it.

President Abbas made in Arabic in Saoudi arabia a speech advocating for peace, so we have a belief that this solution will bring to Palestinians the dignity they deserve in their own state.

Israel confronts a reality: it cannot contain security in a neighbouring country.

We know all too well the problems that arise in a status quo.

Settlement announcements will be counter-productive. Ehud Barak warned us of a tsunami in New York, we are starting to see it.
US will do all it can to fight boycotts. These are not threats, US will always have Israel’s back. But as its closest friend, how will it remain democratic and jewish if it controls for millions of people in the west bank. The growing turbulence elsewhere is no reason to downgrade the urgency to reach a two-stat solution, rather the opposite.
That’s why Kerry encouraged the Arab league to revive the API.

A so called one-state solution is unplausible. It’s wrong, illegal and the US will never support it.

only a negotiated solution two state solution can be the answer.

A lasting peace will involve two states for two people, Israel the state of Jewish people, a viable palestine. Permanent borders along 67 lines including land swaps.

Our deep commitment has not waned but it’s not our commitment that will make peace but you and your palestinian neighbours.

CONCLUSION FOR HAAREZ
These same questions lead us. time is becoming short to make peace. Mr. Gordon chose to be the last speaker and I don’t remember a conference that remained so full 11 hours after it started. Let’s hope that won’t need another such conference, but if we don’t have peace, we will consider.

Gour (Gur), Batya (1995), Meurtre au Kibboutz trans. Rosie Pinhas-Delpuech (Paris: Arthème Fayard) 435.

Titre hébreu: Leina Michoutefet: coucher collectif.
13: Quoique l’ambiance fut un tantinet solennelle, on sentait que personne ne prenait les choses très au sérieux. Seuls les enfants paraissaient excités, mais ils s’intéressaient plus à la rangée de véhicules agricoles qu’au coeur d’hommes et de femmes qui chantaient sur le podium. Mis à part les chanteurs, personne n’était en blanc. Aharon remarqua avec une pointe de déception amusée que même les petits du jardin d’enfant n’étaient plus habillés de bleu et blanc et qu’aucun drapeau national ne flottait au-dessus de l’aire de fête. (…) Il se souveint de la nostalgie qu’il avait éprouvée aux fêtes nationales, de l’émotion qui s’emparait de lui particulièrement à Shavouot, la fête des Prémices, du sentiment d’appartnance àè un groupe; et foce lui fut de reconnaître que sans le bleu et blanc, sans les drapeaux sur le Caterpillar, cette cérémonie lui paraissait aussi étrangère et archaïque que si elle avait été célébrée dans un kolkhoze russe.
Il avait l’impression que le temps s’était figé comme dans un vieux film sur l’histoire du sionisme. Toute cette mise en scène pastorale était une vaste comédie qui masquait la faillite d’une agriculture sauvée in extremis par une activité industrielle.
17: Nos greniers sont pleins de grains, nos pressoirs débordent de vin , nos maisons sont riches d’enfants” chantait le choeur, et Aharon se tit que nul endroit ne pouvait mieux illustrer cette phrase. La crise économique qui affectait les kibboutzim faisant la une des journaux et alimentait les discussions de la Nnesset et des commissions deéducation , ne soemblait pas concerner ce lieu. Les bénéfices de l’usie de produits cosmétiques était tels, lui avait dit Moysh, qu’ils permettaitent même de subventionner les activités d’autres kibboutzim lourdement endettés. Ici, les membres pouvaient encore se payer des voyages à l’étranger et si le projet de logements familiaux avait été ajourné, ce n’eétait pas faute de moyens mais à cause du débat idéologique engagé avec l’aile conservatrice du mouvement national. Autoriser les enfants à dormir sous le même toit que les parents, recréer la cellule familiale bourgeoise impliquait un renoncement à l’un des fondements de l’idéologie collectiviste.
56: Aharon suivit le cortège qui continuait d’avancer malgré l’attorupement autour de Fania. On essayeait de l’apaiser, mais le chiffre bleu inscrit sur son avant-bras intimidait souvent les bonnes volontés. TRout le monde craignait Fania et Gouta. Même si cette dernière paraissait moins effrayante et quil lui arrivait parfois de rire et de raconter des histoire. Quant il était enfant, il regardait avec effroi le chiffre tatoué sur le bras avec l’impression que tout lui était permis, tout leur était pardonné.(…)Aharon observait Gouta, la manière dont elle mangeait lentement, méthodiquement, la moindre miette dans son assiette pleine à ras bord, avec cette même expression concentrée et solitaire qu’elle avait pendant la cueillette et qui lui faisait peur.
“Que voulez-vous, après tout ce qu’ils ont subi…” disait toujours Myriam lorsque ceux qui travaillaient à l’étable se plaignaient de Gouta qui les épuisait et les réprimandait sans cesse.
131: Le docteur Hirsh s’y assit et décrocha le récepteur pour (…) appeler le Dr Kestenbaum. (…) Aussitôt assis,il se mit à parler (…) long monologue qui commença par :”A l’étranger, je faisais pas seulement autopsies, mais je praticipais aussi enquête, autrement dit, docteur et détective. Michaël lui demanda poliment de quel pays il venait: “de Transylvanie. Huit ans que je suis ici, mais en Hongrie, je travaillais dans la police.”
135: “Je fais opération dans dispensaire où il est mort. Je ne trouve pas signe de choc anaphyalctique à péniciline. Pas trace de violence qui explique la chause de mort, cependant…”
Michaël réprima un sourire. Selon une loi jamais explicitée par les meilleurs linguistes, ce mélange étrange d’expressions toutes faites comme “cependant” et de phrases défectueuses faisait de Kestenbaum quelqu’un qui ne parelerait jamais l’hébreu correctement.
144: Le ton indifférent de Kestenboum masquait mal sa passion d’orateur et Michaël se sentit quelque peu coupable de sa réussite professionnelle, de son jeune âge, de son appartenance inébranlable à ce pays et à sa culture. Il eut conscience que la vie lui avait souri et éprouva une envie de toucher le docteur Kestenbaum, auquel il avait pourtant prodigué juste ce qu’il fallait de compliments pour ne pas verser dans l’exagération ou l’ironie (le contraste entre l’hébreu défecteueux de son interlocuteur et son air important pouvait prêter à ironie). Pourquoi avait-il cette impression d’enfant gâté par la chance devant cet éminent médecin de l’Institut médico-légal?
150: Michaël contempla les espaéces vert et or qui s’étendaient de chaque côté de la route étroite. Il était tendu et pensait à son beau-frère Amy, le mair de sa soeur aînée Yvette. Pendant la guerre du Liban, il avait été enrôlé comme réserviste dans l’unité surnommée “les messagers de la mort”, ces officiers chargés d’annoncer la mauvaise nouvelle aux familles des victimes. Durant toute cette période, il rentrait à la maison sans faire de bruit, sans dire un mot à personne, sans manger ni se laver, s’enfermait dans la chambre à coucher et restait longtemps étendu, à fixer le mur. Une fois libéré, il était devenu incapable d’agir. Il farrivait au garage (…) s’asseyait à son bureau et restait immobile devant les comptes et les factures. (…)”Tun ne peux pas savoir ce que c’est, lui avait dit Ami le lendemain. Les pires sont ceux qui se retiennent, les Ashkenazes. Ils ne crient pas, ils ne disent rien. Une nuit, j’ai attendu dans la voiture avec le médecin qu’il fasse jour. Tu es assis dans la voiture, tu regardes les fenêtres et tu attends que le ciel s’éclaircisse, qu’il soit cinq heures du matin. Tu sais que là-haut des gens dorment tranquillement et que toi tu es comme l’ange de la mort, que d’un seul mot, tu vas briser leur vie.”. Amy s’était couvert le visage de ses grandes mains.
150: Pendant la guerre du Liban, il avait été enrôlé comme réserviste dans l’unitié surnommée “les messagers de la mort”. ces officiers chargés d’annoncer la mauvaise nouvelle aux familles de victimes. Durant toute cette période, il rentrait à la maison sans faire de bruit, sans dire un mot à personne, sans manger ni se lager, s’enfermait dans la chembre à coucher et restait longtemps étendu, à fixer le mur. Une fois libéré, il était devenu incapable d’agir.
“Tu ne peux pas savoir ce que c’est,(…). Les pire sont ceux qui se retiennent, les Ashkenazes. Ils ne crient pas, ils ne disent rien.
200: J’ai cru que nous avions tout vu, finit-elle par dire d’une voix caverneuse. TU étais peut-être trop petit pour t’en souvenir, mais il y a eu le drame de la scission entre idéologie et politique, en 1951. Je croyais que nousavions déjà tout vu. Des familles détruites. La haine. Nous avons déjà vu la haine. Mais à l’époque, elle était sans fard.(…) Ma vie est finie (…). Il s’agit de ton avenir et de celui de tes enfants. Il faut réparer ce qui est tordu.
—-Tordu? répéta Michaël (…)
—-Tordu! Il y a ici un lent processus d’effritement! Il n’est pas d’aujourd’hui. Le travail salarié” —Elle éleva la voix—“le travai salarié au kibboutz! Tous les kibboutzim se prostituent aujourd’hui! poursuivit-elle avec ardeur. On loue aux gens de la ville la pelouse devant la salle à manger pour les fêtes de famille, Où a-t-on vu chose pareil (…) Ne vois-tu pas qu’il y a là un processus? Ne vois-tu pas qu’il conduit à privilégier l’individu au détriment de la société, à ne pas savoir réfréner l’appétit des biens matériels?(…) On commence par spéculer à la bourse, puis à la banque, et au finit par distribuer des bonus aux membres qui cueillent les fuits de leurs propres arbres. Ca fait longtemps que vous refusez de voir les choses en face. Ca fait longtemps que l’appartement privé compte plus que le kibboutz. Il y a ici un processus dont le comboule aboutit à vos projets d’appartements familiaux(…).

182: Ici personne n’était en colère contre lui, mais personne non plus ne le respectait particulièrement. Il s’en était ouvert à Shorer qui l’avait fourré dans ce pétrin.
“Tu vas t’habituer, lui avait répondu Shorer. Ne viens pas me raconter des histoires d’amour-propre. Je compte sur toi pour devenir un jour préfet de police, le premier à être diplomé de l’université. Heureusement que tu n’es pas ashkénaze, sinon on ne t’aurait jamais fait avancer, du moins pas aux enquêtes. Il est temps que tu sois conscient de tes avantages. (…)”
182-83: “Ca pue Tel-Aviv là-bas! Je ne les comprends pas, ils fonctionnement différemment. Sa secrétaire…on dirait toujours qu’elle vient de sortir de chez le coiffeur…ses cheveux sont dressés sur la tête. Youval m’a dit qu’il existait maitenant des gels qui collent comme ça les cheveux, que c’est le dernier cri. On ne l’imagine pas travaillant dans la police. On la voit bien dans un téêtre, un café, mais pas dans la police. Il y a une espèce d’excentricité qui me tape sur les nerfs. Ca n’a rien à voire avec la Ghila d’Arieh Lévi, qui grignote un croissant et se met du vernis à ongles. Là-bas, c’est autre chose.
200: Ses cheveux blancs ramassés en chignon, sa robe grise et simple, son immobilité exprimaient une retenue qui inspirait le respect. Michaël se demanda une fois de plus quel avantage il y avait à exprimer ses sentiments, si cette capacité était une valeur en soi, ou plutôt si une personnalité comme celle de Vorka, pour qui la retenue était une valeur suprême, m’était pas le ciment d’une société fragile et menacée. Il admirait cette culture spartiate qui enseignait à ne pas baisser la tête devant les catastrophes. Dvorka était, peut-être, à l’exception de Jojo, la seule à avoir gardé sa réserve, et Michaël savait d’expérience que la moindre faille dans cette retenue, le moindre coup et tout l’édifice s’écroulait.(…)
“J’ai cru que nous avions tout vu, finit-elle par dire d’une voix caverneuse. Tu étais peut-être trop petit pour t’en souvenir, mais il y a eu le drame de la scission entre idéologie et politique, en 1951. Je croyais que nous avions déjà tout vu. Des familles détruites. La haine. Nous avons déjà vu la haine. Mais à l’époque, elle était sans fard.(…). Ma vie est finie, je n’ai plus beaucoup d’années à vivre. Il s’agit de ton avenir et de celui de tes enfants. Il faut réparer ce qui est tordu.
– Tordu? répéta Michaël comme s’il entendait ce mot pour la première fois.
– Tordu! Il y a ici un lent processus d’effritemetn! Il n’est pas d’aujourd’hui. Le travail salarié” – elle éleva la voix- “le travail salarié au kibboutz! Tous les kibboutzim se prostituent aujourd’hui! poursuivit-elle avec ardeur. On loue aux gens de la ville la pelouse devant la salle à manger pour des fêtes de famille. Où a-t-on vu chose pareille?
Moysh soupira.
“Dvorka, dit-il, à bout, il n’est pas question de ça en ce moment. Ne vois-tu pas la différence? On n’a jamais vu ça, même dans les pires de mes rêves…
– Quelle différence?” Elle détachait chque mot, les découpait au scalpel. “Il n’y a pas de différence, une chose découle de l’autre, c’est un processus. Ne vos-tu pas qu’il y a là un processus? Ne vois-tu qu’il conduit à priviléger l’individu au détriment de la société, à ne pas savoir refréner l’appétit des biens matiéreils? Ne vois-tu pas (…) que c’est un long processus? On commence par spéculer à la bourse, puis à la banque, et on finit par distribuer des bonus aux memebres qui cueillent les fruits de leur propres arbres! Ca fait longtemps que l’appartement privé compte plus que le kibboutz. Il y a un long processus dont le comble aboutit à vos projets d’appartements familiaux et de…”
206: “Je ne peux pas m’y faire” —il se souvenait des mots exacts —“à cette coutume de s’enfermer chez soi pour manger. Manger ensemble est une des valeurs du bibboutz.
218: C’tait des temps difficiles, comme vous pouvez le lire dans la brochure que nous avons publiée pour le jubilé du kibboutz…mais vous ne comprendrez pas vraiment. Il est très difficile d’imaginer le premier contact avec cette terre. Les errances, la sécheresse, l’eau, la faim. Surtout la faim et le travail. Parfois douze heures par jour à creuser, labourer et consruire lentement. La chaleur en été, le froid en hiver, la pauvreté et la faim. Les hommes étaient faibles et affamés. Nous tous. Il y a eu un temps…”(…) “où une femme enceinte n erecevait que deux tranches de pain et un demi-oeuf par jour.”
218-219: “Youvik nous est arrivé après deux bébés morts-nés”. Elle soupira. “C’était les temps difficiles, comme vous pourrez le lire dans la brochure que nous avons publiée pour le jubilé du kibboutz…mais vous ne comprendrez pas vraiment. Il est très difficile d’imaginer le premier contact avec cette terre. Les errances, la sécheresse, l’eau, la faim. Surtout la faim et le travail. Parfois douze heures par jour à creuser, labourer et construire lentement. La chaleur en été, le froid en hiver, la pauvreté et la faim.Les hommes étaient faibles et affamés. Nous tous. Il y a eu un temps…” elle esquissa de nouveau l’ombre d’un sourire- …où une femme enceinte ne recevait que deux tranches de pain et un demi-oeuf par jour (…) et les maladies, toutes ces choses qui sont pour vous de l’histoire, des morceaux choisis ou autre chose. Quand j’ai perdu les bébés, on s’écartait sur mon passage, comme on le fait maintenant. La solidarité était telle qu’elles se sentaient coupables.
236-37: Inutile de perdre votre temps avec Havaleh, encore qu’elle soit une bonne source pour les commérages. Avec Jojo, avec Mathilda, si vous pouvez supporter la méchanceté. La méchanceté et l’esprit borné. Toutes ces balivernes sur une société juste, une société idéale. Qu’en est-il advenu? Toute cette idée d’un lieu ou d’un groupe humain fondée sur l’égalité, à chacun selon ses besoins et ses possibilités, quelle bétise!” Il but une gorgée d’eau. “A chacun selon ses possibilités, selon la force de ses coudes et de ses cris, voilà ce qu’il en est advenu. Et le coucher collectif. Même à 12 ans, les enfants n’aimaient pas ça. Il y en avait qui mouillaient encore leur lit, d’autres se réveillaient la nuit. Et toutes les interrogations sur la personne qui les garderait cette nuit…Et le statut des parents…Les parents, c’est une institution qui est niée là-bas. Personne ne leur a jamais demandé leur avis. Je me souviens qu’on avait construit la piscine, et la commission d’éducation avait décidé l’age où les enfants pourraient y aller sans être accompagnés. Je le sais, parce que j’ai été secouriste. ” Michaël lui lança un regard étonné. ” Et oui, j’ai suivi un cours de secourisme. (…) C’était un samedi et deux petites filles sont arrivées, seules” (…). “j’étais près de l’entrée et j’ai regardé. Elka est arrivée -c’était la présidente de la commission éducative. Tout un discours sur la décision d’interdire aux enfants du cours moyen de venir seuls. On ne s’était même pas demandé ce qu’en pensaient les parents. Les parents n’existaient pas. Il n’y avait que Lotté et Dvorka qui existaient.
– Qui était cette Lotté?
– Elle a été notre éducatrice pendant quelques années. Si elle avait travaillé seule, elle aurait été investie d’une autorité quasi divine. Mais comme il y avait Dvorka, nous avions deux déesses. Il n’était jamais question de consulter les parens au sujet d’un problème. Tout passait par Dvorka ou Lotté. Je crois que les mères apprenaient avec un an de retrd que leur fille avait eu ses règes. ” Méeroz parlait sérieusement, sans sourire. “D’abord Lotté et Dvorka qui l’apprenaient. Et éventuellement Riva, l’infirmière. Cette idée d’une éducation unique, la même pour tous, la marque de fabrique, vous en voyez le résultat maintenant…Il n’y a pas de quoi être fier. Une société médiocre et matérialiste. Une société sans autre défi que celui de ne pas perdre son individualité. En fin de compte, c’est l’idée du Kibboutz que je n’aime pas du tout. ” Il insista sur le mot “idée”. “Accorder tant de confiance au genre humain, croire qu’il peut vraiment être égalitaire….et des Juifs de surcroît.
239: Michaël regarda autour de lui. Ils étaient assis à une luxueuse table basse, dans le hall du Hilton où Michael avait donné rendez-vous à Shorer après avoir accompagné Meroz à l’hôpital. Derrière un comptoir, un employé de la réception additionnait les chifrfres. On entendait le bruit monotome du tiroir-caisse et une sonnerie de téléphone. On sentait que l’hôtel bruissait de vie alors qu’il paraissait désert. Aux étages supérieurs, se dit Michaël, il y avait des centaines de gens, des couples, des mants, heureux ou malheureux, en trian de faire l’amour, des cuisiniers et des pâtissiers, des dizaines de travailleurs, le silence et le fourmillement d’une vie secrète. Non loin, presque à quelques pas, des bombes incendiaires, l’Intifada, Youval dans les dédales de Bethléem et le tout sur le point d’exploser.
293: Cette voix douce et mûre, dénuée de toute amertume et de toute colère, exprimait paradoxalement une certaine souffrance. Michaël y entendait la solitude. Son service à Bethléem, dans les territoires, lui vait volé sa jeunesse et avait fait de lui un homme.
313: Esther était la plus jeune de six enfants; elle s’était réfugiée en Russie avec le père d’Avigaïl et c’est ainsi qu’ils avaient échappé à la Shoah. De cette période de sa vie, Esther ne disait qu’une phrase: qu’elle était partie accompagner un ami —-“un goy”—disait-elle—- et qu’à son retour, “ils étaient tours morts”. Elle l’avait raconté à contrecoeur, un soir d’hiver où Avigail avait insisté. Elle ne parlait jamais de ses parents ni de ses fères morts. Il lui arrivait seulement d’évoquer le jour où la guerre avait éclaté et de dire: “On n’aime qu’une fois dans la vie, c’est quand on a seize ans.”
338: Il reprit le bulletin daté de la fin février et relut la rubrique “Nouvelles du secrétariat” tenue par Osant. C’était le compte-rendu d’une journée à laquelle avaient participé des dizaines de secrétaires de kibboutz et dont le sujet était “Confiance mutuelle au kibboutz”. (…) Ensuite il relut le dernier paragraphe (…):
Le kibboutz doit se restructurer comme une société où l’individu est le but et la première des priorités, où la communauté collectiviste et égalitaire n’est qu’un moyen, meilleur que les autres, pour l’épanouissement de l’individu et la réalisaiton de la “belle vie”, d’autant plus tentante que l’idéologie socialiste-sioniste est en crise. Loin d’être soimbre ou désespérée, l’atmosphère qui régnait était celle d’une grande volonté potentielle à l’orée d’un tournant historique. Une fois ce tournant pris, nul doute que nous aurons la roce d’aller de l’avant.
366: “Je me souviens que, pendant des années, j’ai voulu être comme tout le monde, un vrai Israélien, un sabra. J’étais prêt à tout faire pour qu’on ne sache pas que j’étais né ailleurs. On croit touours que c’est le problème des communautés orientales, des marocaines. Mais nous savons très bien que ceux qui sont arrivés de Pologne ou d’ailleurs avaient le même désir, le même problème. (…) Le désir de brouiller le passé, d’entrer dans ce qu’on appelait ici le creuset. Quand on y pense, si on plonge un homme dans un creuset, il brûle.
398: – En quoi l’éducation de nos enfants était-elle mauvaise?” cria Dvorka.
Les mains tremblantes, Moysh se leva et regarda comme s’il les découvrait, sans tendresse ni indulgence, Dvorka et la rangée de vieux:
“Je vais te dire exactement ce qui était mauvais. D’abord, le fait que nous ne parlions jamais du passé. Vous ne vouliez pas entendre, vous ne le permettiez pas. Je me souviens très bien comment Sroulké me ramenait à la maison des enfants quand je m’enfuyais la nuit pour aller retrouver mes parents chez eux. Depuis la mort d’Osnat, à cause de la manière dont elle est morte, j’éprouve le besoin de parler. Je dirai tout ce que j’ai sur le coeur et vous m’écouterez. Ce sera comme dans Kehilatenou. Moi aussi j’ai lu ce ramasis d’étalage public et je me suis dit que les choses avaient bien changé. La réunion plénière est devenue le lieu où l’on autorise ceci ou cela, où l’on débat de tel ou tel sujet. Que savez-vous donc de nous? Sans doute quand nous avons percé notre prmière dent et fait nos premiers pas, mais vous ignorez tout de ce qui se passe en nous. Nous n’avions jamais eu l’occaison d’en perler, sauf en plaisantant et par le biais de sketches que nous préparions por les fêtes du kibboutz et les bar-mitzva. Je ne nie pas la beauté de cette forme de vie, mais ces nuits passées sans père ni mère, avec toutes sortes de remplaçants qui ne remplaçaient rien, comme ce garçon du Nahal qui avait saupoudré de talc la zézette de Noga…Vous en aviez fait une plaisanterie. (…)”Ma mère, Myriam, poursuivit Moysh d’une voix étouffée, que vous avez tous connue, était une femme simple et pas très intelligente (…) me racontait que l’image qu’elle garde de moi est celle d’un mignon petit bébé qui suivait la puériculturce, morveux et en larme, la petite menue agrippée à la robe ou au tablier de Golda qui le rejetait`? Où étiez-vous alors?”Le cri s’adressait à Dvorka, qui ne baissa pas les yeux. Michaël crut qu’elle avait cessé de respiré. Son visage était de pierre. “Voilà ce que je veux savoir. Où étiez-vous`? A quoi pensiez-vous pedant toutes ces nuits o?u nous avions peur? Comment avez-vous pu n’accorder aux mamans qu’une demi-heure par jour pour voir leurs enfants? Comment vous êtes-vous permis de décider que la cellule familiale était nocive à la société? Osnat avait raison: elle m’a dit que nous vous opposiez à ce changement parce que vous vous sentiez coupables. Vous voulez perpétuer cette cruauté poru vous protéger, vous justifier à vos propres yeux!” (…) Arrêtons cette histoire! Vous aviez peut-être vos raisons, je n’en sais rien, la vie difficile et tout le reste, mais nous n’avons pas à perpétuer vos histoires. J’ai envie de border mes enfants le soir, j’ai envie de les entendre tousser chez moi, j’ai envie que lorsqu’ils font un cauchemar, il viennent dans mon liet. Je ne veux pas les voir parler dans un interphone ou sortir dans la nuit à la recherche de notre chambre, trébucher sur les cailloux, voir un monstre à chaque tournant et arriver devant une porte fermée ou chez un père qui les raccompagne à la maison des enfants.(…) Vous avez organisé les choses selon vos besoins. Au nom d’un idéal d’égalité, vous avez détruit notre moi individuel, intime. Quelle assurance peuvent avoir des enfants qui ne doivent compter la nuit que sur d’autres enfants. (…) J’aimerais bien comprendre ce que vous aviez dans la tête quand vous nous enfermiez de l’extérieur et que le veilleur ne venait nous voir que deux fois dans la nuit! Deux fois! Nous passions des nuits entières devant la porte, à frapper et leurer, et personne ne venait. Chque fois que j’y pense, j’explose de rage. Il y a de quoi devenir fou!
430: Le téléphone sonna. Avigaïl le regarda puis décrocha le récepteur.
“C’est pour toi, “dit-elle
Michaël l’entendit ouvrir et refermer des portes de placard, puis une sueur froide se mit à couler le long de son dos.
“Ce n’est rien, expliqua Sarit. Il n’est pas vraiment blessé. C’est juste une pierre.

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1867. Constitution Act.

Originally, “The British North America Act, 1867”)
(U.K. 30 & 31 Victoria, C.3)
Constitution Act (Formerly BNA Act)
(Consolidated with amendments)

An Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and
the Government thereof, and for Purposes connected therewith.

(29 March, 1867.)

WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under
the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a
Constitution similar in Principle to the United Kingdom;

AND WHEREAS such a Union would conduce to the Welfare of the Provinces
and promote the Interests of the British Empire;

AND WHEREAS on the Establishment of the Union by Authority of
Parliament it is expedient, not only that the Constitution of the
Legislative Authority in the Dominion be provided for, but also that
the Nature of the Executive Government therein be declared;

AND WHEREAS it is expedient that Provision be made for the eventual
Admission into the Union of other Parts of British North America:
I. Preliminary

1. This Act may be cited as the Constitution Act, 1867.

2. REPEALED.
II. Union

3. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice of
Her Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, to declare by
Proclamation that, on and after a Day therein appointed, not
being more than Six Months after the passing of this Act, the
Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall form
and be One Dominion under the Name of Canada; and on and after
that Day those Three Provinces shall form and be One Dominion
under that Name accordingly.

[July 1st, 1867 was fixed by proclamation dated May 22, 1867.]

4. Unless it is otherwise expressed or implied, the Name
Canada shall be taken to mean Canada as constituted under this
Act.

5. Canada shall be divided into Four Provinces, named Ontario,
Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

6. The parts of the Province of Canada (as it exists at the
passing of this Act) which formerly constituted respectively
the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada shall be deemed to be
severed, and shall form Two separate Provinces. The Part which
formerly constituted the Province of Upper Canada shall
constitute the Province of Ontario, and the Part which
formerly constituted the Province of Lower Canada shall
Constitute the Province of Quebec.

7. The Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall have
the same Limits as at the passing of this Act.

8. In the general Census of the Population of Canada, which is
hereby required to be taken in the Year One thousand eight
hundred and seventy-one, and in every Tenth Year thereafter,
the respective Populations of the Four Provinces shall be
distinguished.
III. Executive Power

9. The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada
is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.

10. The Provisions of this Act referring to the Governor
General extend and apply to the Governor General for the Time
being of Canada, or other Chief Executive Officer or
Administrator for the Time being carrying on the Government of
Canada on behalf and in the Name of the Queen, by whatever
Title he is designated.

11. There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the
Government of Canada, to be styled the Queen’s Privy Council
for Canada; and the Persons who are to be Members of that
Council shall be from Time to Time chosen and summoned by the
Governor General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and
Members thereof may be from Time to Time removed by the
Governor General.

12. All Powers, Authorities and Functions which under any Act
of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the
Legislature of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova
Scotia, or New Brunswick, are at the Union vested in or
exercisable by the respective Governors or Lieutenant
Governors of those Provinces, with the Advice, or with the
Advice and Consent, of the respective Executive Councils
thereof, or in conjunction with those Councils, or with and
Number of Members thereof, or by those Governors or Lieutenant
Governors individually, shall, as far as the same continue in
existence and capable being exercised after the Union in
relation to the Government of Canada, be vested in and
exercisable by the Governor General with the Advice, or the
Advice and Consent of or in conjunction with the Queen’s Privy
Council for Canada, or any Member thereof, or by the Governor
General individually, as the Case requires, subject
nevertheless (except with respect to such as exist under the
Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain or the Parliament of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) to be
abolished or altered by the Parliament of Canada.

[The restriction against abolishing or altering Laws enacted
by the Parliament of the United Kingdom was removed by _The
Statute of Westminster, 1931_, 22 Geo. V., c.4 (U.K).]

13. The Provisions of this Act referring to the Governor
General in Council shall be construed as referring to the
Governor General acting by and with the Advice of the Queen’s
Privy Council for Canada.

14. It shall be lawful for the Queen, if Her Majesty thinks
fit, to authorize the Governor General from Time to Time to
appoint and Person or any Persons jointly or severally to be
his Deputy or Deputies within any Part or Parts of Canada, and
in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the
Governor General such of the Powers, Authorities, and
Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General
deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them,
subject to any Limitations or Directions expressed or given by
the Queen; but the Appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies
shall not affect the exercise by the Governor General himself
of any Power, Authority or Function.

15. The Command-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia, and of
all Naval and Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby
declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.

16. Until the Queen otherwise directs, the Seat of Government
of Canada shall be Ottawa.
IV. Legislative Power

17. There shall be One Parliament for Canada consisting of the
Queen, and Upper House Styled the Senate, and the House of
Commons.

18. The privileges, immunities, and powers held, enjoyed, and
exercised by the Senate and House of Commons, and by the
Members thereof, shall be such as are from Time to Time
defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any
Act of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges,
immunities, or powers shall not confer and privileges,
immunities, or powers exceeding those at the passing of the
Act held, enjoyed and excercised by the Commons House of
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
and by the members thereof.

19. The Parliament of Canada shall be called together not
later than Six Months after the Union.

20. REPEALED.

The Senate

21. The Senate Shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act,
consist of One Hundred and four Members, who shall be styled
Senators.

22. In relation to the Constitution of the Senate Canada shall
be deemed to consist of Four Divisions:

1. Ontario
2. Quebec
3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island;
4. The Western Provinces of Manitoba, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta;

which Four Divisions shall (subject to the Provisions of this
Act) be equally represented in the Senate as follows: Ontario
by 24 senators; Quebec by 24 senators; the Maritime Provinces
and Prince Edward Island by twenty four senators, ten thereof
representing Nova Scotia, ten thereof representing New
Brunswick, and four thereof representing Prince Edward Island;
the Western Provinces by twenty four senators, six thereof
represting Manitoba, six thereof representing British
Columbia, six thereof representing Saskatchewan, and six
thereof representing Alberta; Newfoundland shall be be
entitled to be represented in the Senate by six members, the
Yukon territory and the Northwest Territories shall be
entitled to be represented in the Senate by one member each.

In the Case of Quebec, each of the Twenty-four Senators
representing that Province shall be appointed for One of the
Twenty-four Electoral Divisions of Lower Canada specified in
Schedule A. to Chapter One of the Consolidated statues of
Canada.

23. The Qualifications of a Senator shall be as follows:

(1) He shall be of the full age of Thirty Years;

(2) He shall be either a natural-born Subject of the
Queen naturalized by an Act of the Parliament of Great
Britain, or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, or of the Legislature of
One of the Provinces of Upper Canada, Lower Canada,
Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, before the Union, or of
the Parliament of Canada, after the Union;

(3) He shall be legally or equitably seised as of
Freehold for his Own Use and Benefit of Lands or
Tenements held in Free and Common Socage, or seised or
possessed for his own Use and Benefit of Lands or
Tenements held in Franc-alleu or in Roture, within the
Province for which he is appointed, of the Value of
Four Thousand Dollars, over and above all Rents, Dues,
Debts, Charges, Mortgages, and Incumbrances due or
payable out of or charged on or affecting the same;

(4) His Real and Personal Property shall be together
worth Four Thousand Dollars over and above his Debts
and Liabilities;

(5) He shall be resident in the Province for which he
is appointed;

(6) In the case of Quebec he shall have his Real
Property Qualification in the Electoral Division for
which he is appointed, or shall be resident in that
Division.

24. The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the
Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada,
summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the
Provisions of this Act, every person so summoned shall become
and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator.

25. REPEALED.

26. If at any Time on the Recommendation of the Governor
General the Queen thinks fit to direct that Four or Eight
Members be added to the Senate, the Governor General may by
Summons to Four or Eight qualified Persons (as the case may
be), representing equally the Four Divisions of Canada, add to
the Senate accordingly.

27. In case of such Addition be at any Time made, the Governor
General shall not summon any Person to the Senate, except upon
a further like Direction by the Queen on the like
Recommendation, to represent, to represent one of the Four
Divisions until such Division is represented by Twenty-Four
Senators and no more.

28. The Number of Senators shall not at any Time exceed One
Hundred and twelve.

29. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a Senator shall, subject to
the provisions of this Act, hold his place in the Senate for
life.
(2) A Senator who is summoned to the Senate after the
coming into force of this subsection shall, subject to this
Act, hold his place in the Senate until he attains the age of
seventy-five years.

30. A Senator may by Writing under his Hand addressed to the
Governor General resign his Place in the Senate, and thereupon
the same shall be vacant.

31. The Place of a Senator shall become vacant in any of the
following Cases:

1. If for Two consecutive Sessions of the Parliament
he fails to give his Attendance in the Senate;

2. If he takes an Oath or makes a Declaration or
Acknowledgement of Allegiance, Obedience, or Adherence
to a Foreign Power, or does an Act whereby he becomes
a Subject or Citizen, or entitled to the Rights and
Privileges of a Subject or Citizen, of a Foreign
Power;

3. If he is adjudged Bankrupt or Insolvent, or applies
for the Benefit of any Law relating to Insolvent
Debtors, or becomes a public Defaulter;

4. If he is attainted of Treason or convicted of a
Felony or of any infamous Crime;

5. If he ceases to be qualified in respect of Property
or of Residence; provided, that a Senator shall not be
deemed to have ceased to be qualified in respect of
Residence by reason only of his residing at the Seat
of the Government of Canada while holding an Office
under that Government requiring his Presence there.

32. When a Vacancy happens in the Senate by Resignation,
Death, or otherwise, the Governor General shall by Summons to
a fit and qualified Person fill the Vacancy.

33. If any Question arises respecting the Qualification of a
Senator or a Vacancy in the Senate the same shall be heard and
determined by the Senate.

34. The Governor General may from Time to Time, by Instrument
under the Great Seal of Canada, appoint a Senator to be
Speaker of the Senate, and may remove him and appoint another
in his Stead.

35. Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, the
Presence of at least Fifteen Senators, including the Speaker,
shall be necessary to constitute a Meeting of the Senate for
the Exercise of its Powers.

36. Questions arising in the Senate shall be decided by a
Majority of Voices, and the Speaker shall in all Cases have a
Vote, and when the Voices are equal the Decision shall be
deemed to be in the Negative.
The House of Commons

37. The House of Commons shall, subject to the Provisions of
this Act, consist of two hundred and eighty-two members of
whom ninety- five shall be elected for Ontario, seventy-five
for Quebec, eleven for Nova Scotia, ten for New Brunswick,
fourteen for Manitoba, twenty-eight for British Columbia, four
for Prince Edward Island, twenty-one for Alberta, fourteen for
Saskatchewan, seven for Newfoundland, one for the Yukon
Territory and two for the Northwest Territories.

38. The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the
Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada,
summon and call together the House of Commons.

39. A Senator shall not be capable of being elected or of
sitting or voting as a Member of the House of Commons.

40. SPENT.

[Defined Federal electoral districts for the original
provinces. Now covered by the _Representation Act, 1952_,
c.334, as amended.]

41. SPENT.

[Defined Federal electoral regulations for the orginal
provinces. Now covered by the _Canada Elections Act, 1960_,
c.38, as amended.]

42. REPEALED.

43. REPEALED.

44. The House of Commons on its first assembling after a
General Election shall proceed with all practicable Speed to
elect One of its Members to be Speaker.

45. In case of a Vacancy happening in the office of Speaker by
Death, Resignation, or otherwise, the House of Commons shall
with all practicable Speed proceed to elect another of its
Members to be Speaker.

46. The Speaker shall preside at all Meetings of the House of
Commons.

47. SPENT.

[Provisions for exercising the powers of the Speaker of the
House of Commons in his absence. Now covered by _The Speaker
of the House of Commons Act, 1952_, c. 254, as amended.]

48. The Presence of at least Twenty Members of the House of
Commons shall be necessary to constitute a Meeting of the
House for the Exercise of its Powers, and for that Purpose the
Speaker shall be reckoned as a Member.

49. Questions arising in the House of Commons shall be decided
by a Majority of Voices other than that of the Speaker, and
when the Voices are equal, but not otherwise, the Speaker
shall have a Vote.

50. Every House of Commons shall continue for Five Years from
the Day of the Return of the Writs for choosing the House
(subject to be sooner dissolved by the Governor General), and
no longer.

51. Omitted.

51A. Notwithstanding anything in this Act a province shall
always be entitled to a number of members in the House of
Commons not less than the number of Senators representing such
province.

52. The Number of Members of the House of Commons may be from
Time to Time increased by the Parliament of Canada, provided
that the proportionate Representation of the Provinces
prescribed by this Act is not thereby disturbed.
Money Votes; Royal Assent

53. Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or
for imposing any Tax or Impost, shall originate in the House
of Commons.

54. It shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt
or pass any Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill for the
appropriation of any Part of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax
or Impost, to any Purpose that has not been first recommended
to that House by Message of the Governor General in the
Session in which such Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill is
proposed.

55. Where a Bill passed by Houses of the Parliament is
presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s assent, he
shall declare, according to his Discretion, but subject to the
Provisions of this Act and to Her Majesty’s Instructions,
either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s name, or that he
withholds the Queen’s Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for
the signification of the Queen’s Pleasure.

56. Where the Governor General assents to a Bill in the
Queen’s Name, he shall by the first convenient Opportunity
send an authentic Copy of the Act to one of Her Majesty’s
Principal Secretaries of State, and if the Queen in Council
within Two Years after Receipt thereof by the Secretary of
State thinks fit to disallow the Act, such Disallowance (with
a Certificate of the Secretary of State on the Day on which
the Act was received by him) being signified by the Governor
General, by Speech or Message to each of the Houses of the
Parliament or by Proclamation, shall annul the Act from and
after the Day of such Signification.

57. A Bill reserved for the Signification of the Queen’s
Pleasure shall not have any Force unless and until, within Two
Years from the Day on which it was presented to the Governor
General for the Queen’s Assent, the Governor General
signifies, by Speech or Message to each of the Houses of the
Parliament or by Proclamation, that it has received the Assent
of the Queen in Council.

An Entry of every such Speech, Message, or Proclamation
shall be made in the Journal of each House, and a Duplicate
thereof duly attested shall be delivered to the proper Officer
to be kept among the Records of Canada.

V. Provincial Constitutions

58. For each Province there shall be an Officer, styled the
Lieutenant Governor, appointed by the Governor General in
Council by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada.

59. A Lieutenant Governor shall hold Office during the
Pleasure of the Governor General; but any Lieutenant Governor
appointed after the Commencement of the First Session of the
Parliament of Canada shall not be removable withing Five Years
from his Appointment, except for Cause assigned, which shall
be communicated to be in Writing within One Month after the
Order for his removal is made, and shall be communicated by
Message to the Senate and to the House of Commons within One
Week thereafter if the Parliament is then sitting, and if not
then within One Week after the Commencement of the next
Session of the Parliament.

60. The Salaries of the Lieutenant Governors shall be fixed
and provided by the Parliament of Canada.

61. Every Lieutenant Governor shall, before assuming the
Duties of his Office, make and subscribe before the Governor
General of some Person authorized by him Oaths of Allegiance
and Office similar to those taken by the Governor General.

62. The Provisions of this Act referring to the Lieutenant
Governor extend and apply to the Lieutenant Governor for the
Time being of each Province, or other the Chief Executive
Officer or Administrator for the Time being carrying on the
Government of the Province, by whatever Title he is
designated.

63. The Executive Council of Ontario and of Quebec shall be
composed of such Persons as the Lieutenant Governor from Time
to Time thinks fit, and in the first instance of the following
Officers, namely, — the Attorney General, the Secretary and
Registrar of the Province, the Treasurer of the Province, the
Commissioner of Crown Lands, the Commissioner of Agriculture
and Public Works, with in Quebec the Speaker of the
Legislative Council and the Solicitor General.

64. The Constitution of the Executive Authority in each of the
Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall, subject to
the Provisions of this Act, continue as it exists at the Union
until altered under the Authority of this Act.

65. All Powers, Authorities, and Functions which under any Act
of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the Parliament of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the
Legislature of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, or Canada, were or
are before or at the Union vested in or exercisable by the
respective Governors or Lieutenant Governors of those
Provinces, with the Advice and Consent of the respective
Executive Councils thereof, or in conjunction with those
Councils, or with any Number of Members thereof, or by those
Governors or Lieutenant Governors individually, shall, as far
as the same are capable of being exercised after the Union in
relation to the Government of Ontario and Quebec respectively,
be vested in and shall or may be exercised by the Lieutenant
Governors of Ontario and Quebec respectively, with the Advice
or the Advice and consent of or in conjunction with the
respective Executive Councils, or any Members thereof, or by
the Lieutenant Governor individually, as the Case requires,
subject nevertheless (except with respect to such as exist
under Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland), to be abolished or altered by the respective
Legislatures of Ontario and Quebec.

[See note to section 12, above.]

66. The Provisions of this Act referring to the Lieutenant
Governor in Council shall be construed as referring to the
Lieutenant Governor of the Province acting by and with the
Advice of the Executive Council thereof.

67. The Governor General in Council may from Time to Time
appoint an Administrator to execute the office and Functions
of Lieutenant Governor during his Absence, Illness, or other
Inability.

68. Unless and until the Executive Government of any Province
otherwise directs with respect to that Province, the Seats of
Government of the Provinces shall be as follows, namely, — of
Ontario, the City of Toronto; of Quebec, the City of Quebec;
of Nova Scotia, the City of Halifax; and of New Brunswick, the
City of Fredricton.
Legislative Power

1. Ontario

69. There shall be a Legislature for Ontario consisting of the
Lieutenant Governor and of One House, styled the Legislative
Assembly of Ontario.

70. SPENT.
[Defined size and composition of the Legislative Assembly of
Ontario. Now covered by the _Representation Act, R.S.O.
1960_, c.353.]

2. Quebec

71. There shall be a Legislature for Quebec consisting of the
Lieutenant Governor and of Two Houses, styled the Legislative
Council of Quebec and the Legislative Assembly of Quebec.

72. SPENT.
[Defined size, composition and term of the Legislative Council
of Quebec. Now covered by the _Legislature Act, R.S.Q. 1964_,
c. 6.]

73. The Qualifications of the Legislative Councillors of
Quebec shall be the same as those of the Senators of Quebec.

74. The Place of a Legislative Councillor of Quebec shall
become vacant in the Cases, _mutatis mutandis_, in which the
Place of Senator becomes vacant.

75. When Vacancy happens in the Legislative Council of Quebec
by Resignation, Death, or otherwise, the Lieutenant Governor,
in the Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of
Quebec, shall appoint a fit and qualified Person to fill the
Vacancy.

76. If any Question arises respecting the Qualifications of a
Legislative Councillor of Quebec, or a Vacancy in the
Legislative Council of Quebec, the same shall be heard and
determined by the Legislative Council.

77. SPENT.
[Appointment of Speaker of the Legislative Council of Quebec.
Now covered by the _Legislature Act_.]

78. Until the Legislature of Quebec otherwise provides, the
Presence of at least ten Members of the Legislative Council,
including the Speaker, shall be necessary to constitute a
Meeting for the Exercise of its Powers.

79. Questions arising in the Legislative Council of Quebec
shall be decided by a Majority of Voices, and the Speaker
shall in all Cases have a Vote, and when the Voices are equal
the Decision shall be deemed to be in the Negative.

80. SPENT.
[Defined size and composition of Legistlative Assembly of
Quebec. Now covered by the _Legislature Act_.]
3. Ontario and Quebec

81. REPEALED.

82. The Lieutenant Governor of Ontario and Quebec shall from
Time to Time, in the Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the
Great Seal of the Province, summon and call together the
Legislative Assembly of the Province.

83. SPENT.
[Eligibility requirements for members of the Legislative
Assembly. Covered by the _Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.O.
1960_ in Ontario, and by the Legislature Act, R.S.Q. 1964 in
Quebec.]

84. SPENT.
[Defined Provincial election rules for Ontario and Quebec. Now
covered by the a number of Acts in each province, notably the
_Elections Act, R.S.O. 1960_ in Ontario and the _Elections
Act, R.S.Q. 1964_ in Quebec.]

85. SPENT.
[Defined the maximum duration of a sessions of each of the
Legislative Assemblies. Now covered by the _Legislature Act_
of each of the provinces (see above).]

86. There shall be a Session of the Legislature of Ontario and
of that of Quebec once at least in every Year, so that Twelve
Months shall not intervene between the last Sitting of the
Legislature in each Province and its first Sitting of the next
Session.

87 The following Provisions of this Act respecting the House
of Commons of Canada shall extend and apply to the Legislative
Assemblies of Ontario and Quebec, that is to say, — the
Provisions relating to the Election of a Speaker originally

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1982. Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés.

Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés de 1982
(Excerpt from the Constitution Act 1982)

Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law:

Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms

1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Fundamental Freedoms

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.

Democratic Rights

3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members
of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified
for membership therein.

4. (1) No House of Commons and no legislative assembly shall continue for
longer than five years from the date fixed for the return of the writs
at a general election of its members.

(2) In time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, a
House of Commons may be continued by Parliament and a legislative
assembly may be continued by the legislature beyond five years if such
continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the
members of the House of Commons or the legislative assembly, as the case
may be.

5. There shall be a sitting of Parliament and of each legislature at least
once every twelve months.

Mobility Rights

6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada.

(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a
permanent resident of Canada has the right
(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.

(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to
(a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a
province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily
on the basis of province of present or previous residence; and
(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a
qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration in a province of conditions
of individuals in that province who were socially or economically
disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the
rate of employment in Canada.

Legal Rights

7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.

8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.

9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.

10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of
that right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
(a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence;
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a
military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum
punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more
severe punishment;
(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at
the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under
Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again
and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be
tried or punished for it again; and
(i) if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence
has been varied between the time of commission and the time of
sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.

13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any
other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving
of contradictory evidence.

14. A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak
the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has
the right to the assistance of an interpreter.

Equality Rights

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.

Official Languages of Canada

16. (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and
have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use
in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.

(2) English and French are the official languages of New Brunswick and
have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use
in all institutions of the legislature and government of New Brunswick.

(3) Nothing in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament or a
legislature to advance the equality of status or use of English and
French.

17. (1) Everyone has the right to use English or French in any debates and
other proceedings of Parliament.

(2) Everyone has the right to use English or French in any debates and
other proceedings of the legislature of New Brunswick.

18. (1) The statutes, records and journals of Parliament shall be printed
and published in English and French and both language versions are
equally authoritative.

(2) The statutes, records and journals of the legislature of New
Brunswick shall be printed and published in English and French and both
language versions are equally authoritative.

19. (1) Either English or French may be used by any person in, or any
pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament.

(2) Either English or French may be used by any person in, or any
pleading in or process issuing from, any court of New Brunswick.

20. (1) Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with,
and to receive available services from, any head or central office of an
institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or
French, and has the same right with respect to any other office of any
such institution where
(a) there is a significant demand for communications with and
services from that office in such language; or
(b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that
communications with and services from that office be available in
both English and French.

(2) Any member of the public in New Brunswick has the right to communicate
with, and to receive available services from, any office of an institution
of the legislature or government of New Brunswick in English or French.

21. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any right,
privilege or obligation with respect to the English and French languages,
or either of them, that exists or is continued by virtue of any other
provision of the Constitution of Canada.

22. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any legal or
customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after
the coming into force of this Charter with respect to any language that
is not English or French.

Minority Language Educational Rights

23. (1) Citizens of Canada
(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the
English or French linguistic minority of the province in which they
reside, or
(b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in
English or French and reside in a province where the language in
which they received that instruction is the language of the English
or French linguistic minority population of the province,
have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary
school instruction in that language in that province.

(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving
primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada,
have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary
language instruction in the same language.

(3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to
have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in
the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of
a province
(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of
citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the
provision to them out of public funds of minority language
instruction; and
(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the
right to have them receive that instruction in minority language
educational facilities provided out of public funds.

Enforcement

24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.

(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if
it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.

General

25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not
be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty
or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal people of
Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired.

26. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not
be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms
that exist in Canada.

27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.

28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms
referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.

29. Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect
of denominational, separate or dissentient schools.

30. A reference in this Charter to a province or to the legislative assembly
or legislature of a province shall be deemed to include a reference to
the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories, or to the appropriate
legislative authority thereof, as the case may be.

31. Nothing in this Charter extends the legislative powers of any body or
authority.

Application of Charter

32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all
matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect
of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each
province.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not have effect
until three years after this section comes into force. [Section 32
came into force on April 17, 1982; therefore, section 15 had effect
on April 17, 1985.]

33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that
the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.

(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the
declaration.

(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect
five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be
specified in the declaration.

(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration
made under subsection (1).

(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under
subsection (4).

34. This Part may be cited as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés de 1982
(Excerpt from the Constitution Act 1982)

Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law:

Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms

1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Fundamental Freedoms

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.

Democratic Rights

3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members
of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified
for membership therein.

4. (1) No House of Commons and no legislative assembly shall continue for
longer than five years from the date fixed for the return of the writs
at a general election of its members.

(2) In time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, a
House of Commons may be continued by Parliament and a legislative
assembly may be continued by the legislature beyond five years if such
continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the
members of the House of Commons or the legislative assembly, as the case
may be.

5. There shall be a sitting of Parliament and of each legislature at least
once every twelve months.

Mobility Rights

6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada.

(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a
permanent resident of Canada has the right
(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.

(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to
(a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a
province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily
on the basis of province of present or previous residence; and
(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a
qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration in a province of conditions
of individuals in that province who were socially or economically
disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the
rate of employment in Canada.

Legal Rights

7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.

8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.

9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.

10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of
that right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
(a) to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence;
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that
person in respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(e) not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a
military tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum
punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more
severe punishment;
(g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at
the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under
Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again
and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be
tried or punished for it again; and
(i) if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence
has been varied between the time of commission and the time of
sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.

13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any
other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving
of contradictory evidence.

14. A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak
the language in which the proceedings are conducted or who is deaf has
the right to the assistance of an interpreter.

Equality Rights

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.

Official Languages of Canada

16. (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and
have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use
in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.

(2) English and French are the official languages of New Brunswick and
have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use
in all institutions of the legislature and government of New Brunswick.

(3) Nothing in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament or a
legislature to advance the equality of status or use of English and
French.

17. (1) Everyone has the right to use English or French in any debates and
other proceedings of Parliament.

(2) Everyone has the right to use English or French in any debates and
other proceedings of the legislature of New Brunswick.

18. (1) The statutes, records and journals of Parliament shall be printed
and published in English and French and both language versions are
equally authoritative.

(2) The statutes, records and journals of the legislature of New
Brunswick shall be printed and published in English and French and both
language versions are equally authoritative.

19. (1) Either English or French may be used by any person in, or any
pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament.

(2) Either English or French may be used by any person in, or any
pleading in or process issuing from, any court of New Brunswick.

20. (1) Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with,
and to receive available services from, any head or central office of an
institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or
French, and has the same right with respect to any other office of any
such institution where
(a) there is a significant demand for communications with and
services from that office in such language; or
(b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that
communications with and services from that office be available in
both English and French.

(2) Any member of the public in New Brunswick has the right to communicate
with, and to receive available services from, any office of an institution
of the legislature or government of New Brunswick in English or French.

21. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any right,
privilege or obligation with respect to the English and French languages,
or either of them, that exists or is continued by virtue of any other
provision of the Constitution of Canada.

22. Nothing in sections 16 to 20 abrogates or derogates from any legal or
customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after
the coming into force of this Charter with respect to any language that
is not English or French.

Minority Language Educational Rights

23. (1) Citizens of Canada
(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the
English or French linguistic minority of the province in which they
reside, or
(b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in
English or French and reside in a province where the language in
which they received that instruction is the language of the English
or French linguistic minority population of the province,
have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary
school instruction in that language in that province.

(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving
primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada,
have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary
language instruction in the same language.

(3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to
have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in
the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of
a province
(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of
citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the
provision to them out of public funds of minority language
instruction; and
(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the
right to have them receive that instruction in minority language
educational facilities provided out of public funds.

Enforcement

24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.

(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if
it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.

General

25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not
be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty
or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal people of
Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired.

26. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not
be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms
that exist in Canada.

27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.

28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms
referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.

29. Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or
privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect
of denominational, separate or dissentient schools.

30. A reference in this Charter to a province or to the legislative assembly
or legislature of a province shall be deemed to include a reference to
the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories, or to the appropriate
legislative authority thereof, as the case may be.

31. Nothing in this Charter extends the legislative powers of any body or
authority.

Application of Charter

32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all
matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect
of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each
province.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not have effect
until three years after this section comes into force. [Section 32
came into force on April 17, 1982; therefore, section 15 had effect
on April 17, 1985.]

33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that
the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.

(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the
declaration.

(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect
five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be
specified in the declaration.

(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration
made under subsection (1).

(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under
subsection (4).

34. This Part may be cited as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1987. Accord constitutionnel.

1987 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD

(COMPLETE TEXT)
June 3, 1987

WHEREAS first ministers, assembled in Ottawa, have arrived at a
unanimous accord on constitutional amendments that would bring about
the full and active participation of Quebec in Canada’s constitutional
evolution, would recognize the principle of equality of all provinces,
would provide new arrangements to foster greater harmony and
cooperation between the Government of Canada and the governments of
the provinces and would require that annual constitutional conferences
composed of first ministers be convened not later than December 31,
1988;

AND WHEREAS first ministers have also reached unanimous agreement on
certain additional commitments in relation to some of those
amendments;

NOW THEREFORE the Prime Minister of Canada and the first ministers of
the provinces commit themselves and the governments they represent to
the following:

1. The Prime Minister of Canada will lay or cause to be laid before
the Senate and House of Commons, and the first ministers of the
provinces will lay or cause to be laid before the legislative
assemblies, as soon as possible, a resolution, in the form appended
hereto, to authorize a proclamation to be issued by the Governor
General under the Great Seal of Canada to amend the Constitution of
Canada.

2. The Government of Canada will, as soon as possible, conclude an
agreement with the Government of Quebec that would

(a) incorporate the principles of the Cullen-Couture agreement
on the selection abroad and in Canada of independent
immigrants, visitors for medical treatment, students and
temporary workers, and on the selection of refugees abroad and
economic criteria for family reunification and assisted
relatives,

(b) guarantee that Quebec will receive a number of immigrants,
including refugees, within the annual total established by the
federal government for all of Canada proportionate to its
share of the population of Canada, with the right to exceed
that figure by per cent for demographic reasons, and

(c) provide an undertaking by Canada to withdraw services
(except citizenship services) for the reception and
integration (including linguistic and cultural) of all foreign
nationals wishing to settle in Quebec where services are to be
provided by Quebec, with such withdrawal to be accompanied by
reasonable compensation,

and the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec will take
the necessary steps to give the agreement the force of law under the
proposed amendment relating to such agreements.

3. Nothing in the Accord should be construed as preventing the
negotiation of similar agreements with other provinces relating to
immigration and the temporary admission of aliens.

4. Until the proposed amendment relating to the appointments to the
Senate comes into force, any person summoned to fill a vacancy in the
Senate shall be chosen from among persons whose names have been
submitted by the Government of the province to which the vacancy
relates and must be acceptable to the Queen’s Privy Council for
Canada.
Motion for a Resolution to Authorize
an Amendment to the Constitution of Canada

WHEREAS the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force on April 17, 1982,
following an agreement between Canada and the provinces except Quebec;

AND WHEREAS the Government of Quebec has established a set of five
proposals for constitutional change and has stated that amendments to
give effect to those proposals would enable Quebec to resume a full
role in the constitutional councils of Canada;

AND WHEREAS the amendment proposed in the schedule hereto sets out the
basis on which Quebec’s five constitutional proposals may be met;

AND WHEREAS the amendment proposed in the schedule hereto also
recognizes the principles of equality of all the provinces, provides
new arrangements to foster greater harmony and cooperation between the
Government of Canada and the governments of the provinces and requires
that conferences be covened to consider important constitutional,
economic and other issues;

AND WHEREAS certain portions of the amendment proposed in the schedule
hereto relate to matters referred to in section 41 of the Constitution
Action, 1982;

AND WHEREAS section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that an
amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation
issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so
authorized by resolutions of the Senate and the House of Commons and
of the legislative assembly of each province;

NOW THEREFORE the (Senate) (House of Commons) (legislative assembly)
resolves that an amendment to Constitution of Canada be authorized to
be made by proclamation issued by Her Excellency the Governor General
under the Great Seal of Canada in accordance with the schedule hereto.
SCHEDULE

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 1987
Constitution Act, 1867

1. The _Constitution Act, 1867_ is amended by adding
thereto, immediately after section 1 thereof, the
following section:

2. (1) The Constitution of Canada shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with

(a) the recognition that the existence of
French- speaking Canadians, centered in Quebec
but also present elsewhere in Canada, and
English-speaking Canadians, concentrated
outside Quebec but also present in Quebec,
constitutes a fundamental characteristic of
Canada; and

(b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes
within Canada a distinct society.

(2) The role of the Parliament of Canada and
the provincial legislatures to preserve the
fundamental characteristic of Canada referred to
in paragraph (1) (a) is affirmed

(3) The role of the legislature and Government
of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct
identity of Quebec referred to in paragraph
(1)(b) is affirmed.

(4) Nothing in this section derogates from the
powers, rights or privileges of Parliament or the
Government of Canada, or of the legislatures or
governments of the provinces, including any
powers, rights or privileges relating to
language.

2. The said act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 24 thereof, the following
section:

25. (1) Where a vacancy occurs in the Senate, the
government of the province to which the vacancy
relates may, in relation to that vacancy, submit
to the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada the names
of persons who may be summoned to the senate.

(2) Until an amendment to the Constitution of
Canada is made in relation to the Senate pursuant
to section 41 of the _Constitution Act, 1982_,
the person summoned to fill a vacancy in the
Senate shall be chosen from among persons whose
names have been submitted under subsection (1) by
the government of the province to which the
vacancy relates and must be acceptable to the
Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.

3. The said act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 95 thereof, the following
heading and sections:

Agreements on Immigration and Aliens

95A. The Government of Canada shall, at the
request of the government of any province,
negotiate with the government of that province
for the purpose of concluding an agreement
relating to immigration or the temporary
admission of aliens into that province that is
appropriate to the needs and circumstances of
that province.

95B. (1) Any agreement concluded between Canada
and a province in relation to immigration or the
temporary admission of aliens into that province
has the force of law from the time it is declared
to do so in accordance with subsection 95C (1)
and shall from that time have effect
notwithstanding class 25 of section 91 or section
95.

(2) An agreement that has the force of law
under subusection (1) shall have effect only so
long as and so far as it is not repugnant to any
provision of an Act of the Parliament of Canada
that sets national standards and objectives
relating to immigration or aliens, including any
provision that establishes general classes of
immigrants or relates to levels of immigration
for Canada or that prescribes classes of
individuals who are inadmissible into Canada.

(3) The _Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms_ applies in respect of any agreement
that has the force of law under subsection (1)
and in respect of anything done by the Parliament
or Government of Canada, or the legislature or
government or a province, pursuant to any such
agreement.

95C. (1) A declaration that an agreement referred
to in subsection 95B (1) has the force of law may
be made by proclamation issued by the Governor
General under the Great Seal of Canada only where
so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and
House of Commons and of the legislative assembly
of the province that is party to the agreement.

(2) An amendment to an agreement referred to
in subsection 95B (1) may be made by proclamation
issued by the Governor General under the Great
Seal of Canada only where so authorized

(a) by resolutions of the Senate and House of
Commons and of the legislative assembly of the
province that is party to the agreement; or

(b) in such other manner as is set out in the
agreement.

95D. Sections 46 to 48 of the Constitution Act,
1982 apply, with such modifications as the
circumstances require, in respect of any
declaration made pursuant to subsection 95C (1),
any amendment to an agreement made pursuant to
subsection 95C (2) or any amendment made pursuant
to section 95E.

95E. An amendment to sections 95A to 95D of this
section may be made in accordance with the
procedure set out in subsection 38(1) of the
_Constitution Act, 1982_, but only if the
amendment is authorized by resolutions of the
legislative assemblies of all the provinces that
are, at the time of the amendment, parties to an
agreement that has the force of law under
subsection 95B(1).

4. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately preceding section 96 thereof, the following
heading:

General

5. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately preceding section 101 thereof, the following
heading:

Courts Established by the Parliament of Canada

6. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 101 thereof, the following
heading and sections:

Supreme Court of Canada

101A. (1) The court existing under the name
of the Supreme Court of Canada is hereby
continued as the general court of appeal for
Canada, and as an additional court for the
better administration of the laws of Canada,
and shall continue to be a superior court of
record.

(2) The Supreme Court of Canada shall
consist of a chief justice to be called the
Chief Justice of Canada and eight other
judges, who shall be appointed by the
Governor General in Council by letters
patent under the Great Seal.

101B. (1) Any person may be appointed a
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada who
after having admitted to the bar of any
province or territory, has, for a total of
at least ten years, been a judge of any
courts in Canada or a member of the bar of
any province or territory.

(2) At least three judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada shall be appointed
from among persons who, after having been
admitted to the bar of Quebec, have, for a
total of at least ten years, been judges of
any court of Quebec or of any court
established by the Parliament of Canada, or
members of the bar of Quebec.

101C. (1) Where a vacancy occurs in the
Supreme Court of Canada, the government of
each province may, in relation to that
vacancy, submit to the Minister of Justice
of Canada the names of any of the persons
who have been admitted to the bar of the
province and are qualified under section
101B for appointment to that Court.

(2) Where an appointment is made to the
Supreme Court of Canada, the Governor
General in Council shall, except where the
Chief Justice is appointed from among
members of the Court, appoint a person whose
name has been submitted under subsection (1)
and who is acceptable to the Queen’s Privy
Council for Canada.

(3) Where an appointment is made in
accordance with subsection (2) of any of the
three judges necessary to meet the
requirement set out in subsection 101B(2),
the Governor General in Council shall
appoint a person whose name has been
submitted by the Government of Quebec.

(4) Where an appointment is made in
accordance with subsection (2) otherwise
than as required under subsection (3), the
Governor General in Council shall appoint a
person whose name has been submitted by the
government of a province other than Quebec.

101D. Sections 99 and 100 apply in respect
of judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

101E. (1) Sections 101A to 101D shall not be
construed as abrogating or derogating from
the powers of Parliament to make laws under
section 101 except to the extent that such
laws are inconsistent with those sections.

(2) For greater certainty, section
101A shall not be construed as abrogating or
derogating from the powers of the Parliament
of Canada to make laws relating to the
reference of questions of law or fact, or
any other matters, to the Supreme Court of
Canada.

7. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto,
immediately after section 106 thereof, the following
section:

106A. (1) The Government of Canada shall
provide reasonable compensation to the
government of a province that chooses not to
participate in a national shared cost
program that is established by the
Government of Canada after the coming force
of this section in an area of exclusive
provincial jurisdiction, if the province
carries on a program or initiative that is
compatible with the national objectives.

(2) Nouthing in this section extends
the legislative powers of the Parliament of
Canada or of the legislatures of the
provinces.

8. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto the
following heading and sections.

XII – Conferences on the Economy and other Matters

148. A Conference composed of the Prime
Minister of Canada and the first
ministers of the provinces shall be
convened by the Prime Minister of Canada at
least once each year to discuss the state
of the Canadian economy and such
other matters as may be appropriate.

XIII – References

149. A reference to this Act shall be
deemed include a reference to any amendments
thereto.
Constitution Act, 1982

9. Sections 40 to 42 of the _Constitution Act, 1982_ are
repealed and the following substituted therefor:

40. Where an amendment is made under
subsection 38(1) that transfers legislative
powers from provincial legislatures to
Parliament, Canada shall provide reasonable
compensation to any province to which the
amendment does not apply.

41. An amendment to the Constitution of
Canada in relation to the following matters
may be made proclamation issued by the
Governor General under the Great Seal of
Canada only where authorized by resolutions
of the Senate and House of Commons and of
the legislative assembly of each province:

(a) the office of the Queen, the Governor
General and the Lieutenant Governor of a
province;

(b) the powers of the Senate and the method
of selecting Senators;

(c) the number of members by which a
province is entitled to be represented in
the Senate and the residence qualifications
of Senators;

(d) the right of a province to a number of
members in the House of Commons not less
than the number of Senators by which the
province was entitled to be represented on
April 17, 1982;

(e) the principle of proportionate
representation of the provinces in the House
of Commons prescribed by the Constitution of
Canada;

(f) subject to section 43, the use of the
English or French language;

(g) the Supreme Court of Canada;

(h) the extension of existing provinces into
the territories;

(i) notwithstanding any other law or
practice, the establishment of new
provinces; and

(j) an amendment to this part.

10. Section 44 of the said Act is repealed and the
following substituted therefor:

44. Subject to section 41, Parliament may
exclusively make laws amending the
Constitution of Canada in relation to the
executive government of Canada or the Senate
and House of Commons.

11. Subsection 46(1) of the said Act is repealed and the
following substituted therefor:

46. (1) The procedures for amendment under
sections 38, 41, and 43 may be initiated
either by the Senate or the House of Commons
or by the legislative assembly of a
province.

12. Subsection 47(1) of the said Act is repealed and the
following substituted therefor:

47. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of
Canada made by proclamation under section
38, 41 or 43 may be made without a
resolution of the Senate authorizing the
issue if, within one hundred and eighty days
after the adoption by the House of Commons
of a resolution authorizing the issue, the
Senate has not adopted such a resolution and
if, at any time after the expiration of that
period, the House of Commons again adopts
the resolution.

13. Part VI of the said Act is repealed and the following
substituted therefor:

Part VI

Constitutional Conferences

50. (1) A constitutional conference composed
of the Prime Minister of Canada and the
first ministers of the provinces shall be
convened by the Prime Minister of Canada at
least once each year, commencing in 1988.

(2) The conferences convened under
subsection (1) shall have included on their
agenda the following matters:

(a) Senate reform, including the role
and functions of the Senate, its
powers, the method of selecting
Senators and representation in the
Senate;

(b) roles and responsibilities in
relation to fisheries; and

(c) such other matters as are agreed
upon.

14. Subsection 52(2) of the said Act is amended by
striking out the word “and” at the end of paragraph (b)
thereof, by adding the word “and” at the end of paragraph
(c) thereof, and by adding thereto the following
paragraph:

(d) any other amendment to the
Constitution of Canada.

15. Section 61 of the said Act is repealed and the
following substituted therefor:

61. A reference to the _Constitution Act,
1982_, or a reference to the _Constitution
Acts, 1867 to 1982_, shall be deemed to
include a reference to any amendments
thereto.
General

16. Nothing in Section 2 of the _Constitution Act, 1867_
affects section 25 or 27 of the _Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms_, section 35 of the _Constitution
Act, 1982_ or class 24 of section 91 of the _Constitution
Act, 1867_.
Citation

17. This amendment may be cited as the Constitution
Amendment, 1987.

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1991. Shaping Canada’s Future Together (Proposals ). Ottawa: Supply and Services.

le texte complet figure dans le document sous word>;dm>;thesis>;annexes

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1991. Shared Values: The Canadian Identity. Ottawa: Supply and Services.

Gouvernement, Fédéral Canadien. 1992. LES ACCORDS DE CHARLOTTEVILLE: Consensus Report On The Constitution Charlottetown.

August 28, 1992 pour le texte complet, se référer au doc.”annexes” de ma thèse

Gozlan, Martine (2011), L’Imposture Turque (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle).

________ (2012). Israël contre Israël. Paris, l’Archipel.

________ . (2013). Autour d’Israël contre Israël. JCall conference.  Société Nautique, Genève.

Intro Marko Weinberger, Président de JCall Switzerland. Toutes les conférences de 2013 et 2014 sont dédiées à Silvia Machado.
Quelques mots sur JCall. Formation. Identité “passionnément attachée à l’existence de l’Etat d’Israël mais inquiète des erreurs politiques et fautes morales de l’annexion depuis 1967. 2 peuples, deux Etats. Une voix juive de raison, ouverte à tous, au-dessus de tous les clivages partisans et politiques. Nous militons pour vivre ensemble. Idéal universel et loin de se cantonner au seul problème israelo-Palestinien. Horta a résumé la semaine dernière le processus de paix. Il est essentiel que le vainqueur soit magnanime avec le vaincu.
Martine grand reporter depuis 1988. Auteur de nombreux ouvrages sur la question Arabe notamment.

Heureuse de sa présence pour communiquer sur ce qui nous touche au plus profond de nous-mêmes en ces temps de replis sur soi. A affronté des auditoires non pas polémiques mais haineux venus du fond de notre identité et de la communauté juive. Merci pour votre travail et votre énergie.

Trois parties.
1-Pourquoi ce livre. Titre extrêmement contesté. Encore un livre contre Israël me reprochait-on! Tous les peuples, histoires et nations ont aussi leur deux rives. Pourquoi se fixer sur cette problèmatique. Peuple juif, justement, là est la différene. Israël dans son histoire millénaire, c’est existentiel. Contestation des choix du peuple. Yeshayahou Leibovitch. Se battre, c’est au coeur de l’identité du peuple juif. Nécessité de l’autocritique permanente. Je vois là cette élection dont le concept est tellement ambigu. On se combat soi-même. Caractéristique du peuple juif et l’espoir sioniste en son début. Route millénaire qui nous rend haïssable des deux côtés de la barricade.

2- Fractures de l’Etat hébreu. Quel fracture. Voir les sondages israéliens concernant le dossier nucléaire et l’Iran, Toile de fond et vertige de l’anéantissmeent physique. La hantise de l’anéantissement, nous la comprenons, quelque soit nos choix, d’ou notre crispation. Ces fractures se dissimulent pourtant derrière cet immense tableau qui mettrait l’Etat hébreu à portée de l’anéatissment physique. Depuis la 1ère intifada je me me rends en Israël et je vois ces divisions s’enlaidir au fur et à mesure des années. Clans, sous-clans, tribus. Tel Aviv n’est pas uniquement la cité start-up. Pas d’existence normale, voir le service militaire, Bné Brak, oisisi laïques à Jérusalem, jeunes qui ne se reconnaisent pas dans l’habit noir de deuil. Je me souviens du judaisme de mon père, un judaïsme des couleurs. Tradition lumineuse du sionisme est obscurcie. Déchirure fondamentale au début de l’Etat hébreu, les nouveaux israéliens ayant reconquis leur souveraineté se sont entretués. Navire Alta Léna de l’Irgoun coulé sur l’ordre de David Ben Gourion qui avait entendu dire que Ménahem Bégin allait fomenter un coup d’Etat.
Querelles entre cabalistes, nationalistes etc…l’ennemi pressait et on n’avait rien de plus pressé que de tirer sur soi-même. Voir le monument devant la plage de Tel-Aviv. Mais cette histoire a été instrumentalisée par l’Extrême droite, mais aussi lors de l’assassinat de Rabin dont on a rappelé à l’occasion de sa mort qu’il avait tiré sur l’Alta Léna sur ce canon sacré. Cette page d’histoire n’a pas été enseignée à la jeunesse. On la réinstrumentalise à l’heure actuelle et les deux barricades se reconstituent. L’union sacrée, c’est un mythe, un rêve, un leurre. La battaille s’intensifie. Comment supporter que cet état fondé par des pionniers laïcs (Martin Buber le Kibbutz est la seule utopie qui marche… utopie qui est morte). Israël reste pourtant articulé sur la loi juive. Voir les 800’000 fidèles qui ont suivi l’enterrement d’Ovadia Yossef. Le combat d’Anat Hoffman qui s’est heurtée à l’embastillement car elle faisait entendre une voix féminine sur le mur. O’u suis-je dans cette dévalorisation de la femme qui pour tous les barbus des monothéisme est symbole de dévergondage.
c’EST UN Israël qui se bat contre l’autre. Comment peut-on tendre des draps entre trottoirs des femmes et des hommes. J’ai suivi le combat de mes compagnes saoudiennes, certes, mais quel n’a pas été mon désespoir d’apprendre qu’un gourou orthodoxe considérait que les femmes ne devaient pas conduire. On m’accuse de mettre en exergue des épiphénomènes. Notamment chez les gens dont je comprends qu’ils aient Israël au coeur, mais cela n’implique pas que je me mette un tchador ou un thalit devant les yeux. Il y a des voix qui sont en train de traduire les valeurs juives qui ont fondé l’universel.
Rien n’est ni blanc ni noir. C’est ce qui nous amène à examiner les enjeux immédiats. On est, comme d’habitude, à une période cruciale, Car il y a un bras de fer et son allié de toujours les USA.
Il y a un problème entre Natanyaou et Kerri/ Obama.
3- Enjeu de l’Etat hébreu contemporain notamment avec le voyage de François Hollande et le second round sur le dossier nucléaire à Genève. Il y a un fossé entre les deux alliés qui couvait depuis un moment déjà. Hantise de l’anéantissement. L’Iran est en train de changer. J’ai pu constater que la société civile ne correspondait pas à cceux qui la gouvernait. En Iran, on n’est pas dans la détestation du juif comme dans l’ensemble des pays arabes que je couvre depuis 20 ans.
La Shoah nous a tous rendus orphelins. Elle nous a privés de ceux qui représentaient l’altérité qui a été le prore d’Israel au sens large depuis tant et tant de siècle. On me dit que la recherche rabinnique ou talmudique est partout. Certes, je n’en ai jamais vu autant de ma vie, mais où est ce questionnement qui nous a fait apostropher y compris Dieu et nous-mêmes. Il n’y a plus que des réponses, il n’y a plus que des certitudes. Le questionnement juif qui m’a constituée, il a été arraché. Nous sommes dans ce monde ancien qui a perdu ses questions et se raccroche à un univers fait de cdrtitudes.
Colonies, Iran….on ne nous oppose que ces certitudes. Ceux qui ont repris la négociation autour de Tsipi Livni sur la base de la Négociation de Genève, se posent tout de même une question. Que se passera-t-il après? Qui est l’autre, la reconnaissance de quel autre? Ouseibé? Les philosophes, politiques? Le Hamas? Monte-t-il en cisjordanie? Ces questions hantent Israël. Les fous de Dieu, les néomessioniques. A cette question légitime, n’opposent que des certitudes. C’est l’échange, la réflexion qui manquent.
Le monde aussi n’oppose à Israël que des certitudes. Raccourci effroyable qui a fait monter l’antisémitisme en France (Vous n’êtes que des Nazis)
Respectons les anciens mais soyons de notre temps.

Après la présentation, je serai heureuse de répondre à vos questions le plus spontanément possible.

Greilsammer, Laurent (2015), ‘Les murs font de la politique’, Le1Hebdo

C’est à Marko Weinberger que je dois de découvrir cet entretien mené par un journaliste que j’ai bien connu lors du Procès Barbien que j’ai convert en tant qu’attachée de presse…d’Alain Finkielkraut!: “Je pense que cette interview vous intéressera et peut-être encouragera à acheter « Le 1 » disponible dans la plupart des kiosques à Genève”. Amitiés. Momo
http://le1hebdo.fr/numero/77/les-murs-font-de-la-politique-1228.html

« Les murs font de la politique »

Les frontières sont une chose. Mais quelle est la fonction des murs ?

Ce sont des constructions qui font de la politique, qui disent quelque chose. Ils sont constitutifs de la naissance des civilisations et des empires qu’il s’agisse de véritables murailles ou de réseaux de fortins. Ils ne représentent pas seulement des réponses militaires pour prévenir ou parer à des agressions, mais sont l’instrument d’une affirmation. La Grande Muraille de Chine possède cette double fonction, tout à la fois extérieure et intérieure. Elle protège bien sûr, mais elle adresse surtout un message à l’intérieur de la frontière : vous êtes les sujets d’une même civilisation ; ceux qui sont à l’extérieur sont des barbares au sens étymologique du mot, ils ne parlent pas votre langue. C’est vrai pour la Chine, c’est vrai aussi pour l’Empire romain avec son limes (limite).

La dimension militaire, toujours mise en avant, n’est pas la plus efficace. Cela ne vaut que si l’État a les moyens d’entretenir à la fois une force de couverture, donc fixe et permanente, et une force mobile d’intervention. La volonté politique d’affirmer un corps social et politique cohérent est plus importante.

Pouvez-vous esquisser une typologie des murs ?

Le mur-frontière, à l’instar de la muraille de Chine, a traversé les siècles. Le mur de Berlin a coupé la ville en deux jusqu’en 1989. Son discours politique fut très fort, très violent. Cela peut sembler lointain aujourd’hui mais cela a marqué ma génération. L’appareil communiste de l’Allemagne de l’Est prétendait retenir ainsi toute une population. Ce mur érigé pour renforcer le « rideau de fer » entre l’Est et l’Ouest a symbolisé la guerre froide en devenant « le Mur ». Le dernier mur de la guerre froide, toujours en fonction, est celui qui sépare la Corée du Nord de la Corée du Sud.

Il y a aussi le « mur antiterroriste ». L’exemple le plus connu est celui du mur israélien implanté en Cisjordanie. Il est appelé mur antiterroriste par les Israéliens, pas par les Palestiniens qui considèrent qu’il s’agit d’un mur destiné à entériner et étendre la colonisation de leurs terres. Un mur égyptien devant Gaza complète le dispositif. Ce mur est actuellement en cours de consolidation avec le creusement d’un large fossé. On peut aussi citer le mur de la Green Zone, à Bagdad, qui protège depuis 2003 une enclave de 10 km2 où se trouvent les ministères, le Parlement et l’ambassade américaine.

Il faut aussi parler des murs de proscription dont les plus connus sont ceux des ghettos. S’il y a bien un type de mur qui fait de la politique, c’est celui-là. Le premier ghetto de Venise visait déjà à l’exclusion des juifs. On connaît la suite de cette violence politique. Mais il y a eu aussi des murs singuliers comme le mur des Fermiers généraux, dans le Paris du xviiie siècle, qui fut un mur fiscal.

Quelle place occupent les murs antimigratoires dans votre tableau ?

Ce sont les murs qui retiennent le plus l’attention aujourd’hui. L’archétype contemporain, c’est la « tortilla border » : cette clôture qui sépare les États-Unis du Mexique depuis les premiers ordres du président Reagan. C’est le plus long : 3 141 km avec, au début, une efficacité relative puisque des millions de Mexicains sont passés de l’autre côté. Plus de 2 millions de sans-papiers ont été régularisés en 1986. Il y aurait 12 millions de Latinos clandestins aux États-Unis. Mais à partir de 2006-2007, les autorités américaines ont renforcé leur frontière.

C’est devenu le mur de Bush, une frontière sophistiquée, avec une surveillance par radars qui permet aux patrouilles de localiser quiconque passe et tente de se dissimuler. On peut parler d’une deuxième génération du mur (surnommée « Big Brother »). Les migrants clandestins sont systématiquement arrêtés et reconduits de l’autre côté du mur. La frontière est étanche en Californie. Mais du coup les migrantes tentent de passer par le désert d’Arizona ; nombreux sont ceux qui y meurent.

Les murs érigés en Europe participent-ils de la même logique ?

D’un point de vue politique, philosophique et humanitaire, oui. L’Europe en est là. Après avoir condamné le mur de Bush, l’Union européenne a financé dix ans plus tard le premier mur contre l’immigration illégale à Ceuta et Melilla, deux enclaves espagnoles situées au nord du Maroc. C’est le premier mur de l’espace Schengen, des barrières métalliques d’autant plus efficaces que l’espace est très restreint. Les migrants ne peuvent plus passer par cette voie ni par l’Atlantique où le flux migratoire clandestin a été jugulé par Frontex, l’agence européenne de protection des frontières de Schengen. Un réseau de radars a été disposé sur les côtes espagnoles et l’immigration clandestine tente de passer ailleurs : soit à partir de la Libye avec un débouché sur l’Italie, soit par la Turquie avec une issue sur la Grèce.

Frontex a-t-elle pour fonction explicite de repousser les migrants clandestins ?

C’est le bras armé de l’UE sur les frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen. Son siège est à Varsovie et son organisation assez opaque. L’Europe, par son silence, contraint ses pays membres à recourir directement à Frontex. C’est l’Italie qui a fait appel à Frontex lors de son opération Mare Nostrum ; c’est la Grèce qui lui a demandé d’intervenir pour mieux fermer sa frontière commune avec la Turquie.

Et puis, vous avez la dernière phase de ce processus qui consiste à externaliser la gestion des migrations clandestines. C’est ce que fait l’Union européenne en décidant de financer, à l’extérieur de ses frontières, des camps pour enregistrer et trier les migrants au Maroc. C’est une autre manière d’ériger des murs. Nous sommes passés d’un affrontement Est-Ouest, avec le rideau de fer, à une tension Nord-Sud. Jean-Christophe Rufin en a superbement parlé dans son livre visionnaire : L’Empire et les nouveaux barbares (1991). Un Nord, riche, vieux, en déclin démographique d’un côté, et de l’autre un sud jeune, infiniment plus peuplé et terriblement pauvre. C’est Rufin, qu’on peut difficilement taxer de xénophobie, qui le premier a établi un parallèle, mi-sérieux mi-plaisant, avec les migrations « barbares » de la fin de l’Empire romain à cette différence près que la « menace » (en tout cas perçue comme telle) vient maintenant du Sud et non du Nord. On pourrait continuer à filer la métaphore en comparant la Rome du ive siècle au « gouvernement » de Bruxelles d’aujourd’hui, aussi impuissants l’un et l’autre à contrôler le phénomène et d’ailleurs à le comprendre.

Comment expliquez-vous que les murs soient aujourd’hui souvent ressentis comme un objet de honte ?

Le haro sur les murs est assez général. Il y a plusieurs raisons à cela. D’abord, une partie des opinions publiques souhaiterait qu’il n’y ait pas de frontières. Des ponts, pas de murs… Ce point de vue utopique existe : une libre circulation des hommes dans un État-monde rêvé. En attendant ce monde meilleur, les frontières existent.

Ensuite, les murs sont ressentis comme une affirmation du fort face au faible. C’est le fort qui refuse que le faible vienne chez lui. En réalité, il s’agit d’une opposition du riche au pauvre. Le problème est là, dans ce déséquilibre profond entre les populations. Et puis le mur est un aveu d’échec. Cela révèle la misère de l’autre côté. On est du bon côté du mur ou du mauvais. Il y a celui qui meurt de faim et celui qui suit un régime pour maigrir…

C’est ce différentiel qui fait naître le sentiment de honte. Les murs exacerbent les tensions. Ils ne sont jamais une solution, de l’aveu même de ceux qui les font construire. Ils sont une réponse dans l’urgence. Les opinions occidentales ont cru, après la chute du mur de Berlin, en novembre 1989, à une fin de l’histoire et à la fin des murs… En réalité, les frontières conflictuelles se sont multipliées. Mon travail d’historien m’a conduit à cette conclusion : les murs ont de l’avenir.

Propos recueillis par LAURENT GREILSAMER

Greilsammer, Ilan à la Communaute Israélite libérale de Genève (Gil) le 3 septembre 2017 sur les Relations Diaspora-Israël

Introduction où il rappelle avoir connu le Rabbin François Garaï à la Synagogue Copernic à Paris.

On fête cette année les 69 ans de l’état d’israel, une célébration à laquelle ne s’associent pas
2 populations de ce pays:

les Arabes israéliens (qui “deviennent de plus en plus israéliens”)

– Les Haredim (Juifs ultra orthodoxes) qui pourtant “vivent des subsides du gouvernement israéliens”

Les juifs savent qu’ils ont un pays où ils peuvent retourner en cas de danger. L’Etat d’Israel n’a pas le droit de refuser la nationalité (sauf Meir Lansky et les criminels de cet acabit) à tout Juif qui en ferait la demande

Le Sionisme est né en plein antisemitisme débridé dans toute l’Europe.

Il s’agissait de trouver une solution à l’antisémitisme en diaspora, mais l’idée du peuple juif comme Nation était dans l’air du temps, comme l’Italie ou l’Allemagne unifiées.

Mais l’idéologie sioniste était de faire naître un Juif nouveau sur ses terres ancestrales, tournant le dos au Juif de la diaspora dans la même idée que les antisémites qui voyaient en lui un intellectuel chétif et scribouillard.

Il était question non plus de Juif mais d’Hébreu : paysan, Grand,sur de lui

Borochov: pyramide inversée : les juifs de la diaspora sont seulement en haut de la pyramide. Faisons l’inverse en Israel avec paysans et ouvrier (normalité ) à la base.

La diaspora est finie: où les juifs iront en Israel soit ils disparaîtront

Mépris pour la diaspora : le yishouv n’a pas fait grand chose pour les juifs persécutés pas plus que pour les rescapés de la Shoah

Cette perspective emplie de mépris a changé à partir des années 60 avec le Procès Eichman en 61:
1) constat que les juifs de diaspora ne disparaissaient pas, même amoindries du fait de hitler et des pays arabes.
2) ces communautés étaient en plus d’une grande aide lors des attaques anti sionistes en raison de la sympathie pour la cause palestinienne. Les juifs restent dans leur immense majorité pro-israéliens.

Avec le Temps les israéliens ont réévalué l’histoire et l’importance des Juifs.

Avant le Procès Eichman, les jeunes israéliens ont découvert la Shoah jusque là occultée en raison de la langue et d’un manque de communication (on parlait de moutons menés à l’abattoir).

Ce Procès a vraiment raconté aux israéliens ce qui s’est passé dans la Shoah. Ils ont découvert la richesse des communautés décimées. Le ghetto vu comme une forme de bravoure.

Shoah après ce proces est devenu un élément fondamental de la société et de l’éducation israéliennes.

Marche des vivants et voyages restent controversés.

Réhabilitation et objet de recherche sur la diaspora et Culture séfarade

Relations aujourd’hui extrêmement étroites entre diaspora et Israel :

1) solidarité est un élément central de l’identité Juive en Israel de la part des Juifs de diaspora : un Juif doit soutenir l’existence et toutes les politiques israéliennes.

2) les israéliens eux-mêmes sont divisés à propos de leur gouvernement. Je suis de ceux qui pensent que tous les Juifs ont le droit de donner leur opinion sur ce qu’ils pensent positivement ou négativement d’Israel en vertu que c’est l’état du Peuple Juif

Ex:
Le mouvement libéral est discriminé en Israel par exemple de l’espace non orthodoxe non autorisé ce qui est intolérable (question posée aux Libéraux américains qui ont répondu : nous ne voulons pas donner des armes aux ennemis d’Israel).

Du côté d’israel manque de compréhension de ce que vivent les israéliens. Admonester les Juifs après les attentats antisemites

Ne pas faire passer la realpolitik avant : le gouvernement israélien s’est tu devant les menées antisemites contre Soros

Idem devant le renvoi dos à dos de trump récemment

Avenir: je reste optimiste. Israel est un état fort (eco, pol, militairement, scientifiquement …) (sport)

Diaspora : communauté Juive en France florissante, vivante, organisée

Israel ne doit pas patronner les communautés juives et les Juifs ne doivent pas hésiter à donner leur opinion

Regarder où va notre argent. Se méfier de la générosité aveugle. Exigez plus de son état, l’état des Juifs

Il n’y a rien de plus stupide que l’action palestinienne

Écart social le plus élevé de l’OCDE

Le camp de la paix (Oz, yehoshua, grossman ) n’a pas d’équivalent chez les palestiniens. (Nusseibe)

Une reconnaissance du droit des Juifs à revenir sur une partie de leur territoire n’est pas possible pour les palestiniens.

Green, Leslie. 1995. Internal Minorities and their Rights. In The Rights of Minority Cultures, edited by W. Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grin, François. 1994. Combining Immigrant and Autochthonous language rights. In Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination, edited by T. Skuttnab-Kangas and R. Phillipson. Berlin-New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

39: Let us consider the case of anglophones in Ihe Montreal melropolitan area. Under the present system, the proteclion of Prench as a rninorily cuitl a threatened language in Canada (or, perhaps more to Lhe poinl, in North America) results in restrictions on the use of English in the province of Vuebec, including in local communities where speakers of English are a majority. This has created much outrage, and loud demands for the repealing of all or part of the language act, in particular section 58 pertaining to the language of commercial signs (see Quebec 1977). French in North Arnerica certainly faces an uphill battle for survival, because of the generally dominant position of English. It follows that Ihe Québécois can hardly afford to relax existing regulations. However, the protection of French as a minority language could probably be achieved at a lower psychological cost to the anglophone community, by granting the territorially limiled rights to a broader use of English.

In more general terms, granting adequate linguistic rights to included Ininorities calls for lerritorialization and a high degree of decentralization along with the devolution of significant law-making and spending power to local authorities. Ideally, several tiers of government should be created, each with its clearly defined set of attributions.

41: principles of territorial multilingualism Let us consider a polity where a balance of rights must be granted to speakers of three languages. Three main assumptions are made:

Assurnption 1. There are three language groups: A (autochthonous majority language); B (minority language spoken by immigranls; B is a majority language in the immigrants’ country of origin); C (autochthonous, threatened minority language, whose geographical spread has been declining for several decades).
Assumption 2. There are three levels of government, or tiers: national, provincial, and local(or municipal), each with clearly defined tasks. or areas of jurisdiction. Typical tasks or areas of jurisdiction are the social security system, education, roads, defence, justice, etc.
Assumption 3. Each level of government has control over the language used in its areas of jurisdiction. Jurisdictions are allocated between government tiers in such a way that each tier has roughly equivalent influence on language use in the overall provision of services to the public.

___ 1996. Economic approaches to language and language planning: an introduction. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 121 (1996).

Economic apporaches to language and language planning are usually referred to under the label of “economics of langue”. The economics of language is a generic term applying to an emerging field of research, which remains little-known either within or outside the discipline of economics.
The very notion of an exonomic apporach to language issues may seem puszzling

___ 2001. Kalmykia, victim of Stalinist genocide: from oblivion to reassertion. Journal of Genocide Research 3 (1):97-116.

Kalmykia new language legislation: Language Act of the Republic of Kalmykia, oct. 1999

____ 2003. Diversity as Paradigm, Analytical Device, and Policy Goal. In Language Rights and Political Theory, edited by W. Kymlicka and A. Patten. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

sur le concept de diversité

___2003. La Suisse comme non-multination. In Etats-nations, multinations et organisations supranationales, edited by M. Seymour. Paris: Liber.

sur la Suisse et la politique linguistique

___(2007), ‘Pourquoi donc apprendre l’anglais? Le point de vue des élèves’, in Daphné Romy-Masliah and Larissa Aronin (eds.), L’Anglais et les Cultures: carrefour ou frontière? (Paris: L’Harmattan), 75-95.

___, Jean Rossiaud, and Bülent Kaya. 2003. Les Migrations et la Suisses. In Résultat du programme national Suisse de recherche Migrations et Relations Interculturelles, edited by H.-R. Wicker, R. Fibbi and W. Haug. Bern: Editions Seismo et FNRS.

sur les langues de l’immigration, cas de la Suisse Romande

Grin, François, and Irene Schwob. 2002. Bilingual Education and Linguistic Governance: the Swiss experience. Intercultural Educaton 13 (4):409-426.

Succinct overview of the Swiss context and the expericence of switzerland with bilingual education. In section 1 we briefly characterise the issue at a general level, providing some definitions necessary for the ensuing discussion In section 2 we review the main features of linguistic governance in Switzerland, with reference ot its demolinguistic, geolinguistic and historical context. Section 3 presents the main traits of language education in Switzherland, while section 4 is devoted to a descriptive overview of the (very few) cases of bilingual education in this country. In section 5 we attempt to assess these experiments. In a concluding section 6, we discuss the parallels and differneces between the respective language education challenges of Switzerland and Latvia.

___, and François Vaillancourt. 1999. The cost-effectiveness evaluation of minority language policies. Flensbourg: European Centre for Minority Issues.

___, and François Vaillancourt. 2002. Minority Self-Governance in Economic Perspective. In Minority Governance in Europe, edited by K. Gal. Flensbourg: European Centre for Minority Issues.

sur minorités, gouvernance et décentralisation

Grosjean, F. 1982. Life with Two Languages: An Introduction to Bilingualism. Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press.

Prof. Grosjean now has a new blog…how did I hear about it, considering he lives in Switzerland, like me…well….through Yolandi Khaos Klein, a brilliant South African researcher from the University of Cape Town who is one of my admin on my facebook page Sociolinguists Worldwide , a page she contributed to create actually. Yolandi also happens to have created a really useful page of which I’m honored to be an admin…Group is called Linguinees, Linguists in the Making, a very tasty programme!

Grossman, David (2015), ‘citation par Finkielkraut dans La Seule Exactitude’.

Cité par Finkielkraut, Alain (2015), La Seule Exactitude (Paris: Éditions Stock)p. 208: “L’israélien moderne de mon age qui se considérait déjà comme un citoyen du monde, qui est relié à Internet et qui a une antenne parabolique sur son toit, cet homme a commencé à sentir le tragique destin juif se refermer sur lui”

Grossman, David (2011), ‘Ce que je connais de la guerre me donne le droit de parler de la paix’, in David Chemla (ed.), JCall: les raisons d’un appel (Paris: Liana Levi ), 55-66.

cf also the JStreet-JCall page and posts in this blog

Lorsque j’ai commencé à écrire Une femme fuyant l’annonce (ed. du Seuil, 2011) (…) j’ai essayé de montrer comment le conflit au Moyen-Orient “se projette” et projette sa brutalité dans la délicate et fagile bulle familiale, comment il en altère -inévitablement-la trame la plus intérieure. J’ai tenté de décrire comment les gens piégés dans ce conflit (…) luttent pour préserver le tissu fin et complexe des relations humaines, de la tendresse, de la sensibilité et de la compassion dans une situation qui n’est que dureté, indifférene et effacement de l’individu. Parfois je compare la tentative de préserver ces valeurs dans l’intensité de la guerre àune marche, au milieu d’une tempête déchaînée, une bougie à la main.
(…)
Et me souvenir – et c’est parfois le plus difficile, que celui qui se tient face à moi, mon ennemi qui me hait et voit en moi une menace à son existence, est lui-aussi un être humain, avec une famille et des enfants, avec sa perception de la justice et ses espoirs, avec ses désespoirs et ses peurs, avec ses points d’aveuglement.
(…)
Je ne peux pas parler des espoirs des Palestiniens quant à la paix. Je n’ai pas le droit de rêver leurs rêves. Je ne peux que leur souhaiter, du lus profond de mon coeur, qu’ils connaissent rapidement une vie libre et souveraine après des générations de soumission et d’occupation par les Turcs, les Anglais, les Egyptiens, les Jordaniens et les Israeliens; qu’ils construisent leur nation et leur Etat comme une démocratie, qu’ils réussissent é élever leurs enfants sans peur, qu’ils profitent de ce qu’une vie de paix peut offrir à tout homme.
Mais je peux parler de mes espoirs et de mes voeux en tant qu’Israélien et en tant que juif.
(…)
Et s’il y a la paix, Israël aura enfin des frontières. Ce n’est pas suelement quelque chose de trivial, surtout pour un peuple qui, pendant la plus grande partie de son histoire était dispersé parmi les autres peuples, ce qui fut en grande partie la cause des catastrophes qui l’ont frappé. Rendez-vous compte: depuis 62 ans, Israël n’a pas de frontières permaentes. Les frontières bougent et changent, s’élargissent et se rétrécissent tous les dix ans. Dans notre monde, un pays qui n’a pas de frontières claires est comparable à une personne habitant dans une maison dont les murs bougent sans arrêt, une personne dont les pieds reposent sur un sol qui ne cesse de trembler (…). Tragiquement, Israël n’a pas réussi à guérir l’âme juive de sa blessure fondamentale, la sensation amère de ne jamais se sentir chez soi dans ce monde.
(…)
Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait un autre pays dans le monde qui vive dans une telle peur existentielle. Quand vous lisez dans un journal que l’Allemagne prépare des grans projets nationaux pour 2030, cela vous semble logique et naturel. Mais aucun Israélien en ferait des projets aussi lointains. Quand je pense à Israël de 2030, je ressens des serrements de coeur, comme si j’avais violé un cerain tabou en ayant osé m’allouer une telle “quantité” de temps….
(…)
Si seulement mon pays, Israël, pouvait trouver la force d’érire à nouveau son histoire, s’il pouvait avoir le courage d’affronter d’une façon nouvelle son histoire tragique, s’il pouvait se se recréer en elle. Si nous pouvions trouver les forces spirituelles nécessaires pour faire la différence entre les vrais dangers qui, en effet nous guettent et les puissants échos de catastrophe et de tragédies qui nous ont frappés dans le passé. Que nous ne soyons plus les victimes, ni de nos ennemis, ni de nos propres frayeurs. Qu’enfin nous arrivions à la maison.

Grossman, David (2014), ‘On despair and hope’, paper given at Israel Conference on Peace, David Intercontinental, 8 July 2014.

The most important issue of the struggle for peace for the State of Israel evolves around hope and despair. Void of activities and arena and ethics. Story of the fish (what is water). The water is here but behind it is the extreme manifestation of the settlements, the stagnant water, crazy gambling over the future of the state. State of extremists, rabbis and settlers. despair of those who understand that this is a design against us. 83 we hoped that our enemy would become our partner and that life would be good one day. Now it’s a betrayal of any chance and hope. No matter what Abu Mazen professes, our prime minister will still scorn him. Necessity for a new dialogue. Mocking and scoffing way for past 12 years. Announcing that they will never believe any Palestinians again. Israel sounds if it had decided to close that option of hope.. Why, when it comes to peace, the middle east is storming but vis-à-vis this threat, a lack of character and numbness is a desease. It is very frustrating that all our military force has become such an obstacle instead of a tool for peace. We are an empire, the strongest state in the region but we keep acting as a victim. We are victims of our own history and of our own despair. Anxiety of jewish faith, victimhood. from day to day, with every news headline, cult of isolation, killing trees and young boys.
Wisdom of life and compromise is a characteristic feature of both nations. I cannot accept that we’ve been defeated, not on the battlefield but at the lack of actions towards peace.
We are too desperate to loose that despair.

Grossman, David 2012. “Words are not enough.” In. society de lecture theatre de Carouge.

Words are not enough but after a while I desperately need to map my sorrow with my own word
Monolithic dimension of death but the only way to Be in touch with it is art
I try to never be a victim. How can you remain true to yourself ? Not to be a slave to the bureaucracy of the senses
Politics is just a very narrow layer of reality
Each and everyone of us has a major suffering, so how come we are not nicer to each other!
All this region is soaked with suffering
Vicious circle of suffering
Real dramas of life don’t happen on battlefields but in kitchens and bedroom
In Hebrew there’s a specific term for parents’ bereavement, something that doesn’t exist in all languages
The left in Israel is what’s left of the left, a leftover almost!
I want to have a real border. Borders in Israel is like living in a house with mobile walls
Army cannot be the only way to converse with our neighbors

Gruenais, M.-P., ed. 1986. Etats de Langue. Paris: Fondation Diderot/Fondation Arthème Fayard.

Grunwald, Yitzhak (2013), ‘Un éducateur humaniste au Goush Etsion’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Tel Aviv.

Fils du fondateur de la Paix maintenant. Habite El-Azar, fait partie du Goush Etsion, 6 enfants, plusieurs petits-enfants. Directeur d’école, primaires à Jérusalem et maintenant sur le point de devenir directeur d’un lycée de 500 élèves à Ephrate. Nous habitons dans le même village, la même implantation comme on dit dans le jargon. A habité à Gilo et se faisait tirer dessus. Mes enfants avaient l’habitude et ont été heureux de déménager. En tant que directeur d’école religieuse j’ai fait partie du même groupe avec musulman: plus on se rapprochait du point de vue indivuduel plus on s’éloignait au niveau idéologique. Un homme que j’aime bien, un collègue, me présente ses condoléances pour la mort de deux étudiants mais en m’indiquant que le terroriste (activiste) est un ancien élève à lui, Suis tout à fait opposé à la barrière de la honte entre nous et les palestiniens. C’est une idée brillante de la gauche israélienne. On ne voit peut-être plus les palestiniens mais cela ne règle rien. J’ai beaucoup de peine pour les palestiniens qui doivent passer par des passage insupportable. Ces check-points sont stupides et ridicules et humiliants. Cela dit, je ne suis pas d’accord qu’on sépare ma terre en deux. Je suis pour un comportement moral, respect de l’autre créé à l’image de Dieu. Mais pour mes enfants mitraillés pendant deux ans, situation complexe. En tant qu’éducateur, il nous revient d’expliquer cette complexité. Sincèrement je ne pense pas qu’un état palestinien à coté d’un état israélien dans ce mouchoir de poche.
Sincèrement, j’étais pour Oslo, j’étais surpris et ai voté Pérez mais on s’est pris une telle giffle. On se levait le matin et on se demandait qui allait mourir ce jour là. Avant Oslo on pouvait prendre un café à Bethléhem. J’étais contre le retrait de Gaza. Depuis, on n’a jamais eu autant de problème. On essaie de vivre. Respect de l’autre au-dessus des opinions politiques.
Pour qu’on fasse comme en Gallilée. iL FAUT annexer les territoires et donner le maximum de droit. Carte d’identité mais pas de passeport. Je ne suis pas venu habiter en Israel à cause de Tel Aviv mais à cause de la tombe de Rachel et le caveau d’Abraham.
La conquête de 1948 était beaucoup moins morale que celle de 67.
Pour un arabe palestinien il n’y a pas de différence entre les deux. Un état palestinien se crééera en Jordanie. Tout arabe palestinien prêt à vivre ici devrait avoir le droit de vote.
Q: QUE Signifie le maximum de droit. pour moi on doit parler les mêmes droit? Est-ce la même chose: choix d’école, de lieu d’habitation? Le fait que certains rabbins moyen-ageux interdisent la mixité est condamnable. C’est chez Rami Lévi que juifs et arabes se rencontrent. Avec Jaffa ce sont les seuls endroits.
Q: Citoyenneté pour les Palestiniens? Je souhaiterais donner les droits municipaux et législatifs pleinement et entier tant qu’ils acceptent de vivre comme une minorité. Ben Gourion: je ne crois pas au miracles mais je les prends en considération.
Sans honte mais avec respect. Et sinon ils peuvent aller en Jordanie!

Guerrero, Ed. 1993. Framing Blackness. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Guest, Edwin. 1838. History of English Rhythms.

Cité par John Edwards (1994)

Guggenheim, Evi and Oron, Yair (2012), ‘Névé Shalom-Wahat al-Salam’, paper given at JCall trip to Israel and Palestinian Territories, Nevé Shalom.Wahat al-salam.

Evi:Vient de Zurich. Nous ne sommes ni un Kibboutz ni un moshav mais un village de paix dont la traduction vient d’Oasis de Paix. Vous venez de Hebron où vivent Israeliens et Palestiniens vivent, mais pas ensemble. Ici, les israéliens et les palestiniens vivent ensemble car ils l’ont décidé,J’ai grandi en Suisse dans une famille religieuse, sioniste, a été au Bné Akiva comme les juifs de Hébron. J’ai cessé d’être religieuse vers 17 ans. Après mon bac j’ai décidé de monter en Israël. Au Bné Akiva on ne parlait pas du tout des palestiniens. Israel était vu comme la seule solution pour le peuple juif après l’holocauste. Seul endroit où les juifs peuvent vivre en sécurité (mère rescapée de la Shoa, père en but). A l’uni, je me suis assise à côté de Mohamad, ce qui m’a étonnée. Etant déjà sensibilisée à ce que c’est qu’une minorité, j’ai commencé à faire le dialogue avec les arabes. J’ai commencé à sentir un certain malaise. Lorsque Mohamad m’a rencontré que sa soeur était hors d’Israël en 1948 et n’a donc pas pu s’enregistrer comme citoyenne et est donc devenue une réfugiée. Comme juive, je pouvais venir de Suisse et aurais pu recevoir le lendemain de mon arrivée une carte d’identité. Ayant reçu une éducation à la justice, j’ai compris qu’ici quelque chose ne fonctionnait pas. On a créé un groupe de dialogue à l’université. Si je voulais vivre dans ce pays en bonne conscience, il me fallait faire quelque chose pour la paix et la cohabitation avec Palestinien.

Groupe de dialogue de Bné Brit en 77, séminaire à Nevé Shalom. Tout ce que vous voyez ici aujourd’hui n’existait pas, arbres. 3 semaines dans des tentes, sans eau. Abdel Salam était notre cuisinier. Un groupe, avec à sa tête Bruno Hussard, juif d’origine, qui a grandi en Egypte. Parti en France étudier l’ingénierie et a trouvé le christianisme : père dominicain. A grandi dans un pays arabe, était juif et chrétien! Envoyé ici par l’église dominicaine pour fonder un institut pour des recherches de racines du christianisme dans le judaisme. Il a eu l’idée de créer un village oeucuménique. A cherché un terrain pendantn 10 ans car depuis la création de l’état d’Israel, un seul village arabe a été créé. Donc refus du gouvernement d’entrer en matière pour un village israélo palestinien. Il a fini par trouver le Monastère de Latrun. Ici on est exactement sur la ligne de démarquation. Il a donc pu avoir cette colline. A la fin de notre camp, en 77, Bruno nous a proposé de crééer un village. Il ne voulait pas des volontaires qui allaient et venaient mais une famille. Il a fait un ultimatum à Dieu.

Un noyau s’est formé en 77. On se rencontrait une fois par mois dans une barque (à présent Ecole de la Paix) et on a discuté sur la forme de notre entité. Les palestiniens ne voulaient pas d’un kibboutz, concept israélien, mais nous avons opté sur la coexistence au sein d’un village.

Ce n’est pas un village de couples mixtes, mais mon couple est mixte, Cf Notre livre Le Mariage de la Paix, Michel Laffont. 300 personnes, 60 familles. moitié-moitié juifs et palestiniens et parmi les palestiniens moitié musulmans et moitié chrétiens. Nous avons projeté un aggrandissement pour la deuxième génération. Incroyable nombre d’enfants veulent vivre ici. Travail essentiel: éducation. Pas facile du tout, on a beaucoup de discussions et de disputes.

Elle s’est mariée à Zurich.

En 84, j’ai proposé un feu de camp pour l’anniversaire de l’Indépendante. A l’époque on parlait d’arabes et pas de palestiniens. Or il ne sont pas venus. Nous avons discuté toute une nuit et avons compris que pour eux, l’indépendance est le sentiment de la Naqbah. On a alors défini notre principe: pour vivre ensemble en paix c’est d’accepter de ne pas être d’accord. C’est ce qui nous a permis de survivre à toutes les guerres. Nous avons des identifications différente. Personnellement, je suis contente que mon peuple ait son état mais je comprends et respecte l’autre. Pas de drapeau israélien. Malgré toutes ces guerres, personne n’a quitté le village. Plus dûr événement, mort d’un jeune dans un hélicoptère. Palestiniens et Juifs étaient tous en deuil. Sa famille voulait faire un mémorial. C’est quelque chose de très juif. Certains palestiniens ont alors dit que cela allait trop loin. Pas de mémorial d’un soldat, fut-il un enfant du village. 2 ans pour résoudre le dilemne. Les médias ne nous aiment pas beaucoup en Israël. Yediyot Aharonot a même titre “Guerre à Neve Shalom”. On a pu résoudre cela par une plaque dans la salle de sport.

Guerre du Golfe, j’étais enceinte de ma première fille. Les palestiniens se réjouissaient que Saddam Hussein montre aux israéliens ce que cela faisait de se faire détruire sa maison.

Toute notre infrastructure dépend des Amis de NS, car le gouvernement israélien ne nous donne rien. Quand Sharon était président, il a été blessé ici en 48, il n’aimait pas cet endroit. Maintenant nous sommes reconnu par l’état, mais nos institutions éducatives ne reçoivent rien pour l’éducation pour la paix.

Normalement, nous expliquons toujours le village à deux, un arabe et un juif. Depuis la mort de Tom, la question du service militaire est devenue une question personnelle, donc nos enfants sont exemptés.

Pour la question 1 ou deux etat, tous les avis sont représentés. Nous sommes seulement la manifestation politique qu’il est possible de vivre en paix.

Nous avons un secrétaire général élu, sorte de maire. Secrétariat, sorte de gouvernement. Cf. Brochure. Tous les dons vont aux institutions éducatives

5 institutions pour l’éducation pour la paix:

ECOLE DE LA PAIX: au début du village, sur un vrai dialogue. Nous sommes devenue une avant-garde. Formation d’animateurs d’éducation à la paix. Education pour agents de changement. Projet de 18 mois avec Israéliens juifs et palestiniens et palestiniens de Gaza. Jeunes politiciens. atelier et cours pour journalistes afin que juifs et palestiniens peuvent confronter leurs infos. USAID a donné des fonds mais cherchons de nouveaux partenaires. Si on avait un millième du budget de l’armée, on ferait beaucoup plus que tout ce que l’armée fait. L’Etat d’Israel ne fait rien, même si nous savons comment faire.
Elle va créer une bibliothèque de la paix en relation avec l’Université de Massachussets. Silvia Machado a permis de trouver des fonds auprès des mairies de Genève, Meyrin et Bâles.

ECOLE PRIMAIRE ET CRECHE: 90% des enfants viennent du dehors.

ECOLE: Va devenir une école de l’Etat.

CENTRE PLURALISTE

CLUB POUR FORMER LES DIRIGEANTS A nous représenter.

Yair Oron. spécialiste des génocides.
Complication et facilité à la fois. A été à Ramallah, normalement interdit aux israéliens, mais a assisté à une conférence au monument Darwish. A vu quelques mauvaises herbes. Une dame est venue car j’ai aussi enlevé une pensée…je lui ai donc offert cette fleur. On a commencé à se parler.
Au niveau individuel, c’est facile, mais vous, européens, avez un rôle à jouer. Il faut dénoncer le gouvernemnt israélien très sévèrement.Vous avez un devoir envers nous et le monde entier. Nous sommes une société malade de l’occupation. Les palestiniens également sont malade pour la même raison.

On a eu tant d’espoir avec Obama, et il n’a rien fait, il a laissé Netanyahu continuer sa politique d’occupation. Mes enfants ont fait l’armée civile et pas l’armée. Alors que leurs cousins sont pilotes de guerre.

Je suis arrivé ii il y a 8 ans. Je pense que le fait que j’ahbite ici m’a rendu plus sensible aux souffrances des Palestiniens. Je me sens responsable lorsque j’écoute des Palestiniens en tant qu’Israélien.

Je suis un expert des génocides: rwanda, arménien (Israël ne le reconnaît pas non seulement à cause de la Turquie mais parce que beaucoup estiment ici que l’holocauste est unique, c’est une honte): On ne reconnait pas la Naqba, c’est interdit en Israël et si on le fait, on retire la bourse d’étude.

Je ne peux pas me définir ni comme sioniste ni comme antisionite. Lors de ma candidature ici, j’ai d’âbord été refusé car considéré comme trop sioniste.

BIAFFRA

Guillaume, P., Lacroix M., Pelletier R., and Zylberberg J. 1986. Minorités et Etat. Québec et Bordeaux: Presses de l’Université Laval et Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux.

Découvert lors de ma toute première participation à un colloque sur mon domaine de recherche. J’étais en train d’écrire mon mémoire de Master! Souvenirs souvenirs….J’avais présenté un papier ensuite publié sur Majorités et Minorités au Canada et Zylberberg m’avait gentiment dit que vu mon extrême jeunesse il m’avait pardonné certaines lacunes!

Guillorel, Hervé (1992), ‘De l’utilisation politique de la variété dialectale’, in Hervé Guillorel and Jean Sibille (eds.), Langues, dialectes et écriture (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Occitanes et Institut de Politique Internationale et Européenne), 122-34.

_________ and Koubi, Geneviève (1999), Langues du droit, droit des langues (Langues et Droit; Bruxelles: Bruylant).

L’Etude des rapports entre langues et droits, entre les langues et le droit, entre le droit des langues et les langues du droit, ne relève pas d’une seule et unique discipline ni d’un seule aire géographique. Les contributions rassemblées dans cet ouvrage mobilisent les démarches et les problématiques des sciences juridiques, politiques, économiques, linguistiques, anthropologiques, sociologiques, historiques et géographiques à propos des significations véhiculées par les mots dans les sociétés contemporaines.
Elles illustrent donc les difficultés que rencontrent tant les sociétés plurilingues que les Etats se déclarant officiellement unilingues dans la gestion des rapports entre langues et droits.
La langue, écrite ou orale, ne s’analyse pas selon le nombre de ses locuteurs mais bien dans sa fonction de territorialisation et de communication.
Elle ne peut ainsi faire abstraction des formes de relations sociales, économiques, politiques et juridiques. Elle exprime la force du pouvoir aussi bien que la résistance à la puissance de la parole du droit.
Cet ouvrage propose ainsi de revoir les relations que les langues entretiennent avec les systèmes de pouvoirs quels qu’ils soient.

Gumperz, John. 1971. Language in Social Groups. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

in Labov’s bibliography of: Labov, W. (1972). Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular. Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press.

___, and Dell Hymes. 1964. The ethnography of Communication. American Anthropologist Special Publication (66):No. 6, part 2: 137-153.

in Labov’s bibliography of: Labov, W. (1972). Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular. Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press.

Gunew, Sneja. 1993. Multicultural Multiplicities: US, Canada, Australia. In Cultural Studies: Pluralism & Theory, edited by D. Bennett. Melbourne: Department of English, University of Melbourne.

The “political correctness”(PC) controversy in the US is beginning to intrude on Australian interllectual debate, but there seems to be little awareness of the controversy’s origins and specific resonances within North America. The PC debate has variously been described as a covert attack on all the reforms that have happened in the name of cultural democracy in the US since the 1960s, and as a “call …for the policicisation of academic knowledge by the Right, in the name of the “mainstream” or of “Western civilisation””(Chicago Cultural Studies Group, “Critical Multiculturalism”, Critical Inquiry, 18, (Spring 92), p. 552). One way of surveying the nationally specific connotation of this debate is through a discussion of multiculturalism, which is central to the argument in the US, but less so to its Australian counterpart. (cf. Patricia Aufderheide’s Beyond PC and Paul Berman’s Debating PC).

In Austalia, the homgenising term “multiculturalism” usually refers to groups that are defined oppositionally as non-Anglo rather than non-Western. Post-war European communities are seldom distinguished from more recent non-European arrival, except in the context of debates aboutcurtailing immigration from “Asia”(another homgenising term), while in the next breath hoping that the “Asian market” will lift Astralia out of its current recession.

Postcolonialism resonates more strongly in Australia and Canada than in the US, which does not seem to see itself as ever having been either a colonised nation or a coloniser. Postcolonialism in Australia draws its impetus partly from the need to tacke the question of the treatment of Australia’s indigenous peoples and partly from the new republican push to cast off Australia’s ties with Britain.

Australia has, and in some respects has always had, a population characterised by the variety of its linguistic and cultural references points, but until quite recently this obvious fact has not been accepted as a key element of Austalia’s national institutions and, indeed, its certified national imaginaries, the arts and culture industries. The ways in which Australia defines itself both internally and externally need to b e thoroughly infused with this perception at a conscious level. The repression of this knowledge is registered unconsciously in a number of symptomatic irruptions, of the kind that I have traced around such terms as “migrant”, “home” and “mother tongue” and in relation to “ethnic” food.

Whether it is acknowledged or not, the challenge represented by Australia’s demographic mixture links this country to comparable debates around the world. Questions of cultural difference and nationalism, for example, have been bundled under the umberella of postcolonialism. There has been a burgeoning of academic courses and conferences dealing belatedly with Australia’s legacy of oppression towards its indigenous peoples. In effect, this absolves non-Aboriginal Australians from having to analyse Australia’s neocolonialism, its internal colonisations.

Australians continue to seek national unities, coherent narratives of the nation. They are still emboirled in arguments about whether totreat linguistic and cultural diversity as anything other than a set of sociological problems that supply convenient scapegoarts for the current malaise and provide an imperative to close the traditional ranks.

North America has outstripped Australia in the anaysis of ethnic/racial difference, sometimes under the label of multiculturalism.

The controversy over terminology has long operated as an excuse for refusing to deal with the substantive socio-political issues involved. Certainly, the elements aligned under the banner of multiculturalism in Canada and the US are different from those familiar to Australians. To some extent, the difference can be measured in therms of a movement beetween ethnicity and race..

Gunning, Tom. 1991. D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Gur(Gour), Batya. 1992. The Saturday Morning Murder: A psychoanalytical Case. Translated by Dalya Bilu. New York: HarperCollins.

Titre hébreu: Retsah Be-Shabat ba-boker: Meurtre un samedi matin
37: Then there was the skinny man called Rosenfeld, Nahum, with the mane of white hair and the small, thin cigar that he never took out of his mouth, who reminded Michael of the senticen he had heard from his mother throughout his childhood: “Eat, Michael, eat so you won’t end up with no flesh on your bones and bad thoughts in your heard”, which was no doubt why he always felt uneasy and somewhat suspicious in the company of excessively thin people.
(…)
When Hildesheimer had finished introducing his colleagues he presented Michael to them, mentioning his rank, which did not seem to impress anyone, and saying that he was the police officer “in charge of investigating our tragedy”, then he said: “Chief Inspector Ohayon has kindly consented to join us in order to clarify certian matters, at my request, and help us in any way he can” In the ensuing silence, Michael leaned back in his chair, puffing on his cigarette, without daring to take a sip of the hot coffee in the cup standing in front of him. Everyone stared at him, and the air wa so thick with suspicion that he could almost touch it. These people, he tought, are not sure at all of my ability to solve anything and are full of prejudices about policemen and probably about people whose parents didn’t come from Europe.
At this point he called himself to order and warned his weaker side not to give way to irrelevant impulses, such as the need to make an impression.
51: But here he sensed that he had to proceed with the greatest possible delicacy, the only way to get onto the wavelength of the person sitting opposite him and pick up those ostensibly trivial things, the things people said between the lines and sometimes never said at all, that in the last analysis provided the master key to solving the mystery. And there was also what he heferred to as “my historical need”. In other words, the historian’s need to obtain a full picture, to see everything concerning human beings as part of an overall process, like a historical process possessing lawas of its own, which -he never tired of explaining- if ony we were able to grasp their meaning, provide us with the tools for going right to the heart of the problem.
The main thing in the initial stage of an investigation, Michael Ohayon would repeat to his subordinates- he never could define what he meant exactly but suceeded only in demonstrating it- the main thing, he stubbornly claimed, was to understand the people involved in the case. Even if his understanding might not seem to play any role in the investigation at first. Which was why he always why he always tried to penetrate as deeply as possible into the emotional and intellectual world under investigation. Superficially this was manifested by the fact that investigations of which he was in charge began too slowly, according to his superiors. Now, for example, he made no attempt to contact the members of his team, because he didn’t want to miss the meeting with Hildesheimer even for the sake of a new lead. He was unwilling to hear facts that might oblige him to cut short his conversation with the old man. He knew that one talk with Hildesheimer would help him to understand the siprit of the place where the murder had occured and the forces activating the characters more than would any fact discovered in the filed. Naturally, he was in conflict; he was tense, and he suspected that there would be a price to pay for his absence: he would have to explain himself, and he knew in advance that he would not be understood. Shorer, his immediate superior, was always attacking him for his “eccentricities”. But he was sure that he was right: you had to start slowly, with a kind of theoretical introduction, and speed things up, as much as possible, only later.
53: In 1937, when it was already clear what was going to happen, he had concluded his analytic training and was about to begin his professional life. He decided to emigrate to Palestine.
With him was a small group of people at a similar stage in their career. They had been preceded to Palestine by Stefan Deutsch, whose training and experience were more serious than theirs – “after all, he had undergone analysis with Ferenczi, a personal friend and disciple of Freud’s” (…)
54-55: It was a pioneering atmosphere. The financial situation and slowness of their professional advancement did not really bother any of them. Yes, there were tensions; that went without saying. The tensions were related mainly to Deutsch’s dominant personality but also to the conditions of the country. The heat was terrible. The dryness of the Jerusalem summers. There were language difficulties too. He glanced at the bookcase and wen on talking. All the seminars were held in German, and the therapy itself was conducted in a mixture of languages, including broken Hebrew-and he smiled his childish smile again. Now of course it was hard to imagine that then he had not known a word of Hebrew, but the effort! What an effort! Here, he paused to ask Micahel if he himself had been born in Israel.
No, but he had come to the country when he was three years old.
For children the language does not present such difficulties.
Yes, said the old man, and he looked at him keenly.
96-97: For the past few months, Ali had been working on Saturdays instead of Sundays. After doing his work quietly for a year withut asking for anything, he had succeeded in persuading the maintenance supervisor to agree to this special arrangment. No one woutside hte hospital knew about it. The supervisor was afraid of the Health Ministry’s reaction to so flagrant a breach of sanctity of the Sabbath. In the hospital books and work roster, the gardener was sisted as working on Sundays. Not that Ali was a believing Christian, as he presented himself; he simply wanted to be home and enjoy himself with his friends, wh had Sundays off from work. (…)
Until he reached the rosebush nearest the fence, everything was normal. He worked at a leisurely pace and basked in the sun. The ground was still a little muddy. And then, in the rosebush in the row next to the fence, he saw the gleam. Something was glittering there. He put out his hand and touched cold metal. When he saw the object in is hand, a little pearl-handled pistol, he acted fast. He looked to the right and left, and when he was sure nobody was watiching, he dropped the pistol and, with his foot, covered it with earth, then he squatted down next to the bush and considered his next move.
He did not know how the pistol had landed in the hospital gounds or how long it had been tangled there in the rosebush. But he knew very well the kind of trouble he could get into by finding it.
First he contemplated burying it deeper in the ground and pretending he had never seen it. But the thought that someone from the hospital would find it and he, the only gardener, would be called on to explain how it got there was too frightening to contempate.
Then he considered the possibility of taking it home with him and getting rid of it there. But because of the fine weather, he imagine that there would by many Jewish tourists and also may police on the roads between Jerusalem and what the Jews called the “territories”, and this thought frightened him to death. He thought, too, of the searches and arrests in the wake of the murder of the tourist in the Old City, which were probably still going on. He dug his fingers into the damp ground and wondered what to do. His younger brother had been arrested a few months before on suspicion of hostile activities. Nobody in the hospital knew about it. He realized that he would have no peace of mind until the pistol disappeared both from his sight and his thoughts. He didn’t want any trouble.
119: In the most formal tone of his repertoire and with all the civility of a British civil servant, Michael explained that he could not allow him to leave and suggested that he cancle all his appointmenets for the rest of the morning. The reaction was virulent. Things were said about “this country” where you got screwed for behaving like a good citizen and the oly way to survive was to “shut up and mind mind your own business” (…)
157: Michael pricked his ears and asked about the gardener’s relations with the pations, and Baum sang Ali’s praises at lenght. When asked were Ali could be found, he said he couln’t say; he only knew that Ali lived in Dehaisha. Ohayon shivered when he tought of the wretched conditions of the refugee camp, only a half hour away from Jerusalem.
163: He (…) asked the swithchboard operator to put him in touch with Bethlehem.
The Arab policeman who answered the phone connected him with the officer on duty, who sounded overjoyed to hear his voice.
“Ohayon, my dear fellow, how are you this morning? When are we going to see you? You haven’t visied us in agaes. Is there something I can do for you? Anyhting -just say the word!”.
Michael performed the social rites, inquired after the health of his wife and children, hoped the little one was over his pneumonia. In his mind’s eye, he saw the round face and vast paunch of Itzik Gidoni, renounwned amonth his cohorts for his geniality.
“You can put the water on to boil”, Michael joked. “I’m coming aournd for some real coffee.”
Cries of joy burst from the receiver.
“But first of all” -Michael grew serious- “you’ll have to locate one Ali Abu Mustafa from the Dehaisha camp.”
Gidoni, too changed his tone. “Have you got anything else on him? With them. Abu Mustafa is like Cohen or Levy.”
182: Michael was afraid that he wouldn’t manage with his Arabic. “You can’t conduct an interogation when you’re busy trying to convert Moroccan into Jorndanian Arabic; you have to be fluent and precise.
184-85: Michael looked at the slack limbs, at the eyes, which contaiened the defeated expression of someone who knew that the game was lost in advance. (…). After a long silece, he repeated the question. Michael, who understood Arab ic well but was always nervious about differences in accent and vocabulary, about missing nuances, kept his eyes fixed on the young gardener, who finally said that he was sick.
Eli inquired as to the nature of the sickness, and Ali pointed to his head and said that he had been feverish all night. After a slight hesitation, he asked if his absence from work was the reason for his arrest. There was no irony in the question. only the rsignation of a man who had grown used to the fact that you could be arrested for anything. Eli explaiened that the arrest wa snot political but connected to the investigation of a murder. (…)
Eli raised his eyes from the sheet of paper and the littel boxes that were rapidly filling it and asked what religious reasons could possibly make a muslim choose Sunday as his day off from work. Later he explained to Michael that the great majority of the population of Dehaisha were muslims, so he hadn’t taken much of a risk. Ali’s face looked gray as he stammered that most of his friends worked on Saturdays, so that the social life of the refugee camp and its environs took place mainly on Sundays. The answer was persuasive, but Eli looked skeptical and suddenly asked how long his brother had been in jail. The prisoner trembled and tried to explain that there was no justifications for his brother’s administrative detention. He wasn’t blaming the authorities, he said, only his brother; he was so young and foolish, he did not know what he was saying, and because of this he had been arrested on suspicion of rioting and incitement, whereas the trugh was that he didn’t even know how to throw a stone straight.
255: He spoke about his elderly parents, Holocaust survivors. About the fact that he was the eldest, the only son; his sister didn’t matter so much he explained, he was their “Kaddish”, the only one who would say the mourner’s prayer when they died”.(…)Alon spoke about the Hashomer Hatzair youth movements and the ieal of equality, about volunteering for tough combat units in the army as the highest value, about his distinction as a student, about his promotion in the army and the expectations that he would rise all the way to the top. (…)
Afterwards he spoke about his first day as military governor in the territories. He had signed a permit for an old peasant to grow olives on his ancestral land, and the peasant had looked at him in a way that mdade him feel like an arrogant fool.From day to day, said Alon, he had tried to make himself more insensitive, and he had succeeded, or so he believed when he sgned expulsion orders, when he forbade family unifications, “all in accordance with policy, just doing my job. And with the G.S.S. breathing down my neck all the time. I don’t know what your political opinons are, but it’s completely irrelevant, believe me. No one can be a liberal military governor; those are two mutually contradictory terms.
Titre hébreu: Retsah Be-Shabat ba-boker: Meurtre un samedi matin

37: Then there was the skinny man called Rosenfeld, Nahum, with the mane of white hair and the small, thin cigar that he never took out of his mouth, who reminded Michael of the senticen he had heard from his mother throughout his childhood: “Eat, Michael, eat so you won’t end up with no flesh on your bones and bad thoughts in your heard”, which was no doubt why he always felt uneasy and somewhat suspicious in the company of excessively thin people.
(…)
When Hildesheimer had finished introducing his colleagues he presented Michael to them, mentioning his rank, which did not seem to impress anyone, and saying that he was the police officer “in charge of investigating our tragedy”, then he said: “Chief Inspector Ohayon has kindly consented to join us in order to clarify certian matters, at my request, and help us in any way he can” In the ensuing silence, Michael leaned back in his chair, puffing on his cigarette, without daring to take a sip of the hot coffee in the cup standing in front of him. Everyone stared at him, and the air wa so thick with suspicion that he could almost touch it. These people, he tought, are not sure at all of my ability to solve anything and are full of prejudices about policemen and probably about people whose parents didn’t come from Europe.
At this point he called himself to order and warned his weaker side not to give way to irrelevant impulses, such as the need to make an impression.
51: But here he sensed that he had to proceed with the greatest possible delicacy, the only way to get onto the wavelength of the person sitting opposite him and pick up those ostensibly trivial things, the things people said between the lines and sometimes never said at all, that in the last analysis provided the master key to solving the mystery. And there was also what he heferred to as “my historical need”. In other words, the historian’s need to obtain a full picture, to see everything concerning human beings as part of an overall process, like a historical process possessing lawas of its own, which -he never tired of explaining- if ony we were able to grasp their meaning, provide us with the tools for going right to the heart of the problem.
The main thing in the initial stage of an investigation, Michael Ohayon would repeat to his subordinates- he never could define what he meant exactly but suceeded only in demonstrating it- the main thing, he stubbornly claimed, was to understand the people involved in the case. Even if his understanding might not seem to play any role in the investigation at first. Which was why he always why he always tried to penetrate as deeply as possible into the emotional and intellectual world under investigation. Superficially this was manifested by the fact that investigations of which he was in charge began too slowly, according to his superiors. Now, for example, he made no attempt to contact the members of his team, because he didn’t want to miss the meeting with Hildesheimer even for the sake of a new lead. He was unwilling to hear facts that might oblige him to cut short his conversation with the old man. He knew that one talk with Hildesheimer would help him to understand the siprit of the place where the murder had occured and the forces activating the characters more than would any fact discovered in the filed. Naturally, he was in conflict; he was tense, and he suspected that there would be a price to pay for his absence: he would have to explain himself, and he knew in advance that he would not be understood. Shorer, his immediate superior, was always attacking him for his “eccentricities”. But he was sure that he was right: you had to start slowly, with a kind of theoretical introduction, and speed things up, as much as possible, only later.
53: In 1937, when it was already clear what was going to happen, he had concluded his analytic training and was about to begin his professional life. He decided to emigrate to Palestine.
With him was a small group of people at a similar stage in their career. They had been preceded to Palestine by Stefan Deutsch, whose training and experience were more serious than theirs – “after all, he had undergone analysis with Ferenczi, a personal friend and disciple of Freud’s” (…)
54-55: It was a pioneering atmosphere. The financial situation and slowness of their professional advancement did not really bother any of them. Yes, there were tensions; that went without saying. The tensions were related mainly to Deutsch’s dominant personality but also to the conditions of the country. The heat was terrible. The dryness of the Jerusalem summers. There were language difficulties too. He glanced at the bookcase and wen on talking. All the seminars were held in German, and the therapy itself was conducted in a mixture of languages, including broken Hebrew-and he smiled his childish smile again. Now of course it was hard to imagine that then he had not known a word of Hebrew, but the effort! What an effort! Here, he paused to ask Micahel if he himself had been born in Israel.
No, but he had come to the country when he was three years old.
For children the language does not present such difficulties.
Yes, said the old man, and he looked at him keenly.
96-97: For the past few months, Ali had been working on Saturdays instead of Sundays. After doing his work quietly for a year withut asking for anything, he had succeeded in persuading the maintenance supervisor to agree to this special arrangment. No one woutside hte hospital knew about it. The supervisor was afraid of the Health Ministry’s reaction to so flagrant a breach of sanctity of the Sabbath. In the hospital books and work roster, the gardener was sisted as working on Sundays. Not that Ali was a believing Christian, as he presented himself; he simply wanted to be home and enjoy himself with his friends, wh had Sundays off from work. (…)
Until he reached the rosebush nearest the fence, everything was normal. He worked at a leisurely pace and basked in the sun. The ground was still a little muddy. And then, in the rosebush in the row next to the fence, he saw the gleam. Something was glittering there. He put out his hand and touched cold metal. When he saw the object in is hand, a little pearl-handled pistol, he acted fast. He looked to the right and left, and when he was sure nobody was watiching, he dropped the pistol and, with his foot, covered it with earth, then he squatted down next to the bush and considered his next move.
He did not know how the pistol had landed in the hospital gounds or how long it had been tangled there in the rosebush. But he knew very well the kind of trouble he could get into by finding it.
First he contemplated burying it deeper in the ground and pretending he had never seen it. But the thought that someone from the hospital would find it and he, the only gardener, would be called on to explain how it got there was too frightening to contempate.
Then he considered the possibility of taking it home with him and getting rid of it there. But because of the fine weather, he imagine that there would by many Jewish tourists and also may police on the roads between Jerusalem and what the Jews called the “territories”, and this thought frightened him to death. He thought, too, of the searches and arrests in the wake of the murder of the tourist in the Old City, which were probably still going on. He dug his fingers into the damp ground and wondered what to do. His younger brother had been arrested a few months before on suspicion of hostile activities. Nobody in the hospital knew about it. He realized that he would have no peace of mind until the pistol disappeared both from his sight and his thoughts. He didn’t want any trouble.
119: In the most formal tone of his repertoire and with all the civility of a British civil servant, Michael explained that he could not allow him to leave and suggested that he cancle all his appointmenets for the rest of the morning. The reaction was virulent. Things were said about “this country” where you got screwed for behaving like a good citizen and the oly way to survive was to “shut up and mind mind your own business” (…)
157: Michael pricked his ears and asked about the gardener’s relations with the pations, and Baum sang Ali’s praises at lenght. When asked were Ali could be found, he said he couln’t say; he only knew that Ali lived in Dehaisha. Ohayon shivered when he tought of the wretched conditions of the refugee camp, only a half hour away from Jerusalem.
163: He (…) asked the swithchboard operator to put him in touch with Bethlehem.
The Arab policeman who answered the phone connected him with the officer on duty, who sounded overjoyed to hear his voice.
“Ohayon, my dear fellow, how are you this morning? When are we going to see you? You haven’t visied us in agaes. Is there something I can do for you? Anyhting -just say the word!”.
Michael performed the social rites, inquired after the health of his wife and children, hoped the little one was over his pneumonia. In his mind’s eye, he saw the round face and vast paunch of Itzik Gidoni, renounwned amonth his cohorts for his geniality.
“You can put the water on to boil”, Michael joked. “I’m coming aournd for some real coffee.”
Cries of joy burst from the receiver.
“But first of all” -Michael grew serious- “you’ll have to locate one Ali Abu Mustafa from the Dehaisha camp.”
Gidoni, too changed his tone. “Have you got anything else on him? With them. Abu Mustafa is like Cohen or Levy.”
182: Michael was afraid that he wouldn’t manage with his Arabic. “You can’t conduct an interogation when you’re busy trying to convert Moroccan into Jorndanian Arabic; you have to be fluent and precise.
184-85: Michael looked at the slack limbs, at the eyes, which contaiened the defeated expression of someone who knew that the game was lost in advance. (…). After a long silece, he repeated the question. Michael, who understood Arab ic well but was always nervious about differences in accent and vocabulary, about missing nuances, kept his eyes fixed on the young gardener, who finally said that he was sick.
Eli inquired as to the nature of the sickness, and Ali pointed to his head and said that he had been feverish all night. After a slight hesitation, he asked if his absence from work was the reason for his arrest. There was no irony in the question. only the rsignation of a man who had grown used to the fact that you could be arrested for anything. Eli explaiened that the arrest wa snot political but connected to the investigation of a murder. (…)
Eli raised his eyes from the sheet of paper and the littel boxes that were rapidly filling it and asked what religious reasons could possibly make a muslim choose Sunday as his day off from work. Later he explained to Michael that the great majority of the population of Dehaisha were muslims, so he hadn’t taken much of a risk. Ali’s face looked gray as he stammered that most of his friends worked on Saturdays, so that the social life of the refugee camp and its environs took place mainly on Sundays. The answer was persuasive, but Eli looked skeptical and suddenly asked how long his brother had been in jail. The prisoner trembled and tried to explain that there was no justifications for his brother’s administrative detention. He wasn’t blaming the authorities, he said, only his brother; he was so young and foolish, he did not know what he was saying, and because of this he had been arrested on suspicion of rioting and incitement, whereas the trugh was that he didn’t even know how to throw a stone straight.
255: He spoke about his elderly parents, Holocaust survivors. About the fact that he was the eldest, the only son; his sister didn’t matter so much he explained, he was their “Kaddish”, the only one who would say the mourner’s prayer when they died”.(…)Alon spoke about the Hashomer Hatzair youth movements and the ieal of equality, about volunteering for tough combat units in the army as the highest value, about his distinction as a student, about his promotion in the army and the expectations that he would rise all the way to the top. (…)
Afterwards he spoke about his first day as military governor in the territories. He had signed a permit for an old peasant to grow olives on his ancestral land, and the peasant had looked at him in a way that mdade him feel like an arrogant fool.From day to day, said Alon, he had tried to make himself more insensitive, and he had succeeded, or so he believed when he sgned expulsion orders, when he forbade family unifications, “all in accordance with policy, just doing my job. And with the G.S.S. breathing down my neck all the time. I don’t know what your political opinons are, but it’s completely irrelevant, believe me. No one can be a liberal military governor; those are two mutually contradictory terms.

Guy, Gregory. 1988. Coping with Diversity: Australia and the Soviet Union. In The Rights of Peoples, edited by J. Crawford. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

453: Essentially, the equation of “one nation=one language” was an invention of the nineteenth century, a by-product of the rise of European nationalism
454: The monolingual model was first applied as a political principle in the Versailles Treaty, which redrew the map of Europe after World War I. (…) The outcome of this process is that, in the course of the past century, a few cases of linguistically imperialist peoples who had established relatively monolingual but powerful states, have been promulgated as a model for the world. This monolingual model is inappropriate for the ethnically diverse United States, a nation of immigrant and indigenous peoples who originally spoke hundreds of different languages, a nation that has never been monolingual.
452:In the ancient world, all major states and empires were multilingual. Egypt, Persia, China, and Babylon all included among their subjects speakers of dozens of languages.
453:The roman Empire encompassed speakers of Italic, Greek,  Celtic, Basque, Semitic, Slavic, and Germanic languages, among others. Native speakers of of Latin were a small fraction of the population of the empire.(…=)The major medieval and early modern states were also polyglot entities )…)In the modern world the same picture still obtains. Nations like China, India, The Soviet Union, Nigeria, and Indonesia all include speakers of not five or ten different languages, but rather fifty or a hundred, and not small numbers of speakers, but millions. Linguistic diversity is therefore the moral human experience. Historically, most human beings have lived in close contact with speakers of other languages. This fact is madly at odds with the basic rationale underlying the English Only movement, namely that a nation should have just one language.

Guy, Gregory R. . 1989. International Perspectives on Linguistic Diversity and Language Rights. Language Problems and Language Planning (Spri ng):45.

Guy, Gregory R., Feagin Crawford, Deborah Schiffrin, and John Baugh, eds. 1997. Towards a Social Science of Language: Papers in honor of William Labov. : Social interaction and discourse structures. 2 vols, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 127-128.

This is a two-volume collection of original research papers designed to reflect the breadth and depth of the impact that William Labov has had on linguistic science. Four areas of ‘Labovian’ linguistics are addressed: First is the study of variation andchange; the papers in sections I and II of the first volume take this as their central theme, with a focus on either the social
context and uses of language (I) or on the the internal linguistic dynamics of variation and change (II). The study of African American English, and other language varieties in the Americas spoken by people of African descent and influenced by their linguistic heritage, is the subject of the papers in section III of the first volume. The third theme is the study of discourse; the papers in section I of the second volume develop themes in Labovian linguistics that go back to Labov’s work on narrative, descriptive, and therapeutic discourse. Fourth is the emphasis on language use, the search for discursive, interactive, and meaningful determinants of the complexity in human communication. Papers with these themes appear in section II of the second volume. Contributors volume 1: Peter Trudgill; Anthony Kroch; Penelope Eckert; Raymond Mougeon; Niloofar Haeri; Claude Paradis; Crawford Feagin; Junko Hibiya; Charles Ferguson; Fernando Tarallo; Gregory R. Guy; Richard C. Steiner; Malcah Yaeger-Dror; Philip F. Seitz; Derek Bickerton; Peter Patrick; John Rickford; Ralph Fasold; John Baugh. Contributors
volume 2 : Charlotte Linde; Emanuel A. Schegloff; Deborah Schiffrin; Anne Bower; Marjorie Harness Goodwin; Barbara M.
Horvath; Roger W. Shuy; E. Judith Weiner; Sylvie Dubois & David Sankoff; John Gumperz; Maria Luiza Braga & Marco
Antonio de Oliveira; Ellen F. Prince; John Myhill; Sally Boyd; Shana Poplack; Benji Wald.

Gwyn, Richard. 1980. The Northern Magus. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Cité par Bissoondath, N. (1995). Le Marché aux Illusions: la méprise du multiculturalisme. Montréal, Boréal – Liber, p. 54:
139: Après 1972, Trudeau ne cherchait plus à faire ce qui était juste, rationnellement, mais ce qui était politiquement avantageux (…). Il avait été accusé de vouloir écarrter les ethnies? Il instaurait une politique multiculturelle inflationiste fonctionnant comme une sorte de caisse occulte où on puisait l’argent pour acherter les votes ethniques.

Gyldén, Axel. 2000. Brésil: Un géant du XXIème siècle. Le Point Edition Affaires avec Business Week, 21 avril, 74-79.